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Case No. 20110481-CA
INTHE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
DEBRA BROWN,
Petitioner/ Appellee & Cross-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/ Appellant & Cross-Appellee.

Reply Brief of Appellant
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner asserts that "the only window of time" during which she could
not prove her whereabouts was between "6:4c a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on Saturday
November 6,1993." Petitioner's Br. at 13. But Petitioner ignores evidence from
two independent witnesses who saw her at Lael's home between 11:15 a.m. and
noon on Saturday, when she claimed to have been at her son's basketball game.
TR.598-600 [89-91], 630-33, 1687-92; PCR.2257:83. She also ignores the fact that
her son Ryan Buttars — who perjured himself at her trial —provided the only
corroboration for her claim that she arrived home shortly after midnight on
Sunday morning. TR.913, 920-21.
Petitioner claims that "[t]he testimony of Paulette Nyman

was

unquestionably newly discovered evidence." Petitioner's Br. at 13. But the post-
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conviction court found that Nyman's testimony was not newly discovered given
Nyman's admission at trial that she told a defense investigator she was unsure
whether she heard the shots on Saturday or Sunday morning. TR.590-92 [81-83];
PCR.1822-23.
Petitioner declares that the medical examiner "completely discredited the
State's theory that Lael Brown was murdered Saturday morning." Petitioner's
Br. at 14. But the medical examiner testified at trial, and reaffirmed in the factual
innocence hearing, that he was comfortable placing the time of death anywhere
between 9 p.m. on Friday, November 5tn and 3 a.m. on Sunday, November 7th.
TR.1489; PCR.2256:69.
Petitioner states that the post-conviction court found it "highly probable"
that Terry Carlsen "accurately remembered seeing Lael in Angie's restaurant on
Saturday, November 6th." Petitioner's Br. at 16 (citing PCR.2127). The postconviction court actually found that "[o]verall ... Carlsen's testimony ... is not
sufficiently credible to independently establish by clear and convincing evidence
that Lael was alive" on Saturday evening. PCR.2129.
Relying solely on her own testimony at the factual innocence hearing,
Petitioner claims that Lael's son Mike also had a key to Lael's house. Petitioner's
Br. at 19 (citing PCR.2257:73). But Mike testified that he returned his key in
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March 1992 when he moved out of Lael's house, and that he did not have a key
in November 1993 when Lael was murdered. PCR.226L37-38.
Petitioner states that Detective Ridler testilled that many of Lael's bank
statements were missing. Petitioner's Br. at 21. She claims that a chart that
Detective Ridler prepared (Petitioner's Exhibit 2, tab 59) showed that "multiple
checks and bank statements were missing." Id. But Petitioner ignores that all of
the missing checks identified on that exhibit were made out to her.
PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 2, tab 59. She also ignores that the exhibit shows only
two bank statements missing, the September and October 1993 statements, both
of which contained checks that Petitioner now admits having forged.
PCR.2257:74-75.
Petitioner claims that "[n]ewly discovered evidence also showed that the
October 1993 bank statement ... was not received at Lael Brown's house until
after his murder." Petitioner's Br. at 22. But Petitioner produced no evidence of
when Lael's October 1993 bank statement was mailed, likely because neither
police nor Lael's family ever received that original statement. TR.591-92 [42-43];
PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Tab 59.

Rather, Petitioner's assertion is an

extrapolation based on postmarked envelopes that contained Lael's bank
statements from other months in 1993.

PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Tab 9.

Petitioner produced no evidence directly contradicting bank and postal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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employees' trial testimony that the October statement would have arrived by at
least Friday, 5 November 1993. TR.767-68, 773, 776.

1

Petitioner posits that police did not investigate Bobby Sheen's possible
involvement in Lael's murder and never disclosed his possible involvement to

1

her trial counsel. Petitioner's Br. at 23. But Petitioner admitted in her deposition
that she viewed Sheen as a suspect and communicated this to her defense team.
PCR.2270:71-72,11, 95.l And Shannon Demler, the only surviving member of her
defense team, testified that the defense team investigated Sheen. PCR.1031;
i

2256:81-82.
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S POINTS la & 1c
Relying exclusively on section 78B-9-404, Petitioner argues that "nothing in
the statute compels or even supports" a requirement that newly discovered
evidence demonstrate or establish factual innocence. Petitioner's Br. at 27. She
also contends that both Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25, Tf 1 13-14, 226 P.3d 743,
and the 2012 amendments to the factual innocence statutes, support her assertion
that newly discovered evidence did not have to demonstrate her innocence. Id.
at 28-31. She also contends that as long as a petitioner alleges some newly
discovered evidence in her petition, a post-conviction court can base its
determination on any evidence, old or new, because the pleading requirements
1

Petitioner's deposition transcript is designated as both PCR.2270 and
Respondent's Exhibit 8.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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^

in section 78B-9-402(2)(a) are separate from section 78B-9-404(4)'s directive that
the court consider ''all the evidence" at a factual innocence hearing. Id. at 33-36.
Petitioner misreads the statutes because she ignores the well-established
principle that proper "'interpretation of a statute requires that each part or
section be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to
produce a harmonious whole!" State ex rel J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, If 13, 697 Utah Adv.
Rep. 60 (quoting Anderson v. Bell, 2010 UT 47, f 9, 234 P.3d 1147) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Petitioner's argument depends on reading section
78B-9-404 in isolation and ignoring section 78B-9-402, which requires a petitioner
to allege that "newly discovered material evidence" both "establishes" and
"demonstrates" factual innocence. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(i) &
(v).

When properly read, the factual innocence statutes require that newly

discovered evidence be the pivotal evidence that establishes and demonstrates
factual innocence. See State's Opening Br. at 36-42.
Miller v. State, does not support Petitioner's assertion that old evidence
could demonstrate her innocence. Miller was convicted of aggravated robbery
and appealed. 2010 UT App 25, % % 2-3. While his appeal was pending, the State
stipulated to summary reversal and later dismissed the charges. Id. f 4. Miller
filed a factual innocence petition, but the State moved to dismiss it, arguing that
it was not based on any newly discovered evidence as required by section 78B-9-
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402(2)(a). Id. ^ 5. The post-conviction court agreed and dismissed the petition.
Id.
The court of appeals reversed based on its interpretation of section 78B-9402(2)(b). Id. f 19. In 2008, section 78B-9-402(2)(a) required a convicted felon's
factual innocence petition to be based on newly discovered evidence; but
subsection (2)(b) stated "simply that a petitioner whose conviction has been
reversed or vacated and is not facing trial or appeal 'may also file a petition
under this part'"

Id. \ \ 13-14 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402(2)(b)

(2008)). The court of appeals held that unlike subsection (2) (a), subsection (2)(b)
contained no newly discovered evidence requirement.

See id. And, because

Miller—having already obtained a reversal —was proceeding under subsection
(2)(b), his petition did not have to be based on newly discovered evidence. See id.
Unlike Miller, Petitioner's conviction had not been reversed when she filed
her petition. She therefore was not exempt from the newly discovered evidence
requirement.
Petitioner cites Miller for the proposition that the State cannot "write a
newly discovered evidence requirement into a section of the statute that did not
include this requirement/' Petitioner's Br. at 28. But the State is not asking the
Court to write in a nonexistent requirement. Rather, it is asking the Court to
follow well-established statutory construction rules and interpret the factual

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

innocence statutes as a whole, and in harmony with the rest of the PCRA. See
J.M.S., 2011 UT 75,113.
Petitioner also claims that the 2012 amendments to the factual innocence
statute demonstrate that (1) before the amendments, "there was no requirement
in the statute that newly discovered evidence form any basis of an actual
innocence determination/' and (2) the Legislature again refused to require newly
discovered evidence to be the "sole or primary evidence on which an innocence
determination is based." Petitioner's Br. at 30-31. On the contrary, to the extent
that the 2012 amendments are relevant to this case, they demonstrate the
Legislature's intent to correct the post-conviction court's misunderstanding that,
as long as the court included some newly discovered evidence in its reasoning,
then the court could rely on previously available evidence as the pivotal
evidence that established Petitioner's innocence.
The post-conviction court ruled that newly discovered evidence only had
to provide "part" of the basis for a factual innocence determination. PCR.2115.
In its first session following this ruling, the Legislature unanimously passed H.B.
307, which, among other things, amended section 78B-9-404(8)(b) to require that
a court "may not find the petitioner to be factually innocent unless .... the
determination is based upon the newly discovered material evidence described
in the petition."

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-404(8)(b) (2012); see also
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http://le.utah.gov/-2012/status/hbillsta/hb0307.htm
2012).

The Legislature also left undisturbed

(last visited 25 May
section 78B-9-402(2)(a)'s

*

requirements that a petition specifically describe the newly discovered material
evidence that "establishes" and "demonstrates" factual innocence. See id. § 78B-

1

9-402(2012).
Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the 2012 amendments do not
demonstrate the Legislature's refusal to require newly discovered evidence to
"be the sole or primary evidence on which an innocence determination is based."
i

Petitioner's Br. at 31. As amended, section 78B-9-404(8)(b) explicitly prevents a
court from finding a petitioner factually innocent unless "the determination is
i

based upon the newly discovered material evidence described in the petition,
pursuant to section 78B-9-402." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-404(8)(b) (2012).
Thus, the amendments make even clearer the Legislature's intent that a factual
innocence determination must be "based upon the newly discovered material
evidence described in the petition." See id.
To the extent that this Court considers the 2012 amendments, it must view
them as evidence of the Legislature's intent when it originally enacted the factual
innocence statutes. "When a statute is amended, the amendment is persuasive
evidence of the legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended
statute." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 486 (Utah 1988), overruled on other grounds
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

as recognized by State v. Baker, 884 P.2d 1280,1283 (Utah 1994). Indeed, in addition
to the well-established rules of reading a statue as a whole and in harmony with
related statutes, "[t]he evolution of a statute through amendment by our
Legislature may also shed light on a statute's intended meaning/'

State v.

Carreno, 2006 UT 59, f 11,144 P.3d 1152.
The Legislature's swift and unanimous action demonstrates its intent to
correct the post-conviction court's misinterpretation of the factual innocence
statutes. Had the post-conviction court interpreted the statutes as the Legislature
intended, then there would have been no need to amend them. Therefore, to the
extent that they are relevant, the 2012 amendments demonstrate that the postconviction court misinterpreted the prior version of the factual innocence
statutes.
Petitioner asserts that the Attorney General's Office "lobbied" for the 2012
amendments to be "retroactive." Petitioner's Br. at 30. Petitioner misrepresents
the facts. At the 3 February 2012 meeting of the House Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice Standing Committee, Scott Reed, the Office's Criminal Justice
Division Chief, addressed H.B. 307.

See audio recording of the hearing at

05:30-17:40 available at http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
view_id=31&clip_id=599 (last visited 31 May 2012). Representative Arent asked
Reed if the amendments would impact "cases ... pending before the Utah
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Supreme Court."

Id. at 16:11-17:40.

Reed responded, "No."

Id. He also

explained that the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, not the
Attorney General's Office, inserted the language that apparently created the
impression that the amendments might apply retroactively. Id.

<

REPLY TO PETITIONER'S POINTS lb & Id
Petitioner also contends that the State's reading of the statutes is
i

inconsistent with the statutes7 purpose of freeing innocent prisoners, and leads to
the absurd result of denying an innocent person relief merely because previously
i

available, rather than newly discovered

evidence demonstrates

factual

innocence. Petitioner's Br. at 31-39. She contends that her case demonstrates this
absurd result. Id. at 36-39. On the contrary, the State's reading is consistent with

'

the statutes7 purposes of freeing innocent prisoners while preventing needless
do-overs of criminal trials. And Petitioner's case does not exemplify an absurd

,

result because, as explained, her previously available evidence —Del Hall's
testimony — did not clearly and convincingly establish her factual innocence.
.<

Even her post-conviction counsel did not see Hall's testimony as clear and
convincing evidence of her innocence until the post-conviction court sua sponte
suggested that it might be.
The purpose of the factual innocence statutes is not only to free prisoners
who can demonstrate their factual innocence, but also to prevent needless doDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

overs of criminal trials based on evidence that a petitioner could have presented
at trial, but did not. The statutes ensure that jury verdicts are afforded the "high
deference" to which they are entitled and are set aside under only the most
compelling circumstances. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, | 38, 70 P.3d 111.
This interpretation does not lead to absurd results or keep innocent
prisoners incarcerated. The newly discovered evidence requirement would only
prevent an allegedly innocent petitioner from proceeding if she had deliberately
chosen not to present evidence at trial that she now contends demonstrates her
innocence. As explained in the State's Opening Brief, a factual innocence petition
must be based on "newly discovered material evidence," which is "evidence that
was not available to the petitioner at trial." UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-401.5(3),
-402(2) (a); State's Opening Br. at 36-42. Petitioner argues that this definition
refers only to evidence that was available to the petitioner herself, regardless of
whether it was also available to her defense counsel. Petitioner's Br. at 41.
Assuming, without conceding, that Petitioner's interpretation is correct, then the
only time evidence would not qualify as newly discovered is when a petitioner
could have presented it at trial, but deliberately chose not to. Therefore, the
statute would only bar a claim based on evidence that a petitioner deliberately
withheld at trial.
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But if evidence exists that clearly and convincingly establishes a
petitioner's innocence, and that evidence is available to the petitioner at trial,
then a petitioner would not logically withhold it. A decision to consciously
withhold evidence at trial signals that the evidence is not clear and convincing
evidence of innocence.
Petitioner's case is not an example of an absurd result because, as
explained in both the State's Opening Brief and below, Del Hall's testimony did
not clearly and convincingly establish her innocence. See State's Opening Br. at
47-54. Petitioner's defense team knew of Hall and chose not to call him at trial.
PCR.2135-36; 2261:9-10. Even Petitioner's post-conviction counsel did not allege
or argue that Hall's testimony established her factual innocence until the postconviction court suggested the issue sua sponte. PCR.1-9; 2120-21 n.14. Hall's
testimony did not clearly and convincingly establish Petitioner's factual
innocence. Rather, as explained in the State's Opening Brief, a reasonable juror
could have easily found that Hall was mistaken about seeing Lael at Angie's on
Saturday afternoon. See State's Opening Br. at 48-49. And a reasonable juror
could have also found that Petitioner murdered Lael sometime after Hall
supposedly saw him on Saturday afternoon.

See id. at 52-54. Therefore, as

Petitioner's case demonstrates, requiring a factual innocence determination to be
based on newly discovered evidence does not produce an absurd result.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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REPLY TO PETITIONER'S POINT l e
Petitioner contends that even if a factual innocence determination must be
based on newly discovered evidence, Del Hall's testimony qualified as newly
discovered because her trial counsel allegedly "did not know that Del Hall saw
Lael Brown alive on Saturday/' Petitioner's Br. at 39. On the contrary, her trial
counsel Shannon Demler testified that, although he could not now remember
information about Hall specifically, the defense team was "aware of information
of who had seen Mr. Brown at Angie's." PCR.2256:87. More importantly, Hall
himself testified that he had met with Petitioner's lead defense counsel, John
Caine, before trial. PCR.2261:9, 16. Therefore, Hall's own testimony establishes
that the defense team was not only aware of him, but had interviewed him.
Petitioner contends that Hall's testimony nevertheless qualifies as newly
discovered because, even if her defense team knew of Hall, she did not.
Petitioner's Br. at 40. But Petitioner ignores the post-conviction court's factual
finding that she did not establish that Hall's testimony was unavailable to her.
PCR.2129-30. The post-conviction court found that Petitioner "did not carry her
burden of establishing that she was unaware of Hall as a potential witness or that
Hall was not available to testify at trial." PCR.2129-30.
This Court should accept this finding because Petitioner ignores it and
therefore does not even attempt to carry her burden to demonstrate that it is
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clearly erroneous.

Petitioner's Br. at 40-41; see Martinez v. Media-Paymaster

Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, \ 19, 164 P.3d 384

(

("[P]arties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing
court will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings/').

1

To support her claim that she personally did not know about Hall's
testimony, Petitioner cites her own testimony that her defense team did not
generally inform her of either the police investigation or their own investigation.
Petitioner's Br. at 40. But she does not attempt to marshal all of the evidence
i

supporting the post-conviction court's finding and then demonstrate why that
finding was clearly erroneously in light of all of the evidence.

See State v.

Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 60, 28 P.3d 1278 (explaining a party's burden when
challenging a factual finding). For example, Petitioner ignores that Hall was
listed on the defense witness list, was subpoenaed to testify, and was available
and willing to testify at trial. PCR.2263 (Respondent's Exhibit 7); 2261:10. She
also ignores that she introduced no evidence showing that she was unaware of
any of these facts, or unaware of Hall himself.

Petitioner never testified

specifically about her knowledge of Hall because, at the original four-day
hearing, she did not contend that Hall's testimony established her factual
innocence.

And even after the post-conviction court raised the issue and
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reopened the factual innocence hearing, Petitioner introduced no evidence that
she was personally unaware of Hall
Hall's testimony cannot qualify as newly discovered where the postconviction court found that the evidence was available to Petitioner, and she
does not show that this finding was clearly erroneous. See Widdison, 2001 UT 60,
160.
REPLY TO PETITIONER'S POINT 2
Petitioner first argues, without analysis, that clear error is the appropriate
standard

of review

for

the post-conviction

court's

factual

innocence

determination. Petitioner's Br. at 42. Second, relying on the evidence from the
initial four-day hearing, Petitioner contends that the questions she raised about
the State's circumstantial case against her at trial were sufficient to demonstrate
her innocence. Id. at 42-43. Third, she argues that the evidence at the reopened
hearing established her innocence because it showed that Lael was alive on
Saturday afternoon, and that she had adequately accounted for her whereabouts
after 10 a.m. on Saturday morning. Id. at 43-44. Finally, Petitioner asserts that
the State is estopped from arguing that she could have murdered Lael sometime,
other than Saturday morning. Id. at 45-48. Petitioner's claims lack merit.
Applicable standard of review. Petitioner first argues that the applicable
standard of review is clear error. Petitioner's Br. at 42. But that standard applies
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only when a court reviews purely factual questions. See State v. Levin, 2006 UT
50, f 20, 144 P.3d 1096. The clear error standard does not apply in this case,
because the State is not challenging any of the post-conviction court's factual
findings. Rather, the State challenges only the court's legal conclusions based on
its factual findings.
A factual innocence determination is a mixed question of law and fact. See
Levin, 2006 UT 50, lj 21. A mixed question of law and fact arises when an
appellate court reviews "a trial court's application of a legal concept to a given
set of facts." Id. A factual innocence determination presents a mixed question
because it requires a court to apply a legal standard —the factual innocence
definition-to a set of facts. See id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-401.5(2) & -404(4).
When this Court reviews a mixed question of law and fact, "the amount of
deference that results will vary according to the nature of the legal concept at
issue."

See Levin, 2006 UT 50, ^f 21. This Court examines three factors to

determine the appropriate amount of deference:
(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the
legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's
application of the legal rule relies on 'facts' observed by the trial
judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the
record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that
weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts.
See id. at % 25 (quotations and citations omitted).
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Application of these factors in this case favors granting little if any
deference to a factual innocence determination. The first two factors may weigh
in favor of granting deference to the post-conviction court's determination. But
while the post-conviction court must judge the demeanor of witnesses at the
factual innocence hearing, it must also consider "the record of the original
criminal case." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-404(3). And the post-conviction court
is no better situated to review that record than an appellate court.
Moreover, "[e]ven where a case for appellate deference is strong under the
first two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless lead [this Court] to limit
that deference." See Levin, 2006 UT 50, f 26. Such policy considerations include
situations where "uniform application" of legal standards "is of high
importance."

See id. ^ 23.

In Levin, these policy considerations required

application of the non-deferential "correctness" standard to the mixed question
of whether a defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation. Id. ^ 41-42.
Those same policy considerations weigh in favor of applying that standard here.
Uniform application of the factual innocence standard is critically
important. The factual innocence statutes provide an extraordinary remedy for
an extraordinary circumstance. See State's Opening Br. at 39-40. Unlike the
PCRA's general provisions, the factual innocence statutes have no limitations
period or procedural bars and grant a complete exoneration and monetary
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compensation. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-404(4)(a), -405(l)(a).

Non-uniform

application of this extraordinary remedy could lead to the erroneous reversal of
criminal convictions and raise equal protection concerns. The ruling in this case
demonstrates that lower courts require guidance as to what constitutes clear and
convincing evidence of factual innocence. Therefore, this Court should grant no
deference/or at least only limited deference to the ruling in this case. See Levin,
2006 UT 50, If 21.
Evidence from the first four days of the hearing. Relying on evidence
from the first four days of the factual innocence hearing, Petitioner next argues
that she established her factual innocence because she disproved the State's
circumstantial case presented at her trial. Petitioner's Br. at 42-43. But as the
post-conviction court found, this argument failed because Petitioner based it on
an incorrect legal standard: that her evidence only had to establish that no
reasonable juror could have found her guilty. PCR.2115. As the post-conviction
court determined — but as Petitioner ignores —her evidence about the security of
Lad's house, the possibility of other suspects, and the mailing of bank statements
for months other than October, did not satisfy the correct legal standard: a
showing that she did not murder Lael. PCR.2115-19.
Evidence at the reopened hearing.

Third, Petitioner argues that her

evidence at the reopened hearing established that Lael was alive on Saturday
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afternoon. Petitioner's Br. at 43-44. But Petitioner misrepresents a key detail of
the post-conviction court's ruling.

Petitioner asserts that she called two

witnesses at the reopened hearing — Carlsen and Hall—"who testified that they
saw [Lael] alive on Saturday afternoon/' and that "the trial court found that these
witnesses were credible." Id. at 43. On the contrary, the post-conviction court
found that Carlsen's testimony was not credible and discounted his testimony
for good reasons: Carlsen was Petitioner's friend, he failed to come forward
earlier, and he had been convicted of witness tampering. PCR.2135-36.
The post-conviction court's determination hinged entirely on Dei Hail's
testimony. But, as explained, Petitioner's defense team knew of Hall and chose
not to call him at trial. PCR.2135-36; 2261:9-10. And even Petitioner's postconviction counsel did not allege that Hall's testimony established her innocence
until the post-conviction court suggested the possibility. PCR.1-9; 2120-21 n.14.
Hall's testimony did not clearly and convincingly establish Petitioner's factual
innocence, because substantial evidence, detailed in the State's Opening Brief,
contradicted Hall's assertion that he saw Lael at Angie's on Saturday afternoon.
See State's Opening Br. at 48-49.

Because a reasonable juror could have easily

found that Hall was mistaken about seeing Lael at Angie's, Hall's testimony did
not clearly and convincingly establish that Petitioner did not murder Lael.
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Moreover, as also explained, even if Petitioner did not murder Lael on
Saturday morning, Hall's testimony did not establish that Petitioner did not
murder him at some other time. Even if the State's evidence about the timing of
the murder was incorrect, the other evidence still implicated only Petitioner.
Petitioner's access to Lael's house has never been disputed, Lael's missing
financial documents implicated only Petitioner, and she now admits that she lied
about forging Lael's checks.
Petitioner claims that she did not murder Lael some other time because she
adequately established her whereabouts after 10 a.m. on Saturday morning.
Petitioner's Br. at 45-47. But the only evidence of her whereabouts came from
herself, her boyfriend — Brent Skabelund, and her son—Ryan Buttars.
Skabelund and Buttars had a motive to lie for Petitioner.

Both

Indeed, Buttars

perjured himself for Petitioner by falsely testifying at trial that he saw Lael write
a $1000 check to Petitioner that Petitioner now admits she forged.

TR.902;

PCR.2257:74-75. Buttars provides the only corroboration for Petitioner's claim
that she arrived home shortly after midnight on Sunday morning. TR.913, 92021. And, according to the medical examiner, Petitioner could have murdered
Lael any time before 3 a.m. Sunday morning. TR.1486-89. Therefore, Hall's
testimony did not clearly and convincingly establish that Petitioner did not
murder Lael.
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Petitioner claims that the State has never before asserted that Petitioner
murdered Lael sometime other than Saturday morning, and that no evidence
supports that theory. Petitioner's Br. at 45-47. On the contrary, as explained
above, even if the State's timing evidence was off, the remaining evidence still
supported the State's theory that Petitioner murdered Lael. And Petitioner's
admission that she lied to police about the forgeries reinforces her guilt.
Petitioner's argument ignores her burden of proof. Even assuming that
Petitioner proved she did not murder Lael on Saturday morning, that showing
did not shift the burden to the State to prove that she murdered Lael at some
other time. Rather, Petitioner always bore the burden to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that she "did not engage in the conduct for which [she]
was convicted." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-401.5(2)(a). Thus, regardless of
the State's trial theory about the time of the murder, Petitioner could establish
her factual innocence only by demonstrating that she did not murder Lael at any
time. See id.
Moreover, the State did not introduce evidence at trial that the murder
could have occurred at some other time, because the State did not need to. If
Petitioner had presented evidence at trial that Lael might have been alive
Saturday afternoon, then the State could and would have developed and
introduced evidence to refute her account of her whereabouts after 10 a.m. on
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Saturday. For example, the State could have called Lael's granddaughter to
testify that she saw Petitioner's truck at Lael's home from 11:15 a.m. to 11:45
a.m. — when Petitioner claimed to be at her son's basketball game. TR.1687-92.
The State also would have emphasized that the presence of the soup on Lael's
porch on Sunday morning undermined any theory that he was alive Saturday
afternoon. If Lael were alive Saturday afternoon, then he would have had to step
over the soup at least once, and perhaps twice without bringing it in. See State's
Opening Br. at 49.
Petitioner's argument highlights the problem with the post-conviction
court's reliance on evidence that Petitioner knew about but did not present at
trial. The post-conviction court set aside a jury verdict based on evidence that
could have been presented at trial.
Estoppel,

Finally, Petitioner argues that the State is estopped from

asserting that she murdered Lael sometime other than Saturday morning.
Petitioner's Br. at 47-48. She again attempts to shirk her burden of proof. As
explained, a factual innocence determination does not depend on what the State
did or did not claim at trial. Rather, the determination depends on whether
Petitioner's newly discovered evidence clearly and convincingly established that
she did not murder Lael at any time. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-401.5(2),
-404(l)(b).
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Brief of Cross-Appellee
Petitioner cross-appeals from the granting of the State's summary
judgment motion and the resulting dismissal of her general PCRA claims as
untimely. PCR.1807-50.
PETITIONER'S ISSUES
The undisputed facts demonstrated that Petitioner and her counsel did
nothing to pursue her post-conviction claims for over six years when, in July
2008, Petitioner's counsel requested and received access to the Logan Police
Department's file. Petitioner's post-conviction claims were all based on evidence
either already known to Petitioner, or contained in the police file.
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Petitioner's claims
were untimely because she failed to show that she pursued them with reasonable
diligence?
2.

Is the Post-Conviction Remedies Act's statute of limitations

unconstitutional because it does not contain an "interests of justice" exception?
Standard of review. This Court will "'review an appeal from an order
dismissing or denying a petition for post-conviction relief for correctness without
deference to the lower court's conclusions of law.'" Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46,
t 55,234 P.3d 1115 (quoting Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12,113,156 P.3d 739).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the following:

\

UTAH CONST, art. I, § 11;

Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (2012).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

'

A seven-year investigation
Seven years before she filed her petition for post-conviction relief,
attorneys

from

the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center

investigating Petitioner's case.

PCR.2255:47, 50.

(RMIC)

In "early 2002," RMIC

approached Petitioner wondering if she desired its assistance.
Petitioner

responded

affirmatively

and

began

PCR.2255:49.

RMIC "accepted her case

for

investigation/' with attorney Jensie Anderson, President of RMIC, supervising
the investigation.

PCR.2255:47, 50. In May 2002, RMIC staff attorney Don

Topham took over the investigation and Anderson continued to supervise.
PCR.2255:51.
RMIC began its investigation by seeking records from Petitioner, her
former counsel, and the trial and appellate courts. PCR.2255:52-53. RMIC did
not seek records from the Logan Police Department, because RMIC believed that
it did not need those records. PCR.2255:53. Rather, RMIC focused exclusively on
a possible DNA claim. PCR.2255:53-55.
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In April 2008, RMIC received binders of documents from Petitioner's
family that included "police reports and other kinds of police documents."
PCR.1721; 2255:59.

Sometime in early July 2008, RMIC attorneys asked the

Logan Police Chief for access to the department's file. PCR.1721; 2255:64. In
response, the police chief "invited [RMIC] to come to the police station and look
through that file." PCR.2255:64. RMIC did so on 14 July 2008. PCR.2255:64.
At the factual innocence hearing, Jensie Anderson testified that evidence in
the police file provided the basis of Petitioner's factual innocence and postconviction claims. PCR.2255:68-83. She explained that the file contained the
"information behind" Paulette Nyman's post-conviction proffer that she was
mistaken about hearing gunshots on Saturday morning. PCR.2255:67-71. The
file also contained information indicating that Bobby Sheen was a possible
suspect and linking him to a blue and white Bronco. PCR.2255:79-81. Copies of
some of Lael's bank statements and post-marked envelopes from Zions Bank
were in the police file, as were documents from the medical examiner.
PCR.2255:66, 76.

The file also contained photos of Lael's house, allegedly

showing how unsecured it was. PCR.2255:78-79. RMIC attorneys also found in
the file information that made them question how police had handled the crime
scene and ensuing investigation. PCR.2255:76.
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The petition
On 4 March 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief.

{

PCR.l, 1841. She claimed that newly discovered evidence from the police file
established her factual innocence and entitled her to a new trial under the PCRA.
PCR.5-6, 1808-09. According to Petitioner, this new evidence undermined the
State's circumstantial case against her and suggested that Bobby Sheen likely
murdered Lael. PCR.52-71, 1808-09. Petitioner also claimed that this same
evidence demonstrated that her due process rights were violated because the
police investigation was inadequate, the police and prosecutors withheld
exculpatory evidence, and the prosecutors presented evidence that they knew
could be contradicted. PCR.6, 1809-10. Finally, Petitioner claimed that if the
evidence she had identified did not qualify as newly discovered —either because
her trial counsel knew of it or could have discovered it with reasonable
diligence — then her trial counsel were ineffective for failing to discover or
present the evidence. PCR.6,1810.
The State's summary judgment motion
The State deposed Petitioner. R.2270. She admitted in her deposition that
she believed that Bobby Sheen may have murdered Lael and that she had
reported her suspicions to trial counsel before trial. PCR.1824-25; 2270:71-72, 77,
95. Petitioner also admitted that her defense counsel told her before trial that
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Sylvan Bassett "seems to believe he knows something about the case that could
clear" her, specifically the location of the suspected murder weapon.
PCR.2270:86. But according to Petitioner, her trial counsel "didn't feel [Basset]
was credible." PCR.2270:86.
The State moved for summary judgment on all of Petitioner's claims.
PCR.1191-92, 973-1003. The State argued that Petitioner's newly discovered
evidence claim failed because all the evidence she relied on was either known to
her or her trial counsel, or obtainable through the police file. PCR.973-92, 9981003.

The State argued that Petitioner's due p-rocess claims were untimely

because they were not based on newly discovered evidence and therefore
accrued when Petitioner's conviction became final. PCR.974-75, 993-1003, 183438. The State argued that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
untimely because Petitioner either knew of the basis for her claim when her
conviction became final, or she could have discovered that basis had she
exercised reasonable diligence. PCR.997.
Petitioner argued that all her claims were "based upon newly discovered
evidence" that she did not discover until July 2008 or later, and were therefore
timely raised. R.1287, 1298-1303 (bolding and capitalization omitted). She also
argued that the PCRA's statute of limitations was unconstitutional because it did
not provide an "interests of justice" exception. R.1303-08.
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Tlte post-conviction court's initial ruling
The post-conviction court granted the State's motion. PCR. 1807-1850 (a
copy of the court's ruling is attached as Addendum B). The court agreed that
none of the evidence supporting Petitioner's claims was newly discovered
because that evidence was either known to Petitioner and her counsel, located in
the police file, or generated from information in the police file. PCR.1820-1838.
Because Petitioner's due process claims were not based on newly discovered
evidence, the post-conviction court agreed that they were untimely. PCR.183638. The post-conviction court also found that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim was likewise untimely because it was not based on newly
discovered evidence, and thus accrued in January 1998. PCR. 1838-41.
The post-conviction court also rejected Petitioner's claim that the PCRA's
statute of limitations was unconstitutional. PCR.1843-48. The court found that
this Court had not constitutionalized the "interests of justice" exception to the
PCRA's statute of limitations. PCR.1843-46. The court also found that, based on
the language in rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court had
determined to "exercise its constitutional powers over post-conviction cases
within the parameters of the PCRA." PCR.1846.
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Petitioner's motion to reconsider
Petitioner moved the post-conviction court to reconsider its order.
PCR. 1852-62. She argued that her ineffective assistance of counsel claim could
not have accrued until July 2008, when she personally learned of the facts
supporting that claim by examining the police file. PCR.1855-59. Petitioner
asserted that the post-conviction court's ruling improperly imputed to her what
her trial counsel knew or should have known about the evidence in the police
file. PCR.2254:20-21. Petitioner also argued that she had raised issues of fact
about when she personally discovered the evidence that supported her postconviction claims. PCR.1859-62.
The State responded that even if Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim did not
accrue in January 1998, the claim was still untimely. PCR.1904-05. The State
argued that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that, had she exercised reasonable
diligence, she could not have discovered the basis of her claim before July 2008.
Id.
The post-conviction court affirms the grant of summary judgment
The post-conviction court considered and rejected Petitioner's motion to
reconsider. PCR.2254:63-70 (a copy of the argument and ruling on Petitioner's
motion is attached as Addendum C). The court clarified that its finding that
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Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim accrued in January 1998 was based on what
Petitioner knew and what she could have discovered with reasonable diligence,
not on trial counsels' knowledge imputed to Petitioner. PCR.2254:21-22, 27-29,
68. Based on her deposition testimony, the court had found that before trial,
Petitioner not only "knew about Bobby Sheen" and "Sylvan Bassett," but she also
had discussed that information with her trial counsel. PCR.2254:22, 68. She also
knew that her trial counsel did not present any evidence about Bobby Sheen at
trial. PCR.2254:27. The court also found that Petitioner knew from the trial
evidence that aspects of the police investigation "were lacking." PCR.2254:68.
The post-conviction

court

alternatively

found

that

even

if

the

ineffectiveness claim did not accrue in 1998, it was still untimely because
Petitioner had not demonstrated that she could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered the claim any sooner than one year before she filed her petition.
PCR.2254:67-69.

The court found that until RMIC approached her in 2002,

Petitioner had never complained about her trial counsel's performance or sought
help from any source, including the prison contract attorneys, to attempt to
investigate her trial counsels' performance.

PCR.2254:66-67. The court also

found that, even after RMIC began investigating her case in 2002, it did nothing
to pursue an ineffectiveness claim until 2008. PCR.2254:68. The court could not
conclude that Petitioner or her attorneys had exercised reasonable diligence in
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pursuing her ineffectiveness claim where "the better part of 13 years passed with
nothing on her part that the Court can pinpoint in terms of pursuing this
ineffective assistance of counsel claim."2

PCR.2254:68.

The court therefore

reaffirmed its summary judgment ruling. PCR.2254:70.
Petitioner timely cross-appeals from this order. PCR.2018, 2083.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
L Petitioner demonstrates no error in the ruling that her post-conviction
claims were untimely.

Petitioner mischaracterizes the ruling dismissing her

ineffective assistance claim as based on the imputation of her trial counsel's
knowledge to her.

On the contrary, in deciding Petitioner's motion to

reconsider —a ruling that Petitioner ignores —the post-conviction court explained
that its initial finding that the claim accrued in 1998 was based on Petitioner's
knowledge.

Petitioner admitted knowing that Bobby Sheen was a possible

suspect and that her defense team had discussed Sylvan Bassett with her. She
had also heard the trial evidence regarding the police investigation.

The court

further explained that even if the ineffectiveness claim did not accrue in 1998,
Petitioner had not carried her burden to show that she had exercised reasonable

2

The court also noted that because of Petitioner's delay in filing her
petition, her lead trial counsel, Mr. John Caine, was no longer available to explain
what he knew and why he strategized as he did. PCR.2254:69-70. However, the
court did not rely on this fact. Id.
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diligence in pursuing this claim, or any of her other post-conviction claims. The
undisputed facts demonstrated that Petitioner did nothing to pursue any of her
claims for nearly thirteen years, and that she was represented by counsel for the
last six of those years. The undisputed facts also demonstrated that none of
Petitioner's evidence qualified as newly discovered.
II. The post-conviction court correctly rejected Petitioner's claim that the
PCRA's statute of limitations is unconstitutional because it lacks an interests of
justice exception. This Court has never constitutionalized that exception, and the
recent amendment to Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, embraces the
current version of the PCRA as the sole law governing post-conviction relief. In
any event, Petitioner has not shown that the PCRA's one-year limitations period,
with its accompanying tolling provision, is so inflexible or insufficient that it fails
to provide a reasonable time to file a petition.
ARGUMENT
ITHE POST-CONVICTION COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED
THAT PETITIONER'S CLAIMS WERE UNTIMELY
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erroneously dismissed her
post-conviction claims as untimely. Petitioner's Br. at 48-60. First, she asserts
that the court erroneously found that her ineffective assistance of counsel claim
accrued in 1998, because, in her view, the court "improperly imputed trial
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counsel's knowledge to her/' Petitioner's Br. at 50„ She also asserts that the court
found that her claim "accrued when trial counsel Icnew or should have known of
the exculpatory evidence." Id. at 49. She also argues that she raised "disputed
issues of fact as to when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, [she]
should have discovered the facts underlying her ineffective assistance of counsel
claim." Id. at 54. Second, Petitioner claims that disputed issues of fact precluded
a finding that her other post-conviction claims were untimely. Id. at 58-60.
Petitioner demonstrates no error in the post-conviction court's ruling,
because she ignores the ruling on her motion to reconsider. Her argument is
therefore based on a mischaracterization of the post-conviction court's reasoning.
The post-conviction court did not impute Petitioner's trial counsels' knowledge
to her in order to find that her claim accrued in 1998. Rather, it based that
finding on what Petitioner herself knew.
But even if the post-conviction court incorrectly found that Petitioner's
ineffectiveness claim accrued in 1998, Petitioner demonstrates no error in the
post-conviction court's alternative ruling.

The court alternatively ruled that

Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim, and all of her other post-conviction
claims, were untimely because she did not show that she could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered them any sooner than one year before she
filed her petition. The undisputed facts demonstrated that Petitioner did nothing
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to pursue any of the claims in her petition for thirteen years, and that she was
represented by counsel for the last six of those years.

'

A, The PCRA's statute of limitations.
Under the PCRA, a "petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is

g

filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued/7 UTAH CODE ANN. §
78B-9-107(l). A cause of action generally accrues on the date that the petitioner s
criminal conviction becomes final under the PCRA.

See id. § 78B-9-107(2).

However, if a post-conviction claim is based on facts unknown to the petitioner
when the conviction became final, then the claim accrues on "the date on which
petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based/' See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(e).

i

Petitioner's conviction became final under the PCRA on 22 January 1998,
because that was the last day that she could have filed a petition for writ of

.

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(c); United
States Supreme Court Rule 13(1) (allowing 90 days to file a petition for writ of
certiorari); State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997). Therefore, Petitioner's claims
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she could have discovered by then with reasonable diligence, accrued on 22
January 1998. Her petition based on those facts therefore had to be filed within
one year of that date. See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(c). Any claim based on evidence that
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Petitioner discovered after her conviction became final accrued when "petitioner
knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based/' and therefore had to be filed
within a year of that date. See id. § 78B-9-107(2)(e).
Section 78B-9-106 includes several procedural bars to post-conviction
relief, including when a claim "is barred by the limitation period established in
Section 78B-9-107." See id. § 78B-9-106(l)(e). Once the State raises "any ground
of preclusion under Section 78B-9-106," then "the petitioner has the burden to
disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence."

See id. § 78B-9-

105(2). Therefore, after the State raised the time-bar defense, Petitioner had the
burden to prove that her claims were timely. The post-conviction court correctly
concluded that she did not meet this burden, because she did not show that she
filed her petition within one year of when, with reasonable diligence, she could
have discovered the facts supporting her claims.
B.

Petitioner demonstrates no error in the post-conviction court's
ruling that her ineffective assistance claim accrued in 1998,
because she mischaracterizes that ruling.
Petitioner's challenge to the post-conviction court's ruling on

her

ineffective assistance claims depends on a mischaracterization of that ruling.
Contrary to Petitioner's argument, the post-conviction court did not find that her
ineffective assistance claim was untimely because the court "imputed trial
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counsels7 knowledge to her." Petitioner's Br. at 50; PCR.2254:21-22. Rather, as
the court explained in ruling on Petitioner's motion to reconsider, its finding that

{

the claim accrued in 1998 was based on Petitioner's own knowledge.
PCR.2254:21-22, 27-29, 68.

,

In its initial ruling, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner had
admitted in her deposition not only that she knew about both Bobby Sheen and
Sylvan Bassett before trial, but that she had also discussed Sheen and Bassett
with her counsel. PCR.1824-28; 2270:71-72, 86-87, 95-96. Petitioner told her
A

counsel before trial that Sheen was "a possible suspect" because he was a "shady
person" who had been behind on his rent, had been stealing power from a
neighbor, and had been evicted. PCR.2270:95-96. Petitioner's counsel told her
before trial that Sylvan Bassett "seems to believe he knows something about the
case that could clear" her. PCR.2270:86. Petitioner knew that Bassett's alleged

<

information involved the location of the possible murder weapon. Id. Petitioner
also knew that her counsel did not present any evidence at trial about Sheen or
Bassett. PCR.2254:27.
And Petitioner knew from the trial evidence that aspects of the police
i

investigation "were lacking." PCR.2254:68. For example, she knew that police
did not collect and analyze blood evidence, including a latent bloody handprint
on the front door. TR.1492-1500. She also knew that police moved Lael's body to
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look for a gun and removed his body from the crime scene before the lead
detective arrived. TR.1319-21,1411-12.
Based on this evidence of what Petitioner knew, the post-conviction court
initially ruled that Petitioner's ineffective assistance claims accrued in January
1998. PCR.1838-41; 2254:21-22, 27-29, 68. Therefore, Petitioner's argument that
the ruling was based on the imputation of defense counsels' knowledge
mischaracterizes the court's ruling.
Because Petitioner's challenge to the court's ruling depends on this
mischaracterization, she demonstrates no error in that ruling. Petitioner does not
even argue, let alone demonstrate, how the post-conviction court erred in finding
that she knew of the basis for her ineffective assistance claim in 1998.
A statute of limitations begins running when a petitioner has sufficient
information to put her on notice of a potential claim. See Maoris v. Sculptured
Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, | 18, 24 P.3d 984. "[A]ll that is required to trigger the
statute of limitations is sufficient information to put plaintiffs on notice to make
further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions."

Id. "[I]f a party has

knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably investigate
potential causes of action because the limitations period will run." See Colosimo
v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, % 17,156 P.3d 806; Cf. Baldwin v. Burton, 850

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

R2d 1188, 1197 (Utah 1993) ("[I]t is not necessary for a claimant to know every
fact about his fraud claim before the statute begins to run/ 7 ).
At her 1995 trial, Petitioner knew the core facts of her ineffectiveness claim.
She knew about Sheen and Bassett and alleged defects in the police investigation.
Petitioner also admitted in her deposition that, after her trial, she had questioned
her trial counsels' strategy. PCR.2270:76, 78-79. She said that she wondered why
her counsel did not call the waitress from Freeman's Cafe where she and Lael
allegedly had coffee Friday afternoon, introduce pictures from her son's
basketball game, or clarify details about her 911 call. Id.
Petitioner concedes that a "claim for ineffective assistance accrues when
the petitioner knows or should have known of her counsel's ineffectiveness."
Petitioner's Br. at 53. Nevertheless, Petitioner does not argue that her knowledge
of the above facts and her own questioning of her trial counsels' strategy were
insufficient to cause her ineffectiveness claim to accrue. Thus, she demonstrates
no error in the post-conviction court's ruling that the claim accrued in 1998 and
was therefore untimely.
C

The court also correctly concluded that Petitioner's ineffective
assistance claim was untimely because Petitioner did not pursue it
with reasonable diligence where she did nothing for thirteen
years.
Even if the post-conviction court erroneously ruled that Petitioner's

ineffective assistance claim accrued in 1998, the court correctly concluded that
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the claim was still untimely because Petitioner did not demonstrate that she
pursued it with reasonable diligence.

The post-conviction court correctly

concluded that thirteen years of inaction did not amount to reasonable diligence.
PCR.2254:67-69.
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court "concluded, as a matter of
law, that [she] knew or should have known of each fact giving rise to her claim
for ineffective assistance on or before January 22, 1998." Petitioner's Br. at 55.
She also asserts that disputed issues of fact prevented the post-conviction court
from finding that she was not reasonably diligent. Id. at 54-55.
Petitioner again mischaracterizes the post-conviction court's ruling
because she again ignores the ruling on her motion to reconsider. The court did
not rule that her ineffective assistance claim was untimely because she knew or
should have known of every fact giving rise to her ineffectiveness claim in 1998.
Rather, it found that even if her claim did not accrue in 1998, it was still untimely
because Petitioner could have discovered the facts supporting the claim had she
exercised reasonable diligence. PCR.2254:67-69.
As Petitioner recognizes, her ineffective assistance claim accrued, at the
very latest, on the date that she "should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which [her] petition is based."
Petitioner's Br. at 54 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107(2)(e)).
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Petitioner

reasons that she did not learn those facts until July 2008, when she requested and
was granted access to the police file. Petitioner's Br. at 56-57. However, it is
undisputed that Petitioner did not ask the Logan Police Chief for access to that
file until early July 2008, and that he granted her access on 14 July 2008.
PCR.1721; 2255:64. Petitioner does not explain why, with reasonable diligence,
she could not have sought or obtained access to the police file any earlier.
Petitioner's Br. at 54-58. She presented no evidence that obtaining the police file
required anything more than a request of the Logan Police Chief. Nor does
Petitioner explain why doing nothing to pursue her claim for thirteen years
should qualify as reasonable diligence. Petitioner's Br. at 54-58.
Petitioner claims that she raised issues of fact about when she actually
learned the various facts supporting her ineffective assistance claim. Petitioner's
Br. at 54-58. But Petitioner raised no issue of fact about her lack of diligence in
pursuing her claim before 2008. It was undisputed that Petitioner did nothing to
pursue her ineffective assistance claim between her 1995 conviction and early
2002, when RMIC approached her about investigating her case. PCR.2254:66-67.
It was also undisputed that from early 2002 until July 2008, RMIC likewise did
nothing to pursue her ineffective assistance claim. PCR.2254:68; 2255:53-55, 64,
68.
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Doing nothing cannot amount to reasonable diligence. Petitioner concedes
that "[i]n general, reasonable diligence means 'appropriate action, where there is
some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in a channel in which it
would be successful. ,,/ Petitioner's Br. at 54 (quoting Crellin v. Thomas, 247 P.2d
264, 267 (Utah 1952) (Wolfe, C.J., dissenting)). According to Petitioner, she was
convicted of a murder she did not commit. Yet, even though she knew that
Sheen was an alternate suspect, that Bassett allegedly had information that could
clear her, and that her attorneys presented none of this information, Petitioner
did nothing to seek any form of relief between 1995 and 2002. Even after RM1C
began representing Petitioner in 2002, its attorneys did nothing to pursue any of
the claims in her petition until July 2008. Given these undisputed facts, the postconviction court correctly concluded that Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim
was untimely because she did not demonstrate that she exercised reasonable
diligence in pursuing it. PCR.2254:67-69.
D. The court correctly dismissed Petitioner's other post-conviction
claims.
Petitioner asserts that disputed facts also prevented the postconviction
court from finding that her alleged new evidence did not qualify as "newly
discovered" under the PCRA. Petitioner's Br. at 58-60. Petitioner maintains that
neither she nor her trial counsel knew that Bobby Sheen was a viable suspect,
that Sylvan Bassett had information about Sheen, or that police allegedly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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suppressed Bassett's information. Id. She likewise maintains that neither she nor
her trial counsel knew of (1) Paulette Nyman's uncertainty about when she heard
the shot, (2) information that allegedly challenged the State's evidence about
when the October bank statement arrived, or (3) information that allegedly
showed that other bank statements were missing. Id. She also argues that
because her due process claims that the police allegedly withheld evidence were
based on this alleged new evidence, the post-conviction court erroneously
dismissed those claims as untimely. Id. However, the post-conviction court
correctly concluded that none of this evidence qualified as newly discovered,
and that Petitioner's due process claims were therefore also untimely. PCR.182138.
1. Petitioner's evidence did not qualify as "newly discovered"
under the PCRA.
To allege a claim of newly discovered evidence, a petitioner must show
that "neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence." See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(i).

Additionally, the new evidence cannot be

"merely cumulative of evidence that was known" or "merely impeachment
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evidence." See id. § 78B-9-104 (l)(e)(ii) & (iii). It was undisputed that Petitioner's
evidence did not satisfy this standard.
As explained, it was undisputed that both Petitioner and her trial counsel
knew that Bobby Sheen was a possible suspect because Petitioner admitted
telling her trial counsel that she suspected Sheen. PCR.1823-28; 2270:71-72, 95-96.
Shannon Demler also testified in his deposition that the defense team
investigated the possibility that Sheen committed the murder. PCR.1031, 1041,
1824.

Demler's memory was that "John Caine talked to Bobby himself."

PCR.1031. Moreover, documents in the police file identify Sheen as a possible
suspect, list him as possibly in possession of $1500, and state that he may have
had "a vehicle ... the same description and color" as was seen at Lael's on that
Saturday. PCR.153-54,181. If Petitioner's trial counsel did not already know of
these documents through the discovery process, reasonable diligence would
have led them to these documents because the Cache County Attorney's Office
had an "open door policy" that allowed counsel to "look at whatever we
needed." PCR.1025-26. Demler also testified in his deposition that, although he
could no longer remember the exact colors of the vehicles that he and Caine
discussed, he did remember "discussing the vehicles." PCR.1026-27. He also
remembered that the defense team had access to the police reports about the
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vehicles seen at Lael's house. Id. Therefore, it was undisputed that evidence of
Bobby Sheen being a possible suspect did not qualify as "newly discovered."
Likewise, it was undisputed that both Petitioner and her counsel knew
that Sylvan Bassett had information about Sheen's alleged involvement in the
murder. As explained, Petitioner admitted in her deposition that her counsel
told her before trial that Sylvan Bassett "seems to believe he knows something
about the case that could clear" her. PCR.2270:86. Petitioner also admitted
knowing that Bassett's information related to the location of the possible murder
weapon. Id, Moreover, as demonstrated, the defense team either knew or had
access to Bassett's information that, according to Bassett, linked Sheen to the
murder —namely, that Sheen allegedly had $1500 and drove a blue and white
truck. PCR.153-54, 181. Reasonable diligence also could have led the defense
team to interview Bassett and thus discover his claim that police allegedly did
not want to hear his story. Petitioner presented no evidence that Bassett was
withholding this information. Consequently, it was also undisputed that none of
the evidence regarding Sylvan Bassett qualifies as "newly discovered."
The undisputed facts also established that Petitioner's defense team knew
of Paulette Nyman's uncertainty about when she heard the gunshots. Nyman
testified at trial that she had previously told a defense investigator that she was
uncertain whether she heard the shots on Saturday or Sunday.
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TR.590-92.

Therefore, Nyman's statement about when she heard the shots did not qualify as
"newly discovered/'
The undisputed facts also established that the information Petitioner now
relies on to challenge the trial evidence about when the October bank statement
arrived is not newly discovered.

Trial testimony from bank and postal

employees established that Lael's October statement would have arrived by
Friday, 5 November 1993, at the latest. TR.767-68, 773, 776. To challenge this
evidence, Petitioner attached to her petition copies of post-marked bank
envelopes mailed in months other than November 1993. PCR.127-38. However,
Petitioner obtained those copies from the police file. PCR.2255:66. If Petitioner's
defense team did not know of those documents at trial, reasonable diligence
would have led them to those documents given the prosecutor's "open door
policy."

PCR.1025-26.

Therefore, this evidence did not qualify as newly

discovered.
Information that other bank statements may have been missing was also
not newly discovered. Petitioner never established that any statements, other
than Lael's October statement, were actually missing. Although one detective's
memory seventeen years later was that "several bank statements" were missing,
Petitioner's only evidence of which statements were actually missing was a
document that police prepared during the murder investigation. PCR.2256:39-
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40; Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Tab 59. That document lists only the September and
October statements as missing. PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Tab 59. However,
Lael's son Robert testified at trial that he inspected his father's financial
documents and only the October statement was missing. TR.740-43. Regardless
of whether the police document or Robert's account is correct, it is undisputed
that evidence about any missing statements was available from the police and
Lael's family. Therefore, Petitioner's trial counsel either knew or could have
known, through reasonable diligence, exactly which statements were missing.
Consequently, the detective's vague post-conviction testimony about missing
bank statements does not qualify as "newly discovered."
Petitioner implies that the post-conviction court found that some of the
above evidence did qualify as newly discovered because the court classified
some of it as "new evidence" in its ruling on her factual innocence claim.
Petitioner's Br. at 60. In summarizing the evidence from the factual innocence
hearing, the post-conviction court did label some of it as "new evidence."
PCR.2116-17. But the court's use of that label was not a finding that this evidence
satisfied section 78B-9-i04(i)(e)/s definition of "newly discovered evidence."
Rather, it was simply the court's method for distinguishing the factual innocence
evidence from the criminal trial evidence. PCR.2115-19.
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The court did classify Nyman's testimony at the factual innocence hearing
as "newly discovered evidence/'

PCR.2118-19.

However, the court did not

purport to apply section 78B-9-104(l)(e)'s definition to Nyman's testimony, let
alone find that her testimony satisfied that definition. See id. On the contrary,
when it did analyze that definition in its summary judgment ruling, the court
found that Nyman's uncertainty about when she heard the shot did not qualify
as newly discovered. PCR.1822-23.
Because the undisputed facts demonstrated that none of the above
evidence qualified as "newly discovered" under the PCRA, the post-conviction
court correctly granted the State summary judgment on this claim. PCR.1820-35.
Petitioner contends that if this Court agrees that the post-conviction court
erroneously dismissed her newly discovered evidence claims, then this Court
"should remand and order that the trial court vacate her conviction."
Petitioner's Br. at 60. Petitioner reasons that the post-conviction court's finding
that her alleged newly discovered evidence satisfied the higher standard of
demonstrating her factual innocence also necessarily satisfied the PCRA's lower
standard for relief.

Id. But Petitioner forgets that the post-conviction court

expressly found that the evidence she presented at the initial four-day factual
innocence hearing failed to establish her factual innocence. PCR.2115-19. As
explained in the State's Opening Brief, the post-conviction court based its factual
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innocence determination on Del Hall's testimony —evidence that Petitioner did
not identify in her petition as establishing her factual innocence or as providing a
basis for post-conviction relief. State's Opening Br. at 29-34, 43-45. Therefore, if
this Court reaches this claim and agrees that the post-conviction court erred in
dismissing it, this Court should remand for the post-conviction court to consider
the merits of the claim.
2. Petitioner's due process claims were also untimely.
The post-conviction court also correctly dismissed Petitioner's due process
claims as untimely.

PCPv. 1836-37.

Those claims were based on the same

evidence that she claimed was newly discovered. PCR.63-71; 1836-38. Because
none of this evidence was newly discovered, the post-conviction court correctly
dismissed Petitioner's due process claims as untimely. PCR. 1836-38.
II.
THIS COURT HAS ALREADY AFFIRMED THAT THE PCRA'S
LIMITATIONS STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT IT SHOULD
HOLD OTHERWISE NOW
Petitioner contends that case law interpreting previous statutes of
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Utah Constitution's open courts clause, "unless it contains an 'interests of justice'
exception" that analyzes "both the reason for a petitioner's untimely filing and
the claim's potential merit."

Petitioner's Br. at 64, 66. Because the tolling
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provision in the current statute does not require this analysis, Petitioner asserts
that it is a constitutionally inadequate substitute for the "interests of justice"
exception.

Id. at 65-67. She also argues that this Court rejected a similar

statutory scheme in Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998). Id.
The post-conviction court correctly rejected Petitioner's constitutional
challenge. PCR.1843-48. The post-conviction court found that this Court has
never constitutionalized the "interest of justice exception." PCR.1845-46. The
court also found that this Court's most recent amendment to rule 65C, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which "embraces" the current version of the PCRA "as
the law governing petitions for post-conviction relief," refuted Petitioner's
argument. PCR. 1846-47. Finally, the court found that Petitioner had not "shown
that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations, with its accompanying tolling
provisions, is so inflexible ... or ... 'so insufficient'" that it is unconstitutional.
PCR.1847-48 (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63 (1902)). The postconviction court's ruling was correct.
"[T]he party challenging a statute's constitutionality bears a heavy burden
of proving its invalidity." Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ^f 10, 94
P.3d 283. This Court presumes that a statute is constitutional and "'construefs]
the legislation, to the extent possible, as being in compliance with the federal and
state constitutions.'" State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ^ 7, 245 P.3d 745 (quoting State
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v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, If 18, 993 P.2d 854). "Given the importance of not
intruding into the legislative prerogative/' this Court will "not strike down
legislation unless it clearly violates a constitutional provision." Herrera, 1999 UT
64, f 18 (citations omitted).
presumption'"

and

This Court will indulge "'[e]very reasonable

resolve "'every

reasonable

doubt

...

in favor

of

constitutionality.'" Jones, 2004 UT 53, | 10 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994)).
"To be constitutional, a statute of limitations must allow a reasonable time
for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises." Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). "'What shall be considered a
reasonable time must be settled by the judgment of the legislature, and the courts
will not inquire into the wisdom of establishing the period of a legal bar, unless
the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of
justice.'" Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2004 UT App 436, If 37,104 P.3d 646
(quoting Avis v. Bd. of Rev., 837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1992)), affd, 2007 UT 25,
156P.3d806.
A. No Utah court has constitutionalized the "interests of justice"
exception as defined in Adams v. State.
Relying primarily on Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993),
and Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), Petitioner argues that a statute of
limitations on post-conviction petitions that does not include an "interests of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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justice" exception violates the Utah Constitution's open courts provision.
Petitioner's Br. at 61-67.

Petitioner contends that to be constitutional, any

limitations period must contain an "interests of justice" exception as this Court
interpreted that former statutory language in Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ^f 16,
123 P.3d 400, that is, an exception that examines both the reasons for the late
filing and the merits of the otherwise barred claim. Petitioner's Br. at 66.
This Court's precedent refutes Petitioners' argument.

The holding in

Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, K1f 90-97, 234 P.3d 1115, demonstrates that this
Court has not constitutionalized the "interests of justice" exception. Moreover,
no prior opinion has ever held that a limitations statute on post-conviction claims
must contain an "interests of justice" exception that incorporates merits review.
Rather, those opinions have merely defined the statutory "interests of justice"
exception and required courts to apply that exception in cases where the
applicable statute included the exception.
In Gardner, a death penalty case, the petitioner claimed that although the
Legislature had removed the "interests of justice exception" from the PCRA, this
Court retained constitutional authority to apply the exception. See 2010 UT 56, f
90. This Court declined to address this constitutional issue, because Gardner had
not shown "that any such exception would apply to him." Id. f^f 93-94.
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If, as Petitioner argues, this Court had already constitutionalized the
interest of justice exception, then it would have had no reason to avoid the
constitutional issue in Gardner. Therefore, Gardner refutes Petitioner's argument
that a statute of limitations on post-conviction claims is unconstitutional unless it

(

contains an "interests of justice" exception.
Indeed, no court has constitutionalized the exception.

In 1993, before
•

•

..

1

enactment of the PCRA, the court of appeals held that a limitations statute on
habeas corpus petitions violated the open courts clause because the statute was
"a rigid three-month limitation" with no "provision excusing delay on the
grounds of good cause." Currier, 862 P.2d at 1368 & n.18 (citing UTAH CODE
ANN. § 7842-31.1 (1992)). Later, after the PCRA was enacted, the court of
appeals stated in a footnote in Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, ^ 16 n.4, 89 P.3d
196, that the inclusion of the "interests of justice" exception in the PCRA's oneyear statute of limitations alleviated the concern in Currier. See id. (citing UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-35a-107 (2002)).

But this footnote is dicta because the

constitutionality of the PCRA's statute of limitations was not at issue in Manning.
See id. Moreover, the Manning court did not hold that the old ''interests of
justice" exception was the only means of alleviating the concern in Currier. See
id. And, as explained below, Petitioner has not argued, let alone demonstrated,
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that the flexibility in the current statute is still insufficient to address the concerns
raised by a completely inflexible statute.
In Julian, this Court analyzed the "interests of justice" exception in a oneyear limitations statute that preceded the PCRA.3 See 966 P.2d at 251 & n.4. The
Julian court did not hold that such an exception was necessary to render the
statute constitutional, but it did comment "that no statute of limitation may be
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition." Id. at 253-54. However, that
language was also dicta because Julian did not "directly challenge" the timebar's constitutionality, and the Court granted relief on the basis of statutoryconstruction. Julian, 966 P.2d at 253-54; see Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96, \ 3,
976 P.2d 100 (recognizing that Julian's comment about the constitutionality of a
limitations statute was dicta only).
This Court first considered the PCRA's "interests of justice" language in
Frausto v. State, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). Unlike the petitioner in Julian, Frausto
directly challenged the time-bar's constitutionality.

See id. at 851. The Frausto

plurality author quoted his language from Julian that "'no statute of limitations
may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition. 7 " Id. (Russon, J., with

3

Although the Julian court cited to the PCRA's statute of limitations then
in effect (section 78-35a-107 (1996)), it acknowledged that it was actually
interpreting section 78-12-31.1 (1995), a predecessor to the PCRA. See 966 P.2d at
251 n.4.
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one justice concurring). But that opinion did not carry a majority. Two justices
concurred only in the result—that a court must always consider the statutory
"interests of justice" exception—and one wrote separately that he "disagree[d]
with the main opinion's holding that 'a petitioner's failure to comply with a
statute of limitations may never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a
habeas corpus petition.'" Id. at 851-52; see also Swart, 1999 UT App 96, f 3.
In Adams, this Court again relied only on its interpretation of the statutory
"interests of justice" language. 2005 UT 62, ^

8-9, 14-15. The Court expressly

declined to address Adams' constitutional challenge to the limitations statute
because it resolved the case on statutory grounds. See id.
Thus, none of the cases that Petitioner cites hold that, to be constitutional, a
statute of limitations on post-conviction claims must contain an "interests of
justice" exception. Gardner confirms this. Therefore, the post-conviction court
correctly concluded that the Utah Constitution does not require section 78B-9-107
to contain an "interests of justice" exception as defined in Adams. PCR.1843-48.
B.

This Court's rule embraces the PCRA's current statute
limitations as the law governing post-conviction relief.

of

The post-conviction court also correctly found that this Court's recent
amendment to rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "is inconsistent" with a
claim that a post-conviction limitations statute must contain an "interests of
justice" exception. PCR.1846-47.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In 2008, the Legislature amended the PCRA to make it the only law
governing post-conviction relief. See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, Tf 24, 707 Utah
Adv. Rep. 29 ("[T]he PCRA allows postconviction petitions only under
circumstances defined by statute/'). Before 2008, "the PCRA was 'a substantive
legal remedy' for a petitioner challenging a conviction or sentence." See Gardner,
2010 UT 46, ]f 91 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-102 (1996)). However, the
2008 amendments designated the PCRA as the "sole legal remedy" for a
defendant seeking post-conviction review. See id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9102/
In 2009, this Court amended rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
acknowledge this change.5

This acknowledgement was the result of two

significant aspects of the 2009 amendments. First, the Court amended Rule 65C
to declare that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and extent to which a person
may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence" in postconviction proceedings. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) (2012). Second, the amendments
removed the "good cause" provision, which had previously been interpreted to
4

The 2008 amendments also renumbered the PCRA from sections 78-35101 to -110 to sections 78B-9-101 to -110. See 2008 Laws of Utah c. 3 §§ 1165-73.
5

As the Court recognized in Gardner, the advisory committee notes refer
to the Rule 65C amendments as the "2009 amendments," even though they took
effect in January 2010. 2010 UT 46, | 91 n.240. Therefore, the Court also referred
to them as the 2009 amendments to avoid confusion. Id. The State follows that
practice.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

allow petitioners to file successive post-conviction petitions raising claims that
could have been raised in a prior proceeding, when barring those claims would
create an "obvious injustice/7 See Gardner, 2010. UT 46, ^[ 92.
The advisory committee notes explained that these amendments "embrace
[the PCRA] as the law governing post-conviction relief/' Utah R. Civ. P. 65C
(2012) (advisory committee note). The committee also explained that the PCRA
"provides an independent and adequate procedural basis for dismissal without
the necessity of a merits review" and "that the added restrictions which the Act
places on post-conviction petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus." Id.; cf. Burns v. Boy den, 2006 UT 14, f 18 n.6, 133 P.3d 370
(advisory committee notes "merit great weight in any interpretation of [the]
rules").
In sum, the 2008 amendments to the PCRA establish the PCRA as the only
law governing post-conviction relief.

The 2009 amendments to Rule 65C

acknowledge this Court's adoption of the PCRA and its procedural rules —
including its statute of limitations — as the means by which it will exercise any
constitutional authority it possesses over post-conviction relief. The advisory
committee notes also acknowledge that claims may be dismissed under the
PCRA's procedural grounds without merits review.

Therefore, the post-

conviction court correctly found that Petitioner's constitutional challenge to the
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statute was "inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent adoption of a rule that
embraces the PCRA, which does not include an interests of justice exception, as
the law governing petitions for post-conviction relief." PCR.1847.
C.

Petitioner has not shown that the PCRA's statute of limitations
provides an unreasonable time to file her petition.
Finally, the post-conviction court correctly found that Petitioner had not

demonstrated that the PCRA's statute of limitations provides an unreasonable
time to file a petition, and is therefore unconstitutional.

PCR.1847-48. To be

constitutional, a statute of limitations need only provide "a reasonable time for
the filing of an action after a cause of action arises/' See Beny ex rel. Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Coiy., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985).
The real concern in the cases that Petitioner relies on to challenge the
statute was a lack of sufficient flexibility in the time-bar provisions found to be
unconstitutional. But section 78B-9-107 bars a claim only when a petitioner fails
to pursue it with reasonable diligence and the petitioner is unobstructed by
unconstitutional state action or a mental or physical impairment.

For claims

such as Petitioner's, the one-year limitations period does not begin to run until
"the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-9-107(2)(f).
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Also, the Legislature did not eliminate all allowances for petitions filed
more than one year after a cause of action accrues. Rather, it replaced the
"interests of justice" exception with a tolling provision. That provision tolls the
one-year period "for any period during which the petitioner was prevented from

i

filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution,
or due to physical or mental incapacity." Id. § 78B-9-107(3). Although federal
court of appeals' opinions are not controlling, they unanimously agree that the
analogous one-year limitations period on federal petitions for writs of habeas
corpus-28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)-is constitutional. See Hill v. Dailey, 557 F.3d 437,
438 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Like every other court of appeals to address the issue, this
l

court has held that AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations does not improperly
suspend the writ of habeas corpus."). Therefore, Petitioner does not demonstrate
that the PCRA's limitations period is unreasonable.
Granted, the tolling provision does not include an inquiry into a claim's
potential merits.

But Petitioner offers no reasoned basis for creating a

constitutional right to proceed on a post-conviction claim that she did not file
within one year of the date on which she reasonably should have discovered the
supporting facts and where no unconstitutional State action or mental or
physical incapacity precluded a timely filing. Cf. Burnett v. New York Central R.R.,
380 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1965) (looking only to the reasons for a late filing, not the
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underlying claim's meritoriousness, in determining whether the interests of
justice should excuse a late filing).
Petitioner contends that in Julian, this Court struck down a limitations
scheme similar to the current PCRA scheme. Petitioner's Br. at 65-66. Julian held
that the four-year catch-all limitations statue in former section 78-12-25(3) could
not be constitutionally applied to bar a post-conviction petition. See 966 P.2d at
252-53. Petitioner observes that former section 78-12-36 tolled the four-year
catch-all limitations period during a plaintiffs mental incompetency. Petitioner's
Br. at 65-66 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-36 (1992)). Because Julian struck
down a limitations statute on post-conviction review that was subject to a tolling
provision, Petitioner reasons that the current PCRA's scheme is also
unconstitutional. Id. But the Julian court never acknowledged section 78-12-36's
tolling provision, nor is there any indication in the opinion that the Court
considered the effect of this tolling provision on the constitutionality of the fouryear catch-all statute. See Julian, 966 P.2d at 252-53. Rather, the opinion suggests
that the Court did not consider the tolling provision, because the opinion
described the four-year statute as being as "equalty inflexible''' as the ninety-day
statute struck down in Currier. See id. at 253. Therefore, this Court has not
already rejected a limitations scheme analogous to current section 78B-9-107.
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For the foregoing reasons, the post-conviction court correctly rejected
Petitioner's challenge to the PCRA's statute of limitations. PCR.1843-48.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the order dismissing Petitioner's post-conviction
claims.
Respectfully submitted 11 June 2012.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD

Assistant Attorney General
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UTAH CONST.

Art I, § 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.]

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remed)^ by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C (2012). Post-conviction relief.
(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief
filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9.
The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the
legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence
have been affirmed in a direct appeal under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired.
(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph (h),
if the court comments on the merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first
clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently precluded
under Section 78B-9-106.
(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of
conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is
filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. The petition
shall state:
(d)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(d)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced
and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with
the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
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(d)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the
petitioner's claim to relief;
(d)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of
the appeal;
(d)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of
the prior proceeding; and
(d)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time
for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous postconviction petition.
(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall
attach to the petition:
(e)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the
allegations;
(e)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(e)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or
sentence; and
(e)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(f) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and
deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced
the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.
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(h)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in
a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face,
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that
the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate
with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite
findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(h)(2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(h)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(h)(2)(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or
(h)(2)(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired
prior to the filing of the petition.
(h)(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error
or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a
copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant
one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial postconviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(i) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all
or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the
respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.
(k) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that
have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further
pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(I) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(Z)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(Z)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(Z)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be
presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(m) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the
prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where
the petitioner is confined.
(n) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by
the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to
believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely
to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the
petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records.
(o) Orders; stay.
(o)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner
is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days.
Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and
the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence,
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appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed
by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(o)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(o)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may
be necessary and proper.
(p) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the
court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted
the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections,
Utah Code Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by
which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and
costs.
(q) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah
in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
Advisory Committee Notes
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs
proceedings challenging a conviction or sentence, regardless whether the claim
relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a
sentence other than commitment. Claims relating to the terms or conditions of
confinement are governed by paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B. This rule, as a
general matter, simplifies the pleading requirements and contains two significant
changes from procedure under the former rule. First, the paragraph requires the
clerk of court to assign post-conviction relief to the judge who sentenced the
petitioner if that judge is available. Second, the rule allows the court to dismiss
frivolous claims before any answer or other response is required. This provision
is patterned after the federal practice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The advisory
committee adopted the summary procedures set forth as a means of balancing
the requirements of fairness and due process on the one hand against the public's
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interest in the efficient adjudication of the enormous volume of post-conviction
relief cases.
1

The requirement in paragraph (m) for a determination that discovery is
necessary to discover relevant evidence that is likely to be admissible at an
evidentiary hearing is a higher standard than is normally used in determining
motions for discovery.
The 2009 amendments embrace Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act as
the law governing post-conviction relief. It provides an independent and
adequate procedural basis for dismissal without the necessity of a merits review.
See Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 884-85 (10th Or. 2009). It is the committee's
view that the added restrictions which the Act places on post-conviction
petitions do not amount to a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. See Felker v.
Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (relying on McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489
(1991)).

(

•'

i

Section 78B-9-202 governs the payment of counsel in death penalty cases.
i
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT

2,1 20W
DEBRA BROWN,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE:
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS TO Pi
POST-CONVICTION

vs.
S If!
I "
n
oN

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 100903670

Respondent.

Judge Michael D. DiReda

2 1 2018

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on the State's Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 23, 2010. Oral arguments on
the motion were heard on November 9, 2010. Although Petitioner was not present at the
hearing, she was represented by her counsel, Alan Sullivan, Christopher Martinez, and
Jacqueline Hopkinson. The State was represented by Erin Riley and Patrick Nolan. The Court
has thoroughly reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case law, and all applicable
statutory provisions.

Additionally, the Court has carefully considered the oral arguments

provided by counsel. Now being fully advised, the Court issues this decision granting the State's
motion.
I. Procedural History
On September 12, 1994, Petitioner was charged with one count of aggravated murder in
ihe death of Lael Brown, a long-time friend and employer. Following a jury trial, on October 18,
1995, she was convicted as charged and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. On
January 19, 1996, Petitioner timely filed an appeal. The Utah Supreme Court entered its decision
affirming Petitioner's conviction on October 24, 1997. She did not seek review of the decision
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from the United States Supreme Court. In 2002, the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center began
an investigation into Petitioner's case.

Based upon this investigation, on March 4, 2009,

Petitioner filed both a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act ("PCRA") and a petition for post-conviction determination of factual innocence.1
On May 11, 2009, the State filed a motion to dismiss and Petitioner responded on June 11, 2009.
On July 16, 2009, the Court entered its memorandum decision denying the State's motion and
the parties began the discovery process, which included requests for interrogatories and the
taking of depositions. Following discovery, on April 23, 2010, the State filed a motion for
summary judgment with respect to the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner responded
on May 7, 2010 and the State filed its reply on May 10, 2010. Oral arguments on the motion
were heard on November 9, 2010.
II. Summary of the Arguments
A.

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
Petitioner raises five separate claims in support of post-conviction relief

First, she

argues that newly discovered evidence establishes that she is factually innocent. Second, she
contends that newly discovered evidence that was either unavailable to trial counsel or that was
not discovered by trial counsel as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, establishes that no
reasonable trier of fact could have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. According to
Petitioner, new evidence suggests that the likely perpetrator of the homicide was Bobbie Sheen.
This evidence includes statements from Sylvan Bassett that Sheen was angry with Brown, that he

The petition for post-conviction determination of factual innocence is not the subject of the State's motion
for summary judgment or the Court's memorandum decision.
i
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had a gun similar in appearance to Brown's gun, that he had a large amount of cash, and that he
drove a blue and white Ford Bronco. Also, neighbors reported seeing a blue and white Ford
Bronco at Brown's home on the day of the homicide.
In addition, Petitioner also asserts that new evidence undermines the State's theory on
which Petitioner was convicted. This evidence includes statements by Paulette Nyman that she
heard shots at a time when Petitioner had an alibi, police documents showing that Brown's death
did not occur Saturday morning, Petitioner's statements to police that she owed Brown $3,000,
evidence that the October bank statement never arrived at Brown's home, that many people
knew that Brown had guns in his house and large amounts of money, that Brown's home was not
secure and easy access was available, that Petitioner was not the only person with a key to
Brown's home, and that Petitioner's statements concerning the soup she made and its placement
on Brown's doorstep were not inconsistent.
Third, Petitioner argues that her conviction was obtained in violation of her right to due
process of law because there was an inadequate police investigation and a "rush to judgment"
that Petitioner was the real perpetrator. According to Petitioner, the State failed to preserve
exculpatory evidence at the crime scene, such as hairs, fibers, blood, sheets, blankets, an alarm
clock, a bloody hand print, and failed to investigate other more likely suspects.

Fourth,

Petitioner argues that her conviction was obtained in violation of her right to due process of law
because the police and prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence and the prosecutors presented
evidence they knew could be contradicted.

This includes police reports concerning three

witnesses who heard possible gun shots, witness reports of a blue and white Ford Bronco at
Brown's home, Bassett's attempts to provide information about Sheen to law enforcement

3
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authorities, police reports showing that Petitioner admitted borrowing $3,000 from Brown, and
bank statements showing that Brown had not yet received his October bank statement.
Finally, Petitioner argues that she is entitled to post-conviction relief because both her
trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective representation. According to Petitioner, counsel
failed to present exculpatory evidence that was available at the time of trial, including evidence
concerning the likely possibility of forced entry and the overall condition of Brown's home. In
addition, she contends that counsel also failed to conduct an adequate investigation and discover
exculpatory evidence including evidence that contradicted the State's theory that Petitioner was
the only person with a key to Brown's home, evidence that Brown was killed at a time when
Petitioner had an alibi, and evidence that the police mishandled the crime scene and destroyed
key physical evidence that could have identified the actual perpetrator.
B.

State's Motion for Summary Judgment
The State argues that summary judgment is warranted on all of Petitioner's post-

conviction claims. With respect to Claim 1, the State argues that the PCRA itself mandates that
relief cannot be granted based upon a claim that Petitioner is factually innocent. As for the other
claims, under the PCRA Petitioner's post-conviction petition is timely only if it was filed within
one year after her cause of action accrued. For any claim not based on newly discovered
evidence, the accrual date was January 22, 1998 and, therefore, all claims not based upon newly
discovered evidence should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. With respect to
Claim 2, the State argues that all the evidence Petitioner asserts is newly discovered is not, in
fact, newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and, therefore, that Claim 2 is untimely
because it was not raised until March 4, 2009.

4
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Specifically, the State argues that (1) trial counsel talked to and investigated Sheen and
both trial counsel and Petitioner were aware that Sheen wats a possible suspect; (2) trial counsel
were aware that neighbors of Brown reported hearing gunshots at times that were inconsistent
with the State's case and that trial counsel interviewed the neighbors; (3) trial counsel were
aware that Nyman, who was one of Brown's neighbors, could not remember whether she heard
gunshots on the day of the minder or the day after the murder; (4) both Petitioner and trial
counsel were aware at the time of trial that Petitioner had borrowed $3,000 from Brown and that
she had told the police about this fact; (5) both Petitioner and trial counsel were aware of the date
on which Brown's October bank statement was mailed and, therefore, the mailing dates of other
bank statements is irrelevant; (6) trial counsel were aware that issues related to time of death
were extremely important and were aware that the medical examiner had testified at the
preliminary hearing that his findings would be consistent with a time of death 36 hours from the
time the autopsy was performed; (7) the security of Brown's house, or lack thereof, was known
to trial counsel, trial counsel considered whether someone could have entered the house without
a key, and trial counsel knew that Brown's grandson, Todd Brown, was a suspect; and (8) with
respect to critical evidence that was not collected at the crime scene, trial counsel were provided
police reports, the prosecution had an open file policy, and law enforcement testified at trial
about what physical evidence was collected, including a small bloody hand print.

Since

Petitioner did not raise this claim until March 4, 2009, over ten years beyond the date on which
her post-conviction petition should have been filed, Claim 2 is time-barred and, therefore, the
Court should grant summary judgment.
For similar reasons, the State also argues that summary judgment is appropriate on
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Claims 3 and 4. According to the State, these claims, which allege a due process violation, are
not based upon newly discovered evidence, but are based upon evidence that was either already
known to Petitioner, or her counsel, or that could have been discovered with the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Because Claims 3 and 4 should have been raised no later than January 22,
1999, they are time-barred and, therefore, summary judgment should be granted. Finally, with
respect to Claim 5, which alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the State argues that
Petitioner either knew or could have discovered with reasonable diligence how her counsel
performed at trial and on appeal. Therefore, Claim 5 is not based upon newly discovered
evidence and is, therefore, time-barred. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate. Furthermore,
even if the evidence on which Petitioner bases her ineffective assistance of counsel claims is
newly discovered evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate because, by definition, newly
discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been discovered by exercising reasonable
diligence and, therefore, the failure by trial or appellate counsel to discover it could not have
been the result of deficient performance.
C.

Petitioner's Response
In response to the State's motion, Petitioner argues that all of her post-conviction claims

are based upon newly discovered evidence.

With respect to Sheen as a possible suspect,

Petitioner asserts that Bassett's statements on this claim are newly discovered because there is no
evidence in the record that trial counsel were ever aware of Bassett's connection to Sheen or of
the information contained in Bassett's statements concerning Brown's death. In addition, trial
counsel never received any information concerning Sheen, either from Petitioner or police
reports, until after the trial. In relation to the State's case, Petitioner argues that Nyman has now
6
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stated that her trial testimony that she heard gunshots on the day of the murder is incorrect.
In addition, new evidence shows that neighbors who heard gunshots did not hear them on
the day of the murder and the medical examiner's estimate of the time of death was
inappropriately influenced by prosecutors. Furthermore, contrary to testimony that Brown's
October bank statement was the only bank statement missing from Brown's home, new evidence
from Officer Greg Riddler shows that numerous bank statements and checks were missing and
that the October bank statement was likely not received at Brown's house until after the murder.
Finally, new evidence demonstrates that Brown's home was not secure, that Petitioner did not
have the only other key to the residence, and that there were signs of forced entry.
With respect to the violation of Petitioner's right to due process as a result of the
inadequate police investigation, she argues that newly discovered evidence shows that law
enforcement failed to preserve critical financial information at Brown's house by allowing
Brown's family to "clean out" the house within 36 hours of the murder. In addition, law
enforcement failed to interview witnesses or investigate Sheen as a likely suspect, compromised
the crime scene, and failed to photograph the blood evidence in Brown's house, Concerning the
violation of Petitioner's right to due process as a result of the State's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence, she argues that the State failed to disclose that Warren Brown and Bassett
identified Sheen as the likely killer, that Brown's home was turned over to Brown's family even
though family members were key suspects, and that the prosecutors influenced the medical
examiner's testimony concerning time of death. In addition, prosecutors presented evidence
during trial that they knew was not accurate. With respect to the ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, Petitioner argues that if the Court concludes that trial counsel either had or could

7
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have had access to all the evidence she argues is newly discovered, then the Court must find that
trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to use this evidence at trial.
Finally, Petitioner argues that none of her claims are time-barred because all of her
claims accrued well within the time frames established by the PCRA's statute of limitations.
Bassett signed his affidavit on March 4, 2008, Nyman was interviewed on February 21, 2009,
and law enforcement documents were not discovered until July 34. 2008. Nevertheless, even if
the Court concludes that Petitioner's post-conviction claims are time-barred, Petitioner argues
that the Court should set aside the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or, in the
alternative, find that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional because it
does not include an interests of justice exception.
D.

State's Reply
In reply, the State first reiterates that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the PCRA

based upon her claim of factual innocence. In addition, the State argues that summary judgment
should be granted on all claims that are not based upon newly discovered evidence. According
to the State, neither Petitioner's newly discovered evidence claim nor her two due process claims
are based upon newly discovered evidence because the evidence relied upon is evidence that
Petitioner and her counsel either knew before or at the time of trial or could have discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Because these claims are not based upon newly
discovered evidence, they are time-barred under the PCRA.
With respect to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleging that trial
counsel failed to present exculpatory evidence available to them at the time of trial and
performed deficiently in failing to discover the newly discovered evidence she sets forth in her
8
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post-conviction petition, the State argues that if the evidence was available to trial counsel or
could have been discovered by them, then it cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence and
Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is untimely.

On the other hand, if the

evidence Petitioner sets forth does qualify as newly discovered evidence, then, by definition, it is
evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence and,
therefore, trial counsel could not have been ineffective in not discovering it or presenting it at
trial.

Thus, summary judgment on Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is

appropriate.
As for Petitioner's argument that even if her claims are time-barred the Court should set
aside the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or, in the alternative, find that the PCRA's
one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional, the State argues that Petitioner's reliance oil
federal caselaw cannot justify setting aside the PCRA's statute of limitations. In addition, the
State argues that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations is constitutional because it allows a
reasonable time in which to bring a cause of action and includes provisions that allow the
limitations period to be tolled when a petitioner is prevented from filing a petition due to
physical or mental incapacity, or due to state action in violation of the United States
Constitution.
III. Legal Standards
A.

Introduction
The PCRA is "the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence

for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal/'
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102. See also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) (the PCRA "sets forth the
9
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manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and
sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal . . . or the time
to file such an appeal has expired."). Generally, the function of post-conviction review is to
determine whether a petitioner's constitutional rights were denied in the proceedings that
resulted in the petitioner's conviction and sentence. This review is purposely limited. Under the
PCRA,a
person is not eligible for [post-conviction] relief. . . upon any ground that. . . was
raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; . . . could have been but was not raised at
trial or on appeal; . . . [or] was raised or addressed in any previous request for
post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request
for post-conviction relief.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(b)-(d). Moreover, a petitioner cannot obtain relief on claims
that are untimely raised. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(e) ("A person is not eligible for
[post-conviction] relief . . . upon any ground that . . . is barred by the limitation period
established in Section 78B-9-107.").
In most cases, post-conviction review allows the petitioner an opportunity to (1) locate
and present newly discovered evidence that requires the petitioner's conviction or sentence to be
set aside, and (2) assess whether the petitioner received the trial and appellate representation
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Post-conviction review is not, however, a
platform for a petitioner TO retry the criminal case on an alternate theory. The petitioner bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to obtain relief, see
Utah Code Ann. § 786-9-105(1), and establishing 'that there would be a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed
with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-910
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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104(2). Significantly, under the general provisions of the PCRA, a post-conviction court "may
not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for
which convicted except as provided [under the] . . . Post-Conviction Determination of Factual
Innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(3).
B.

Newly Discovered Evidence under the PCRA
As noted above, one of the primary purposes of the PCRA is to allow a petitioner to

locate newly discovered material evidence.

However, what constitutes newly discovered

material evidence is strictly circumscribed by the PCRA. As explained by the Utah Supreme
Court,
a petitioner may file a claim for [post-conviction] relief based on "newly
discovered material evidence" if: (1) neither the petitioner nor his counsel knew
of, or could have discovered through reasonable diligence, the evidence before or
at the time of trial; (2) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence
already known; (3) the evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and (4)
"viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty
of the offense or subject to the sentence received."
Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ^49, 184 P.3d 1226 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)).
More succinctly, "under the PCRA, as well as our due process case law, newly discovered
evidence merits post-conviction relief only if the evidence would create a reasonable doubt as to
the [petitioner's] guilt." Id. at •pi.
Importantly, the newly discovered evidence must be material in nature. Although the
PCRA does not expressly define the word "material/' the requirement that the new evidence
"demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense
or subject to the sentence received" suggests that evidence is material only if it is relevant to the
issues of the case and, had it been available and presented at trial, the outcome of the
11
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proceedings, either as to guilt or punishment, would have been different. This is consistent with

-

the meaning of "material" in other contexts. See e^g., State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) ("To qualify as newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial, defendant must
. . . establish that the newly discovered evidence is material in the sense that it might have

^

affected the outcome of the trial.").
C.

Statute of Limitations under the PCRA
A petitioner can obtain relief on a post-conviction claim only if it is raised "within one

year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(1). Any "claim for
relief is barred if the petition is not timely filed." Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ^j60, 234 P.3d
1115. A claim is timely raised under the PCRA only if it is asserted by the latest of the
following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the
case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is
filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is
filed;
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f)2 is

9

This portion of the PCRA states that a person may seek collateral review of her conviction and sentence
on the ground that
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United States
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction and
sentence became final on direct appeal, and that:
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or
sentence became final; or
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for which the
petitioner was convicted.

12
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established. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104( 1 )(f).
Notwithstanding the requirement that a claim must be raised within one year after the
cause of action accrued, the limitations period is tolled (1) "during any period of time during
which the petitioner wras prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the
United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9107(3); and (2) "during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting . . . exoneration
through DNA testing . . . or . . .factual innocence."

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(4).

Importantly, no statutory exceptions exist for failing to raise a post-conviction claim in a timely
manner.
D.

Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). According to the Utah Supreme Court,
[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it
to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is
to eliminate the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of
the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail.
Holbrock Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Indeed, any showing in support of
summary judgment "must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial,
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Bullock v. Deseret
Dodge Truck Ctr., 354 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960). See also Bumingham v. Ott 525 P.2d 620,
621 (Utah 1974) (same). "Only when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party
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the opportunity of presenting [her] evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to [her]
views." Holbrooke 542 P.2d at 193. However, if the party moving for summary judgment
satisfies his burden of "informing' the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying the
portions of the pleadings or supporting documents which [it] believes demonstrates an absence

'

of a genuine issue of material fact," TS 1 Partnership v. Alfred 877 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), then the opposing party cannot simply "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
[her] pleading, but [her] response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If [she] does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against [her]." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
IV. Discussion
A.

Claim 1: Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes that Petitioner Is Innocent Under
the Utah Determination of Factual Innocence Statute
(

In Claim 1, Petitioner asserts that "newly discovered evidence in [her] case proves her
innocence under the Utah Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence [sjtatute." Pet.
for Post-Conviction Relief at 5. However, the PCRA expressly states that the "court may not

^

grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for
which convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(3). In light of this statutory prohibition, the
State is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Claim 1 of Petitioner's post-conviction

(

petition.
B.

Claim 2: Newly Discovered Evidence Demonstrates that No Reasonable Trier of
Fact Could Have Found Petitioner Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
In Claim 2, Petitioner argues that "newly discovered evidence in [her] case, when viewed

with all of the other evidence available at the time of trial contradicting the state's case,
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demonstrates that a reasonable jury would not have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 5. The State argues that none of the evidence that Petitioner
relies upon is newly discovered under the PCRA because it is evidence that Petitioner or her trial
counsel either knew about at the time of trial or could have discovered with the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Therefore, the State contends, Petitioner should have raised Claim 2 no
later than January 22. 1999. Because Claim 2 was not raised until March 4, 2009, the State
argues that Claim 2 is untimely and summary judgment is warranted.
1,

Alleged Newly Discovered Evidence

Petitioner does not dispute that the decision on her direct appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court was entered on October 24, 1997, and that the last day for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was January 22, 1998. It follows, therefore, that
for any claim not based upon newly discovered evidence, the PCRA required the claim, and the
evidence in support, to be raised no later than January 22, 1999. The central issue with respect to
Claim 2, then, is whether the evidence set forth below that Petitioner asserts is newly discovered
is, in fact, newly discovered evidence.
a]

Gunshots Heard at Times Inconsistent with the State's Theory

Petitioner asserts that newly discovered record evidence shows that law enforcement was
in possession of reports from neighbors of Brown who heard gunshots on a day and time
contrary to the State's theory of when the murder occurred and on a day and time when
Petitioner had an alibi. At trial, the State presented evidence and argued that the murder
occurred sometime around 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 6th. The alleged newly discovered
police reports show that Juanita Hale reported hearing three gunshots at approximately 1:44 a.m.
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on November 6th; that Susan Nelson reported that a man named "Dino" (Dino Blau) heard two
gunshots at approximately 2:30 a.m. on November 6th; and that Layne Rich reported hearing
three gunshots sometime between 11:30 p.m. on Friday, November 5th and 12:00 a.m. on
November 6th. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 13; Pet'r Mem. in

'

Opp. at 35. However, although trial counsel has indicated that he does not now remember the
names of the persons who reported hearing gunshots at different times and at different locations,
i
he does remember that at the time of trial he was aware of this information. Furthermore, trial
counsel has also indicated that the defense team investigated Brown's neighbors and what they
heard. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 8-11, 27; State's Reply Mem. at 5; Dep. of Shannon Demler
at 28-29. Because this evidence was known to trial counsel at the time of trial, it cannot qualify
as newly discovered evidence.
b)

Paulette Nvman's Recollection of Gunshots

i

Nyman was called by the prosecution to establish that gunshots were heard in the vicinity
of Brown's home on Saturday morning, November 6th, between 6:40 and 10:00 a.m. She now
declares that she always felt uncomfortable about the police timeline and that it seemed to her
that law enforcement wanted hei to have heard gunshots at a time when she in fact had not heard
them. Based upon her recollection that she heard possible gunshots around 6:00 a.m., and no
later than 6:30 a.m., on the day her husband went hunting, which was Sunday, November 7th,
she asserts that her trial testimony pinpointing November 6th as the day on which she may have
heard gunshots was incorrect. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 12-

i

13, 23-24; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 34. Trial counsel, however, was aware of the substance of this
information at the time of trial. First, trial counsel specifically questioned Nyman about when
i
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she heard gunshots. See Dep. of Shannon Demler at 29. Second, Nyman herself testified that
sometime prior to trial she stated to a defense investigator that she could not remember whether
she heard gunshots on Saturday or on Sunday. Furthermore, as noted above, the defense team
investigated Brown's neighbors and what they heard. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 10-11, 27;
State's Reply Mem. at 5; Dep. of Shannon Demler at 28-29. Because the information concerning
Nyman's uncertainty about the day she heard gunshots was known to trial counsel at the time of
trial, it cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence.
c}

Bobbie Sheen as a Possible Suspect in the Case

Petitioner argues that new evidence shows that the State withheld exculpatory evidence
that Sheen was a possible suspect in the murder of Brown. According to Petitioner, new
evidence disclosed by Bassett indicates (1) that Sheen possessed a gun that was similar to the
gun used to kill Brown, (2) that Sheen bragged about using the gun and disposing of it in the
Benson Marina, (3) that he was in possession of a large amount of cash ($1,500), (4) that he was
angry at Brown for having evicted him, and (5) that he drove a blue and white truck. In addition,
new evidence also shows that others, who were apparently friends of Sheen at one time or
another, have indicated that they believe Sheen was responsible for Brown's murder. See Pet'r
Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 14-16, 21-22; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 32.
However, the existence of three discovery documents establishes that law enforcement,
and by extension trial counsel, was aware that Sheen was a possible suspect in the case. A case
information sheet, Bates-stamped 0092, indicates that Warren Brown told police that he believed
Sheen was responsible for the death of Brown. Two police investigative notes, Bates-stamped
0142 and 0147, also list "Bob Sheen" as another possible suspect and refer to "Bob Sheen" with
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the notation of "$1,500" next to the name. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 7-8, 17-18, 26-27;
State's Reply Mem. at. 6-8. These documents were available to trial counsel prior to or at the
time of trial and, therefore, trial counsel were on notice that Sheen was a possible suspect in the
case. In addition, according to trial counsel, the possibility of Sheen as the perpetrator of the
murder was investigated by the defense team and it was determined that he was not a viable
suspect. See Dep. of Shannon Dernier at 36; 73-74.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Petitioner expressly told her trial counsel about
Sheen as a possible suspect.

In her deposition, the following questions and answers were

recorded:
Q. (Scott Reed): Do you recall meeting with either Shannon Demler or John
Caine and talking about your case?
A: (Petitioner): Yes.
Q. And the same thing, what did you tell them about your case?
A. "I didn't do it."
Q. And did you tell Caine or Demler who might have done it.?
A. I don't remember at what point, but somewhere in there, yeah, I gave them a
few ideas I had,
Q. Do you remember what those were?
A. Tenants and ex-tenants.
Q. Do you recall names?
A. One of them.
Q. Which one?

Trial counsel indicated in his deposition that documents provided by prosecutors in response to discovery
requests were usually, if not always, Bates-stamped on the bottom of each page of the document. The inference, of
course, is that Bates-stamped documents were provided to trial counsel by the State during the discovery process.
Petitioner has not rebutted this inference. Rather, she simply asserts that because a document is Bates-stamped does
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is not conclusive evidence that the document was provided to trial counsel during the discovery process, based upon
trial counsel's representations it is strong evidence that it was, in fact, disclosed. Furthermore, when discovery is
provided, unless rebutted, trial counsel is necessarily deemed to be personally aware of the contents of the
documents.
Trial counsel first indicated in his deposition that he may have learned of Sheen as a possible suspect after
the trial. See Dep. of Shannon Demler at 23. However, later he stated that, in fact, he may have learned of Sheer
after Petitioner's arrest. See id at 35. Given Petitioner's statements that she told her attorneys about Sheen as a
possible suspect prior to trial, it is reasonable to conclude that trial counsel learned of Sheen after Petitioner's arrest.
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A. Bobby Sheen.
Dep. of Debra Brown at 71-72. Moreover, later in the deposition Petitioner again states that she
told her trial counsel about Sheen as a possible suspect in the case:
Q. (Erin Riley); And you said that you told your attorneys, Mr. Caine and Mr.
Demler, about Bobby Sheen. What did you tell them?
A. (Petitioner): That I thought he could be a possible suspect. . . .
Q. Did you tell your attorneys any more than just his name Bobby Sheen?
A. Yeah. I shared with them just some stuff that we knew about Bobby when we
cleaned out the apartment. . . .
Id. at 95-96. Petitioner then explained that she told her counsel that Sheen was a "shady person,"
that he had been behind on his rent, that he was stealing power from a neighboring tenant, and
that he had been evicted. See idL at 96. Thus, the fact that Sheen was a possible suspect in the
murder of Brown is not newly discovered evidence.
d)

Blue and White Ford Bronco Linked to Bobbie Sheen

Kimberly Stanbridge, who was a neighbor of Brown, testified that she saw a blue and
white Ford Bronco at Brown's home on Saturday, November 6th. She stated, however, that she
was unable to see the driver because the Bronco drove into the side yard of the house and did not
pull into the gravel driveway. According to Petitioner, new evidence from police reports shows
that several days following the murder a person named Warren Brown told law enforcement that
Sheen drove a vehicle matching the description and color of the vehicle seen on November 6th
and that Sheen was responsible for the murder. Furthermore, Sheen's former girlfriend, April
Geary, has provided new evidence confirming that, at the time of the murder, Sheen drove a blue
and white Ford Bronco. She also indicated that Sheen would sometimes drive her vehicle, which
was a blue and white Blazer. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 16,
22. Finally, Bassett has provided new information that Sheen drove a truck (a Ford F250 pickup)
19
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that was at least similar to the vehicle seen on November 6th insofar as Sheen's truck was blue
and white. See Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 32.
None of the foregoing information constitutes newly discovered evidence. First, trial
counsel has indicated that, at the time of trial, he was aware of information concerning the
presence of several vehicles at Brown's house on November 6th, including a blue and white
Bronco or Blazer, and that he and co-counsel had a discussion about the vehicles. See State's
Mem. in Supp. at 17; State's Reply Mem. at 6. Second, the police investigative note with
information from Warren Brown linking Sheen to a blue and white Ford Bronco was provided to
trial counsel during the discovery process and, therefore, Petitioner's attorneys were on notice
that Sheen was linked to a blue and white Ford Bronco.
Finally, with respect to the Geary affidavit, there is no indication that Petitioner or trial
counsel knew Geary prior to or at the time of trial or that they could have discovered the
information in her possession with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Thus, because the
information from Geary was only discovered by Petitioner's post-conviction counsel on March
1, 2009, see Aff. of April Geary at 1, and Petitioner's post-conviction petition was filed on
March 4, 2009, it has been timely raised in support of Claim 2. However, as just noted, trial
counsel were aware of the link between Sheen and a blue and white Bronco and, therefore, the
substance of Geary's affidavit was already known to counsel. Because the definition of "newly
discovered evidence" requires that "the material evidence [cannot be] merely cumulative of
evidence that was already known," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(ii), even though the
information from Geary was not known and could not have been discovered from her through
the exercise of reasonable diligence, it is, nevertheless, merely cumulative of evidence that was
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already known to trial counsel and, therefore, is not newly discovered evidence as defined by the
PCRA and cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2.
For the foregoing reasons, the information from Warren Brown and, ultimately, the link
between Sheen and a blue and white Ford Bronco does not constitute newly discovered evidence.
Moreover, even though the information from Geary could not have been discovered with
reasonable diligence and has been timely raised, it is merely cumulative of evidence that was
already known and, therefore, cannot be a basis for relief under Claim 2.
e}

Information Disclosed by Sylvan Bassett

Petitioner argues that new evidence shows that the State withheld exculpatory evidence
concerning Bassett's attempts to report to police and Brown's wife his suspicions about Sheen as
the actual killer. As noted above, Bassett has asserted that Sheen possessed a gun that was
similar to the gun used to kill Brown, that Sheen bragged about using the gun and disposing of it
in the Benson Marina, that he was in possession of a large amount of cash ($1,500), that he was
angry at Brown for having evicted him, and that he drove a blue and white truck. Bassett has
further asserted that, based upon this information and his encounters with Sheen, he is convinced
that Sheen murdered Brown. According to Petitioner, new evidence also shows that when
Bassett attempted to speak to law enforcement about his suspicions, he was told "that if he
persisted with this story he would be in 'big trouble.'" Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for PostConviction Relief at 15. Bassett made no further attempts to contact the police. See Pet'r Mem.
in Opp. at 32-33.
As explained previously, Petitioner and her trial counsel were already aware that Sheen
was a possible suspect in the case and that he was linked to a blue and white Ford Bronco.
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Moreover, in the context of advising her attorneys that Sheen wras a possible suspect, Petitioner
told her counsel that Sheen had been evicted by Brown. In addition, based upon a police
investigative note, Bates-stamped 0147 and which references the name "Bob Sheen" with
"$1,500". written next to the name, trial counsel were aware that Sheen may have been in
possession of $1,500. All of this information concerning Sheen was known to trial counsel
independently from Bassett. Furthermore, trial counsel were aware of Bassett prior to trial and
both Petitioner and the defense team knew that Bassett had information about Sheen. According
to Petitioner, sometime in 1994 her attorneys told her that Basset "seems to believe he knows
something about the case that could clear [her], but they didn't feel he was credible." Dep. of
Debra Brown at 86. When asked what her attorneys thought Bassett knewr, Petitioner stated.
"[t]he location of the gun, I believe it was." Id Based upon these statements, Petitioner and her
attorneys also knew at the time of trial that Bassett was making claims that Sheen had a gun,
which would only have been relevant had it been similar to the one used to commit the murder,
and that Bassett knew w7here the gun was located. Thus, none of the evidence in the possession
of Bassett in support of Sheen as a possible suspect in the case constitutes newly discovered
evidence.
0

Bank Statement Envelopes

Petitioner argues that the State withheld exculpatory evidence which showed that at the
time of his murder, Brown had not yet received his October bank statement. At trial, the State
claimed that Petitioner killed Brown because she had stolen $3,000 from him by forging checks
and that he had discovered the theft when he received his October statement. Prosecutors argued
that, in order to cover up this fact, Petitioner stole the October bank statement. According to
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Petitioner, new evidence in the form of envelopes from Brown's prior bank statements, which
the police witlilield, show that the October bank statement was not mailed until after the fourth
day of the month, and possibly not until the seventh day of the month. Thus, the new evidence
shows that the October bank statement could not have been received before November 6th and,
therefore, that Petitioner could not have stolen the October statement as the prosecution had
claimed at trial. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 17-18, 23, 25, 29,
38; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 17-18, 27, 35-36.
However, as the State points out, and as Petitioner herself appears to acknowledge, bank
and postal employees testified at the preliminary hearing that the October bank statement "had
been 'cut' by the bank on October 29 and mailed four business days later on Thursday November
4. With delivery time, it would have arrived two days later, or Saturday, November 6." Pet'r
Mem. in Supp. of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 17-18. See also State's Mem. in Supp. at
25, 28. Because Petitioner and her trial counsel already knew when the October bank statement
had been mailed and that the statement would not have arrived until November 6th, the
information provided by the bank statement envelopes does not qualify as newly discovered
evidence.
Nevertheless, Petitioner insists in her opposition memorandum that she "and her [postconviction] counsel did not know when the October bank statement was mailed until they
discovered the bank statement envelopes in the police file on July 14, 2008." Pet'r Mem. in
Opp. at 18. It is not clear, however, how discovery of the bank statement envelopes from other
months, which specify mailing dates of the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th day of the month, warrants the
logical inference that the October statement was mailed on a specific day of the month. Indeed,
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the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing by bank and postal employees appears to

<

provide a more definitive assessment of when the October bank statement was mailed, and when
it would have arrived at Brown's home, than does the variety of mailing dates indicated on the
envelopes of the other bank statements.

!

In any event, even if the bank statement envelopes themselves were withheld by the
police and were not, presumably, discoverable by trial counsel either prior to or during trial as
i
Petitioner herself explains, the import of the envelopes is to show that Brown "would not have
received his statement before November 6th." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction
Relief at 25. Petitioner knew about this information prior to trial. Moreover, even if Petitioner

g

did not have this information, through the exercise of reasonable diligence trial counsel could
have discovered the actual date on which the October statement was mailed by asking for this
information from the bank. See State's Reply Mem. at 10.

*

For the foregoing reasons, information provided by the bank statement envelopes does
not constitute newly discovered evidence.
g)

Police Documents Related to Time of Death

Petitioner asserts that two newly discovered police documents corroborate that the time
of death could not have been during the morning hours of November 6th. The prosecutor argued
at trial that Brown was murdered around 7:00 a.m. on November 6th, which was the only time
during which Petitioner did not have an alibi. According to Petitioner newly discovered police
documents show that the medical examiner "twice explained to police that the time of death was

i

approximately 36 to 48 hours before the autopsy—between noon and midnight on Saturday,
November 6[th]." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 24.
I
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However, trial counsel indicated in his deposition that he was aware that testimony
concerning time of death was a very important issue in the case. See State's Mem. in Supp. at
29.

Furthermore, Petitioner herself states that in his trial testimony the medical examiner

"maintained his position that the medical evidence supported a time of death thirty-six hours
prior to the autopsy." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 24. Thus, the
facts set forth in the police reports in relation to time of death were already known to Petitioner
and her counsel at the time of trial and, therefore, this information does not qualify as newly
discovered evidence. Finally, because the definition of "newly discovered evidence" requires
that "the material evidence [cannot be] merely cumulative of evidence that was already known,"
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(ii), even if the information from the police documents was
not known and could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, it is
still merely cumulative of evidence that was already known to trial counsel. Therefore, this
information is not newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and cannot serve as a
basis for relief under Claim 2.
h}

Police Documents Concerning to Access to Brown's Home

Petitioner explains that the State's theory at trial was that Brown's home was secure, with
no signs of forced entry, and, therefore, the person who committed the murder must have entered
with a key. Since Petitioner had a key to Brown's house, the implication was that she was the
person who committed the murder. According to Petitioner, newly discovered documents show
that Brown's grandson Todd had broken into his grandfather's house on more than one occasion
and, moreover, that Brown's son Michael reported that his father never locked his front door.
Thus, Petitioner argues, contrary to the State's theory it is likely that entry into Brown's home

25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

p. n 1 © o 1

was forced. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 26-27; Pet'r Mem. in
Opp. at 36-37.
However, as Petitioner herself points out, photographic evidence available at the time of
trial "show[s] that [Brown's] home was in disrepair, that the glass in his front storm door was
smashed, that the front door had a broken lock, and that the back door was jimmied shut with a
knife and in even worse repair than the front door." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for PostConviction Relief at 27. In addition, one of the law enforcement officers testified at trial that
officers in the home who were investigating the murder opened one of the windows. Finally,
trial counsel has indicated that he recalls seeing photographs of Brown's house, viewing the front
and back doors, and considering the possibility of force entry. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 13,
29-30.
There is little question that the security of Brown's home, or the lack thereof, was known
to trial counsel prior to or at the time of trial and, therefore, is not newly discovered evidence.
Moreover, it is undisputed that trial counsel knew who Michael was, see Dep. of Shannon
Demler at 53, and that, although counsel "did not recall information that Todd Brown had broken
into the house, he did recall that Todd was considered a possible suspect." State's Mem. in
Supp. at 13. Both Michael and Todd were interviewed by the defense team. See Dep. of
Shannon Demler at 83-84. However, it is unclear whether trial counsel's knowledge of Michael
and that Todd was considered a suspect in the case is sufficient to also conclude that, through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, counsel could have discovered that Todd had broken into his
grandfather's home on multiple occasions and that Michael had information that his father never
locked his front door. Because this information was discovered during or after July 2008, see
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Decl. of Jensie Anderson at 2, and Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was filed on
March 4, 2009, it has been timely raised in support of Claim 2. Nevertheless, because the
security of Brown's home was a fact known to trial counsel at the time of trial, the information
concerning Todd and from Michael cannot constitute newly discovered evidence because, at
best, it is merely cumulative of evidence that was already known by trial counsel. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-9-i 04( I )(e)(ii). This information-is not, therefore, newly discovered evidence
and cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2.
i}

Police Investigation5

Petitioner argues that newly discovered evidence from internal police notes demonstrates
that the police mishandled the crime scene by failing to preserve critical financial information or
collect hair, fibers, blood, or other evidence left at the murder scene that had exculpatory value.
In addition, she also asserts that law enforcement failed to investigate other possible suspects or
secure .Brown's house. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet for Post-Conviction Relief at 12, 31-36;
Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 37-39. However, the internal police notes are relevant to the scope and
adequacy of the police investigation which could have been discovered by trial counsel through
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Indeed, trial counsel has averred that the prosecution had
an open-file policy which permitted counsel to examine the evidence in the State's possession.
In addition, how law enforcement investigated Brown's murder was known by trial counsel prior
to or at the time of trial. Law enforcement officers testified at the preliminary hearing and at trial

Problems related to the police investigation form the basis of issues raised in Claim 2 and Claim 3 of
Petitioner's post-conviction petition. However, the bulk of the discussion in her supporting memorandum occurs
under Claim 3, which is her due process claim, rather than under Claim 2, which seeks relief based upon newly
discovered evidence. In light of Petitioner's assertion that "all of [her] PCRA claims are based upon newly
discovered evidence," Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 31, the Court assumes that the problems she raises concerning the
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concerning the scope of their investigation.

Through the exercise of reasonable diligence,

including nothing more than simply asking questions of law enforcement, trial counsel could
have discovered what evidence was collected and preserved, what evidence was not collected
and preserved, when Brown's house was released to family members, who had been identified as
a suspect, which suspects had been investigated, and so forth. Therefore, information concerning
the police investigation from internal police notes are not based upon newly discovered evidence.
j)

Police Documents Showing that Petitioner Told Police She Borrowed
$3,000 from Brown

According to Petitioner, the prosecution's case against her relied, in part, upon the claim
that she had stolen Brown's October bank statement after his death in an effort to cover up the
fact that she had forged several of Brown's checks in the amount of $3,000. Petitioner argues
that, contrary to the State's claim, "newly discovered notes from a police interview demonstrate
that [she] voluntarily admitted to police that she owed [Brown] $3,000 at the time of his death."
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 25. However, despite this argument,
Petitioner also acknowledges that "[d]uring an interview on December 12, 1993, [she] . . .
voluntarily told police that she owed [Brown] $3,000." Id. at 17. Clearly, the information in the
police documents cannot constitute newly discovered evidence because the fact that Petitioner
told the police that she borrowed money from the victim is a fact that was known to Petitioner.
2.

Summary

In light of the foregoing considerations, none of the evidence that Petitioner has alleged is
newly discovered is, in fact, newly discovered evidence. With limited exceptions, all of the
information was either known or could have been discovered by Petitioner or her trial counsel at

police investigation under both Claim 2 and Claim 3 are, basically, the same. Therefore, the Court has opted to
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the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Because it is not disputed that the
decision on Petitioner's direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was entered on October 24,
1997 and that the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court was January 22, 1998, all of this information should have been raised in a petition filed on
or before January 22, 1999. Since Petitioner's post-conviction petition was not filed until March
4, 2009, Claim 2 is untimely to the extent it relies upon information that was known or could
have been discovered at trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
As for information from Geary concerning the link between Sheen and a blue and white
Ford Bronco, and information about Todd and from Michael in relation to the lack of security of
Brown's home, the Court has determined that this evidence (1) was not known and could not
have been discovered at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and (2)
was discovered by Petitioner's post-conviction counsel sometime during or after July 2009. It
follows, therefore, that the Geary affidavit and the information concerning Todd and Michael
was timely presented in Petitioner's current petition. Nevertheless, none of this evidence can
serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2 because it is all merely cumulative of evidence that wras
already known and, therefore, cannot constitute newly discovered evidence as defined by the
PCRA.
Based upon the foregoing assessment, all of the evidence presented by Petitioner in
support of Claim 2 was either known or could have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence or is evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence already known at trial.
None of the evidence, therefore, constitutes newly discovered evidence that can support relief
under Claim 2. Therefore, summary judgment is warranted on Claim 2.

consider this issue first under Claim 2.
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Claim 3: Petitioner's Right to Due Process Was Violated by an Inadequate Police
Investigation and a Rush to Judgment about the Real Perpetrator
Petitioner asserts in Claim 3 that newly discovered evidence from internal police notes

demonstrates that the police mishandled the crime scene by failing to preserve critical financial
information or collect hair, fibers, blood, or other evidence left at the murder scene that had
exculpatory value. In addition, she also asserts that law enforcement failed to investigate other
possible suspects or secure Brown's house. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction
Relief at 12, 31-36; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 37-39. These failures, Petitioner argues, violated her
right to due process.
However, trial counsel has indicated that the prosecution had an open-file policy, see
Dep. of Shannon Demler at 12, which, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, would have
permitted counsel to examine the evidence in the State's possession and determine the scope of
the police investigation. Indeed, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, including nothing
more than simply asking questions of law enforcement, trial counsel could have discovered what
evidence was collected and preserved, what evidence was not collected and preserved, when
Brown's house was released to family members, who had been identified as a suspect, which
suspects had been investigated, and so forth. Thus, none of the evidence on which Claim 3 is
based constitutes newly discovered evidence. Claim 3 should have been raised no later than
January 22, 1999. Since it was not raised until March 4, 2009, Claim 3 is untimely and.
therefore, summary judgment is warranted.
D.

Claim 4: Petitioner's Right to Due Process Was Violated when Police and
Prosecutors Withheld Exculpatory Evidence and when the Prosecutor Presented
Evidence He Knew Could Be Contradicted
Petitioner asserts in Claim 4 that her right to due process was violated when prosecutors
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withheld exculpatory evidence and presented evidence at trial that they knew could be
contradicted. According to Petitioner, during the post-conviction investigation she was finally
granted access to police files which included the following exculpatory evidence that was
probably never disclosed to trial counsel:
Police reports regarding at least three different witnesses who heard shots during
the weekend of Lael Brown's death and during a time when Debra Brown had an
alibi; witness reports of a blue and white Bronco vehicle seen at Lael Brown's
home at the time of his death and apparently never fully investigated by police;
information about Bobbie Sheen and his connection to the murder; Sylvan
Bassett's attempts to report his suspicions to Clara Brown and to police; police
reports showing that Debra Brown admitted borrowing $3,000 from Lael; and
bank statements6 showing that Lael Brown had not yet received his October
statement as was alleged at trial.
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 38.
First, with respect to the claim that previously undisclosed police files contained evidence
that Basset': attempted :o report his suspicions concerning Sheen to Brown's wife, this evidence
was not, hi fact, contained in any police files, but was raised by Bassett in his affidavit signed on
March 5, 2009. Indeed, according 10 Petitioner, "[n]either the State nor Petitioner can point to
any place in the case documents that mentions Sylvan Bassett's name," Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 9.
Second, as explained in the sections above, the remainder of the evidence referred to that was
allegedly contained in the police files is evidence that was either known or could have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and, therefore, is not newly discovered
evidence. Under the PCRA, this claim should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999.
Since it was not raised until March 4, 2009, Claim 4 is untimely and, therefore, summary

Presumably, Petitioner is referring to the bank statement envelopes from months other than October, and
not the bank statements themselves. See Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 18 ("Petitioner and her counsel did not know when
the October bank statement was mailed until they discovered the bank statement envelopes in the police file on July
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judgment is warranted.
E.

Claim 5: Petitioner's Trial and Appellate Counsel Were Ineffective in Violation of
Both the Utah and United States Constitutions
Petitioner asserts in Claim 5 that both her trial counsel and appellate counsel7 provided

ineffective representation.

In order to avoid summary judgment on a claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to each prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984): (1) that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 686. See also Buridy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1988) (to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a defendant must show,
first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second,
that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant,"); State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah
1985) (to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove "(1) that his counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the
trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error."). However, as the Supreme
Court noted in Strickland, "counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance"
and there is also a strong presumption that the outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 696.
Under the first prong of the test, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made

14,2008.").
In Petitioners case, her trial and appellate counsel were the same. However, while she refers to the
deficient performance of her attorneys as trial counsel, she nowhere sets forth the deficient performance of her
attorneys as anpeliate counsel.
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errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. The seriousness of any errors is judged by whether counsel's
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. In this context,
the "reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the
defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on
informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the
defendant." Id. at 691. In challenging counsel's effectiveness, a petitioner "must identify the
acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The Court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances,
the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance." Id. at 690. In making this determination, fairness requires "that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective: at the
time." Id. at 689. Moreover, the assessment of counsel's performance cannot be based upon
"what is prudent or appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled." United
States v. Cronic, 466 U S 648, 665 n.38 (1984).
With respect to the second prong of the test, even if a finding is made that an attorney's
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must fail if the errors committed by counsel had no effect on the outcome
of the criminal proceeding. Id. at 691. A petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
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the outcome.

Id. at 694.

Petitioner raises two theories of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, she argues that
trial counsel were deficient in failing to present exculpatory evidence that was available to them
at the time of trial. Alternatively, she argues that if the Court finds that trial counsel could have,
with reasonable diligence, discovered the exculpatory evidence she sets forth in her
memorandum in support of her post-conviction petition, then her counsel were deficient in
failing to do so. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 40. She further
argues that had trial counsel not performed deficiently in failing to present a wealth of
exculpatory evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of her trial would have
been different, namely, that she would not have been convicted. See id. at 41. As the State aptly
points out, however, any exculpatory evidence not presented by trial counsel because it was not
known and could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence cannot
be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Clearly, not presenting evidence that
was neither known nor could not have been discovered does not constitute deficient
performance. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 25; State's Reply Mem. at 11. Therefore, summary
judgment is warranted with respect to Claim 5 insofar as it is based upon newly discovered
evidence.
The State also argues that "[i]f the evidence was available to counsel at the time of trial
or could have been discovered by him, then the evidence does not qualify as newly discovered
evidence and [Claim 5] is untimely." State's Reply Mem. at 11. As noted previously, any claim

This showing is greater than simply demonstrating uthat the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding," but less than demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct/more likely than not
altered the outcome in the case." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984).
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based upon newly discovered evidence should have been raised by Petitioner within one year
from the date her cause of action accrued, which was January 22, 1998. It follows, therefore,
that her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel's failure to present
exculpatory evidence that was already known, or that is based upon the failure of trial counsel to
discover exculpatory evidence that could have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. Because Claim 5
was not raised until March 4, 2009, it is untimely and, therefore, summary judgment is
warranted.
F.

Alternative Requests for Relief
Petitioner states in her opposition memorandum that all of her claims are baised upon

newly discovered evidence, see Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 31, and argues that none of the claims are
time-barred under the statute of limitations. She further argues, however, that even if the Court
concludes that her post-conviction claims are time-barred, the Court should either (1) set aside
the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or (2) find that the PCRA's one-year statute of
limitations is unconstitutional because it does not include an interests of justice exception.
1.

"Obvious Injustice" Argument

In support of her request to have the Court set aside her default based upon an obvious
injustice, Petitioner relies on federal caselaw tnat addresses exceptions to procedurally defaulted
claims in federal court. See id at 45-46 (citing Schlup v Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)). As the
State argues, however, ?;hese exceptions are relevant only to procedurally defaulted claims raised
in federal court and do not apply to claims raised under Utah's PCRA. Therefore, they cannot
independently justify granting Petitioner's request.
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In addition, Petitioner also relies on the case of Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, 128 P.3d
1123, which allowed a Brady claim to proceed many years after trial when previously
undisclosed material evidence was discovered.9 In Tillman, the Utah Supreme Court held that
even if it were to conclude that the petitioner could have raised his Brady claim in one of his

1

previous petitions for post-conviction relief, this failure should be excused because the "Brady
claim was overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction process."
Id. at 1[25. The Supreme Court further stated that it has consistently recognized exceptions to
procedural defaults "in 'unusual circumstances' where 'good cause' excuses a petitioner's failure
to raise the claim earlier," id at ^[20 (quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037 (Utah 1989)),
and in those rare cases "where 'an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional ight has occurred' that would make it 'unconscionable' not to reexamine the
issue. Id. at 1[2i (quoting Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035).
Notwithstanding the language from Tillman and Hurst, this Court has a "duty . . . to
implement the law as it reads," Stephens v. Bonneville Travel 935 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah 1997),
and it cannot ignore the 2009 amendments to.Rule 65C that removed the former "good cause"
language and added other language expressly espousing the PCRA as the law governing "the
manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and
sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal." Utah R. Civ.
P. 65C(a). When these changes are considered in combination with statutory amendments made
m 2008 that now make the PCRA. "the sole remedy" for any person seeking to collaterally

Importantly, the Tillman case does not address exceptions to the PCRA's statute of limitations, but only
"good cause" exceptions to procedural defaults, specifically where a claim could have been raised in a prior postconviction petition, but was :-.iot
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challenge a conviction or sentence, it is the Court's considered view that the overall intent of
these rule and statutory alterations was to restrict any exceptions to procedural or statute of
limitations defaults to those found in the PCRA.

This view is bolstered by the advisory

committee note to rule 65C which states that the "2009 amendments embrace Utah's PostConviction Remedies Act as the law governing post-conviction relief." Utah R. Civil P. 65C,
advisor}7 committee note.10
In addition, both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have
commented that the "sole remedy" language "in Section 78B-9-102 appears to have extinguished
our common law writ authority for future cases." Peterson v. Kennard, 2008 UT 90, ^[16 n.8,
201 P.3d 956. See also Kissell v. State, 2010 UT App 123 n.3 (unpublished) (referring to the
"sole remedy" language, the Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he 2008 amendment . . . of the
PCRA appears to have extinguished our authority to apply the unusual circumstances
exception.").

In light of these recent rule and statutory changes, the Court cannot grant

Petitioner's request and excuse her failure to timely raise her post-conviction claims.11
2.

Constitutional Argument

Petitioner also argues that her failure to timely raise her claims should be excused
because an interest of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations is a constitutional

Although advisory committee notes are not authoritative, they still "merit great weight in any
interpretation of [the] rule[]." Burns v. Bovden, 2006 UT 14, |18 n.6, 133 P.3d 370. The Utah Supreme Court has
"primary constitutional authority to adopt these rules." Id Because adoption of the rules do not require legislative
approval, "the advisory committee note[] [is] a .• . . reliable indicator of [the Utah Supreme Court's] intent in
adopting the rules." Id.
Any remedy in terms of excusing the failure to timely raise a post-conviction claim can only come from
the Utah Supreme Court. See Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, ^[93, 234 P.3d 1115 (agreeing with the State's position
"that this court [meaning the Supreme Court] retains constitutional authority, even when a petition is procedurally
barred, to determine whether denying relief would result in an egregious injustice." (emphasis added)).
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requirement and the Utah Legislature's removal of this exception in 2008 rendered the
limitations period unconstitutional. In support, Petitioner cites to the case of Julian v. State, 966
P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), where the Utah Supreme Court stated that because a "proper consideration
of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of
justice[J . . . [i]t necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied
to bar a habeas petition." IcL at 254 (emphasis in original). Since the PCRA's statute of
limitations no longer includes an interest of justice exception, Petitioner argues that it "is plainly
unconstitutional and cannot be applied to bar [her] claims." Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 50.
In considering whether a particular legislative enactment is constitutional, the Court must
"begin[] with the premise that 'statutes are presumed to be constitutional.'" Salt Lake City v.
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Rio Vista Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349
(Utah 1990)). See also State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^|42, 99 P.3d 820 0"[Legislative enactments
are presumed to be constitutional'") (quoting Greenwood v. Citv of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d
816, 819 (Utah 1991)); Preece v. Rampton, 492 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1972 ("[A]n enactment of
the legislature is presumed to be constitutional and it should not be stricken down unless it is
clearly and unequivocally in conflict with a constitutional provision."); Avis v. Board of Review,
837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("State legislatures possess the discretion to enact
statutes of limitations, and these statutes are presumptively constitutional."). The Utah Supreme
Court has expressly held that "only when statutes manifestly infringe upon some constitutional
provision [can they] be declared void . . . [and] [e]very reasonable presumption must be indulged
in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of constitutionality." In re Estate of Baer, 562
P,2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977).

Moreover, "those who challenge a statute or ordinance as
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unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality." Greenwood, 817 P.2d
at 819. See also Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 347 (Utah 1991) ("The burden is on
the [challenger] to affirmatively demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the statute.").
Generally, a "statute of limitations precludes suit a statutorily specified number of years
after a cause of action accrues." Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123,
125 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

"Statutes of limitations 'are designed to promote justice by

preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'" Myers v.
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway
Express Agency. Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)).

"To be constitutional, a statute of

limitations must allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises."
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). The United States Supreme
Court has opined that "[wjhat shall be considered a reasonable time must be settled by the
judgment of the legislature, and the courts will not inquire into the wisdom of establishing the
period of legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes
a denial of justice." Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U S. 55, 63 (1902). See also Avis, 837 P.2d at
587 ("State legislatures possess the discretion to enact statutes of limitations.").
As Petitioner points out, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Julian that because the
"proper consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in
the interests of justicef,] . . . [i]t necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition." Julian, 966 P.2d at 254 (emphasis m original).
The conclusion Petitioner draws from this language, and which she asserts is binding on the
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Court, is that any statute of limitations under the PCRA is unconstitutional if it excludes an
interests of justice exception. While the logical inference Petitioner draws from the Supreme
Court's language may be correct, whether it constitutes an authoritative pronouncement is less
clear. As the State points out, and as the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized, see Swart v.
State, 1999 UT App 96, f3, 976 P.2d 100, the Supreme Court's language in Julian is dicta12 and
was not an essential part of the Supreme Court's holding in the case because the petitioner was
not challenging the constitutionality of the PCRA's statute of limitations. Normally, comments
that "are dicta[] . . . are not binding authority."13 State v. Worthen 2008 UT App 23, 1J17, 177
P.3d 664.

See also Black's Law Dictionary 1100 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "dictum" as a

statement in an opinion that is "unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
precedential.").
The fact that the Supreme Court's language in Julian is dicta, rather than binding
authority, is significant in the Court's view, because, as noted above, the Supreme Court has
itself more recently determined, based upon its rule-making authority, see Burns v. Boyden,
2006 UT 14,1| 18 n.6, 133 P.3d 370 (Utah Supreme Court has "primary constitutional authority to
adopt these rules."), that the judiciary will exercise its constitutional powers over post-conviction
cases within the parameters of the PCRA. Rule 65C expressly states that the PCRA "sets forth

^ i he language from Julian that uno statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas
petition" was also quoted in Frausto v. State. 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). However, the lead opinion did not garner a
majority. Two justices concurred only in the result, namely, that "courts must always consider the 'interests of
justice' exception in [the PCRA] when a petitioner raises meritorious claims." Id. at 851 Judge Bench from the
Court of Appeals, who was sitting in for Justice Stewart, also only concurred in the result, but specifically indicated
that he adisagree[d] with the main opinion's holding that 'a petitioner's failure to comply with a statute of
limitations may never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a habeas corpus petition.'" Id at 852 (Bench, J.,
concurring).
Dicta may, of course, be considered persuasive.
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nni

the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and
sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal" Utah R. Civ.
P. 65C(a). This change to rule 65C was adopted by the Supreme Court with the knowledge that
the Legislature in 2008 had removed the interests of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of
limitations. Clearly, the logical inference drawn by Petitioner from the Supreme Court's dicta
that no statute of limitations can be constitutional if it lacks an interest of justice exception is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent adoption of a rule that embraces the PCRA, which
does not include an interests of justice exception, as the law governing petitions for postconviction relief. Petitioner has not adequately explained why the Supreme Court's more recent
actions are not a repudiation of the dicta in Julian. Thus, Petitioner has not carried her burden of
demonstrating that the Legislature's removal of the interests of justice exception renders the
PCRA's statute of limitations provision unconstitutional.
In addition, Petitioner has not otherwise shown that the PCRA's one-year statute of
limitations, with its accompanying tolling provisions,14 is so inflexible, see Currier v. Holden,
862 P.2d 1357, 1371 (Utah Ct App. 1993) (striking 90-day limitations period because of
inflexibility), or "is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice,"
Wilson. 185 U.S. 55 at 63, and, therefore, unconstitutional Section 78B-9-107(2)(d) specifically
allowed Petitioner to raise claims based upon evidentiary facts that were previously unknown to
her and which could not have been known to her through the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Again, in the Court's considered view, requiring Petitioner to raise her claims within one year

14

The limitations period is tolled when (1) "the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state
action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity," Utah Code Ann. §
786-9-107(3); and (2) "during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting: (a) exoneration through DNA
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from the date she learned of the evidentiary facts in support of her claims is a "reasonable time
for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises"15 Berry, 717 P.2d at 672, and does not
render the statute of limitations "inflexible." Rather, it merely requires Petitioner to be diligent
in pursuing her claims for relief. Additionally, the equitable tolling provisions, which replaced
the interest of justice exception, further mitigate against any alleged inflexibility by tolling the
limitations period "due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to
physical or mental incapacity." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). Petitioner has simply not
provided the Court with a cogent argument showing that the PCRA's statute of limitations is
impermissibly inflexible or that insufficient time was allowed for her to adequately raise her
post-conviction claims. She has not, therefore, carried her burden of demonstrating that the
PCRA's statute of limitations provision is unconstitutional.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot grant Petitioner's request to excuse her
failure to timely file her post-conviction claims based upon her argument that the PCRA's statute
of limitations is unconstitutional.
V. Conclusion
Petitioner raises five separate claims for relief in her post-conviction petition, all of which
she alleges are supported by newly discovered evidence. The State argues that none of the
evidence is newly discovered and, therefore, Petitioner's claims are all time-barred. With respect

testing . . . or (b) factual innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78b-9-107(4).
"Although clearly not dispositive, it is at least noteworthy that the one-year statute of limitations
applicable to federal writs of habeas corpus has not been found to constitute a suspension of the writ. See Hill v.
Dailey, 557 F.3d 437, 438 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Like every other court of appeals to address the issue, this court has held
that [the] . . . one-year statute of limitations does not improperly suspend the writ of habeas corpus."); Wyzykowski
v. Dept. of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Every court which has addressed the issue-i.e.,
whether, as a general matter, [the one-year statute of limitations] constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of the
writ-has concluded that it does not.").
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to Claim 1, which alleges that newly discovered evidence establishes that Petitioner is innocent
under the Utah Determination of Factual Innocence statute, summary judgment is warranted
because the PCRA expressly states that the "court may not grant relief from a conviction based
on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for which convicted." Utah Code Ann. §
78B-9-104(3).
With respect to Claim 2, which alleges that newly discovered evidence demonstrates that
no reasonable trier of fact could have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, none of
the alleged new-found information set forth in Petitioner's post-conviction petition constitutes
newly discovered evidence. First, most of the information was known or could have been
discovered at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. To the extent Claim
2 relies upon this evidence, it should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. Since it
was not raised until March 4, 2010, Claim 2 is untimely.

Second, the remainder of the

information is evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence that was known at trial. This
information also does not constitute newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and,
therefore, cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2. For these reasons, summary judgment
is warranted on Claim 2,
In terms of Claim 3, which alleges that Petitioner's right to due process was violated by
an inadequate police investigation and a rush to judgment that Petitioner was the real perpetrator,
and Claim 4, which alleges that Petitioner's right to due process was violated when police and
prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence, none of the evidence on which these two claims rely
constitutes newly discovered evidence. Thus, these claims should have been raised no later than
January 22, 1999. Since they were not raised until March 4, 2010, Claims 3 and 4 are untimely
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and, therefore, summary judgment is warranted.
As for Claim 5, which alleges that Petitioner's trial and appellate counsel were ineffective
in violation of both the Utah and United States constitutions, to the extent Claim 5 relies upon
newly discovered evidence, summary judgment is warranted because the failure to present
exculpatory evidence that was not known and could not have been discovered through the
exercise of reasonable diligence cannot constitute deficient performance, On the other hand, to
the extent Claim 5 relies upon evidence that is not newly discovered, summary judgment is also
warranted because the failure to present exculpatory evidence that was known or that could have
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been raised no later
than January 22, 1999.
Finally, the Court cannot excuse Petitioner's failure to timely raise her claims. No
provision in the PCRA or rule 65C permits the Court to excuse her default. Moreover, the Court
finds that Petitioner has not carried her burden of demonstrating that the PCRA's statute of
limitations is unconstitutional because it lacks an interest of justice exception.
Order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief is GRANTED. This Memorandum Decision and Order constitute the
final order of the Court. No further order is necessary to effectuate the Court' sjieoisi
DATED this _QA

day of December, 20^).

(

MJM.

Michael D. DiReda
Second District Judge
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1

WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN, UTAH; JANUARY 14, 2011

2

JUDGE MICHAEL DIREDA

3

(Transcriber's note: speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

7

Good morning, Ms. Brown,.

8
9

Good morning, counsel.
We have not had the

opportunity to meet yet, so welcome.
Let's turn to the matter of Debra Brown vs. the

10 I State of Utah. This is Case 100903670.

This is the time set

11

for a variety of things so if you'll bear with me, counsel.

12

I received - and maybe it would be easiest to say I received

13

a hearing brief at 4:13 yesterday from you, Mr. Sullivan, and

14

your associates.

15

been submitted up in Logan I believe and I wondered, not

16

having had the time to go through and compare the two, are

17

they the same or is the new one significantly different?

18

There was a prior hearing brief that had

MR. SULLIVAN:

Not significantly different.

I can

19

explain to you what the differences are.

20

tried to update some authorities but we omitted the portions

21

of the brief that dealt with the PCRA claims except for the

22

ineffectiveness of counsel portion of the PCRA claim.

23

THE COURT:

24 J

MR. SULLIVAN:

25

I think we may have

Okay.
And we included those for, obviously

we're moving for the Court to reconsider that.
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We also, I

believe a dded one witness, Shannon Dernier , but otherwise the
witnesses are the same and so the canswer is it's largely the
same with those differences.
THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

I appreciate the

courtesy copy binder that you provided to the Court.

That

was helpf ul to me.
MR. SULLIVAN:

You're welcome.

MR. MARTINEZ:

Your Honor, one more thing, the

exhibit 1 ist that was attached was actually our exhibit list
from the last trial.

There's been a few minor changes.

I've

given the State the exhibit list with the minor changes and I
have another copy of the hearing brief wi th the correct
exhibit 1 ist if Your Honor doesn't mind, I'll approach and
hand it t o you.
THE COURT:

That's fine.

Thank you.

So the one

that was given to me last night has even been modified once
again?
MR. MARTINEZ:

Yes, Your Honor, just the exhibit

list.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. MARTINEZ:
THE COURT:

There was five changes.

So the one you just handed me is the

one that I ought to be - the other two I can just set aside
for now; is that right?
MR. MARTINEZ:

Yes, Your Honor.
2
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THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

If you saw my bi g box

up here with all the files and all the extraneous materials,
you'd understand, I'm running out of room.

I'm going to have

to move into a se cond box.
All right.

Let me do my best to try to organize

this and I don't know whether before we launch into the
Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment on the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, if we ought to discuss the
State's Motion to Reconsider the issue of bifurcation.

Now I

recognize that to some degree, Ms,. Riley, the Court's
decision on ineffective assistance, could render a decision
on bifurcation unnecessary.

But I guess what I wanted to

address with your folks is that I've not received a response
by Mr. Sullivan and his associates and I wanted to discuss
procedurally whether they intend to respond to it, whether
they wanted to deal with this issue of ineffective assistance
first and then talk about bifurcation.
Mr. Martinez, Mr. Sullivan, talk to me about that.
I mean, that came sort of late in the process, I recognize MR. SULLIVAN:

Yes it did.

We have not responded.

Our time for responding has not come and we calculated and it
would come basically after our hearing is probably going to
be over and so the first point I would make is what the Court
just observed, that unless the Court grants our Motion for
Reconsideration, there is really nothing to bifurcate.
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1

mean, we have the innocense hearing that will start on

2

Tuesday and that will go forward regardless of the

3

bifurcation issue.

4

Court's reconsideration.

5

will do, if the Court grants our Motion for Reconsideration,

6

then we will be trying the PCRA claims with the innocense

7 I claims.

That will go forward regardless of the
If the Court grants, as we hope it

We have intended unless otherwise ordered by the

8

Court to, or requested by the Court to respond in due course

9

to the bifurcation motion and although I did not speak with

10

Ms. Riley, I understand that she probably doesn't have

11 J problem with that.
12

We think it's, for purposes of the

hearing beginning on Tuesday, we think it's really too late

13 I to bring this bifurcation motion.

We also believe that the

14

reasons that supported Judge Allen's decision last year to

15

deny bifurcation are equally pertinent right now and I can go

16

into those but the Court will remember what they are.

17

the Court would like us to respond sooner than the time

18

required by the rules, we will certainly do so.

19

prefer not to because we're trying to get ready for a trial

20

starting on Tuesday and that's where we are.

21 J

THE COURT:

Okay.

22

Ms. Riley, did you want to respond?

23

MS. RILEY:

So if

We would

All right.

Yes, just briefly, Your Honor.

The

24

State's concern about this is how the two petitions will

25

proceed to appeal and so our main point in filing the Motion
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for Reconsideration of the Bifurcation is because the summary
judgment decision was granted and it's our position that
that's a final order as to the post conviction petition.

But

because the two petitions were filed together and one case
number, that makes the waters a little bit muddy.
THE COURT:

In terms of whether it's a final order.

MS. RILEY:

Right, for purposes of appeal.

THE COURT:

Okay. .

MS. RILEY:

So that's why we renewed the Motion for

Bifurcation is that it would be our preference and we think
it would be more clear cut on appeal to have them separated.
Now, I spoke with Mr. Martinez yesterday and told
him, as I pointed out in the motion that we may, even if
bifurcation isn't granted we may argue anyway that the
summary judgment decision is a final order on the postconviction petition.

We think it would be more clear cut if

they were actually bifurcated but I wanted to warn them about
that for purposes of filing their notice of appeal.

And we

have agreed and Mr. Martinez has a stipulation today that we
don't oppose their extending the time for filing a notice of
appeal 30 days.
And I should point too that if the Court grants the
Motion for Reconsideration and we're required to proceed to
the evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, we're not really seeking to bifurcate again at
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1

that point.

The reason we wanted a bifurcation is if the

2

summary judgment decision remains in effect, that they'll be

3

separated for purposes of appeal.

4

first that a decision on bifurcation if the summary judgment

5

decision remains in effect, occurs before a final decision is

6

entered on the factual innocense petition.

7

don't care when we argue it.

8

middle of a hearing even if I'm not but that a ruling should

9

be made in the Motion to Bifurcate before a final ruling on

10

the factual innocense petition because after a final ruling

And so our concerns are

In other words, I

I understand they'll be in the

11 J is entered on that, I don't think, I think the Court loses
12

jurisdiction and it can't rule on the bifurcation and the

13

point of bifurcation would be to separate the two petitions

14

for appeal.

15

I say, I'm not concerned about timing here, I don't want to

16

pressure them and if they want to wait and argue it at the

17

conclusion of the hearing or something like that, that's fine

18

with me too, just so that a ruling on the bifurcation is

So that's kind of the position we're in and like

19 ! entered prior to entry of the final decision on the factual
20

innocense decision.

21 |

THE COURT:

22

MR. SULLIVAN:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SULLIVAN:

25

Okay.
Your Honor, may I say one word?

Please.
I was prompted by Ms. Riley to

comment.
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THE COURT:

That's more than one word but...

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

Yeah it is.

...you keep going.

MR. SULLIVAN:

Several words, Your Honor.

We do

not believe that the Court's ruling on the PCRA claims was a
final judgment because it didn't dispose of all claims in the
case.
THE COURT:

Given its current composition. .

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

Given its current composition.

But as Ms. Riley indicates, if there

was a decision to bifurcate, would that not then render the
summary judgment decision on the PCRA claims a final
judgment?
MR. SULLIVAN:

Ms. Riley and I may disagree on it,

I don't think it would but I guess we don't need to get into
that right now and the only thing I wanted to say is that we
became concerned when we were advised through the Motion to
Bifurcate, that the State would take the position or may take
the position that the Court's ruling on the PCRA claims is a
final judgment for purposes of the requirement of filing a
notice of appeal within 30 days and so, although we disagree
with that position, we don't want to take any risks and so
what we have done with the stipulation with the concurrence
of the State is to prepare a joint and stipulated motion for
extension of time to file notice of appeal under Rule 4 of
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the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Ms. Riley has signed
on behalf of the State and I'd like to present that to the
Court.

The effect of that, Your Honor, is to allow us an

additional 30-day period beyond the normal 30-day period in
which to make the decision to file a notice of appeal and to
file the notice (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN:

And attached as Exhibit A to this

original copy is the proposed form of order that we have for
the Court.
THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

I'm not quite sure how to address this issue.

I'm

trying to address all of what I perceive are loose ends
before we begin discussing this Motion to Reconsider.
Mr. Nolan, you alluded to the fact on our telephone
conference and I wish I could recreate the way that you
phrased your thought process on this issue, but it gave me
concern and so I thought long and hard about how to broach
this subject.

You made reference in the telephone conference

to the - and we had some discussion about the applicability
or the appropriateness of a motion for summary judgment on
the factual innocense determination petition.

I know Mr.

Sullivan expressed some concern about the untimeliness of
that and I believe your response to that was we could not
have responded any sooner or we could not have brought it any
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1

sooner until we saw what the Court's decision was on summa ry

2

judgment relative to the PCRA claims.

3

quite honestly recently and 1<Doked at Judge Allen's Motion to

4

- or ruling on Motion to Dismiss, but as I understood his .

5

ruling, it dealt with some of these issues, did it not?

6

Would anyone be willing to tell me because I understood that

7

to some degree that was what was addressed in the motion to

8

dismiss.

9

I've not gone back

Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Nolan?
MR. SULLIVAN:

The question that was decided in

10

Judge Allen's ruling was the sufficiency of the pleadings, of

11

the complaint and its compliance with the portions of the

12

innocense statute that deal with - let me just get it here -

13

that deal with the requirements for the petition which would

14

be 78B-9-402 (a), (2a) and (3). And that was the purpose of

15

that and we intend to take the position, Your Honor, that

16

that's been decided, that the pleading is sufficient and the

17

issues that are now before the Court on the innocense statute

18

is whether Ms. Brown is innocent, subject to the question of

19

whether she's innocent.

20

we complied with 402 (2a) or (3).

21

THE COURT:

We're beyond the question of whether

Well, and this is where I'm struggling

22

a little bit because I guess I'm wondering, Mr. Sullivan, if

23

the Court determined as it did as part of the summary

24

judgment motion on the PCRA claims that the evidence was not

25

newly discovered, then would the arguments advanced there be
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equally applicable under the factual innocense determination?
MR. SULLIVAN:

No, it wouldn't and we'd like to -

if the Court is entertaining issues in that regard, we'd like
the opportunity to brief it because we think the statutes are
different.
THE COURT:

Right.

MR. SULLIVAN:

We think the Court made an error

with respect, we think the Court made an error in
interpreting the PCRA statute, but the innocense statute is
different and we do not believe that under the innocense
statute and particularly the relevant provisions, that the
knowledge of counsel, even if they had knowledge, would be
imputable to the petitioner in the case.

So we don't believe

the Court's ruling should apply under the innocense statute
but we need to brief it for the Court if —
THE COURT:

Well, I'm only raising it because I

don't want to be blind sided and I would rather know where
I'm headed and I guess my view is, if we begin the hearing on
Tuesday as we decided and I start hearing evidence on this
factual innocense determination, in my view, we're going all
the way to the end and I'm making the decision about Ms.
Brown's innocense.

What I don't want to do is spend two

weeks hearing evidence and then have somehow this Motion to
Dismiss resurrect at the end.

So I guess I'm just sort of

firing a preemptive strike and saying if we're going to deal
10
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1

with it, we're going to deal with it before we start our

2

evidentiary hearing or if we start the hearing we're moving

3 I on.

I just don't want to be doing the hearing - because the

4

whole point is, I mean - the whole point in bringing the

5

summary judgment as you know better than I to avoid having to

6

go forward with trial and so I just don't want to be asked to

7 I in essence engage in a summary judgment analysis after we're
8

heard all the evidence.

9

MR. SULLIVAN:

10

Court should.

I mean, do you agree with that?
Absolutely, and we don't think the

We're at the point where we need to have a

11 I hearing on innocense.
12
13

THE COURT:

And so the only reason I raise it is

because Mr. Nolan raised it in our telephone conference and

14 I it gave me concern that he hasn't filed anything and I'm not
15

inviting him to, but I'm concerned that somehow this is going

16

to rear its head at the end of our factual innocense trial

17

and I'm saying, Wait a second, I'm going to put a stop to

18

this now.

19

going to brief it and we're going to deal with it now or

20

we're moving on as you would prefer.

21 I
22
23 I

We're either going to deal with it and you're

MR. SULLIVAN:

We would prefer and we think it's

too late to bring another motion for summary judgment.
THE COURT:

All right.

So let me then turn to you

24

Mr. Nolan because you were the one that kind of alluded to

25

this and I just want some clarification from you.
11
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1

MR. NOLAN:

Well, Your Honor, we think the Court is

2

spot on on your analysis.

We do think that you're exactly

3

right, you are going to have to deal with it, whether you

•4

deal with it on the front end or at the close of the

5

petitioner's case but you are going to have to deal with it.

6

It's the State's position that Judge Allen ruled only on the

7 I sufficiency of the pleadings as to whether or not there was a
8

genuine, a bonafide issue as to factual innocense which

9

entitled the case to go forward to a hearing.

That's the

10

extent of the effect of his ruling on the State's initial

11

motion to dismiss.

12

original version of the factual innocense statute before it

13

was amended by the legislature last year and even after the

14

legislature amended it, retroactively so that it applies to

15

this and all other pending cases, that remains the status of

16

the case procedurally; namely, step one is do you get to a

17

hearing at all and that was Judge Allen's decision on the

18

State's initial motion to dismiss and the Judge decided yes,

19

you get to a hearing.

20

rule on the merits of the innocence claim. And so what we

It's a threshold requirement under the

That's as far as he went.

He did not

21 I raised in the telephone conference and what we are asserting
22

again today is that we do, in fact, since the Court's ruling

23

on summary judgment, assert that on the merits of the

24

innocence claim, the very same issues on which the Court.

25

ruled and found summary judgment on the PCRA claims, apply
12
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and the same analysis on the factual innocense claims as to
whether or not the newly discovered evidence, so-called,
applies in this case and that we are going to go through the
same analysis.

We're going to object on the same basis if

the petitioner attempts to introduce that evidence and the
Court is going to have to come to grips with those very same
issues because as we argued then and as we renew our argument
now, the evidence is exactly the same which they have
asserted since day one upon both the PCRA and on the factual
innocense claims and because of that, that was why we raised
the issue of. summary judgment and then counsel made his
objection and we, in our discussions at the Attorney
General's Office decided, okay, if in fact the Court was not
favorably inclined to consider summary judgment at this
point, then we would simply renew it by way of a motion to
dismiss at the close of the petitioner's case in chief, we'll
argue it, we'll brief it if the Court wants us to and we'll
submit it at that point and the Court then can deal with the
issue and if the Court denies it, then the State puts on its
rebuttal case.

But it's the State's position that this Court

is in fact going to have to come to grips with that very
issue, absolutely.
THE COURT:

Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN:

We disagree.

We think that what

Judge Allen did, if you read the last paragraph of his ruling
13
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from last (inaudible) don't remember exactly when it was but
it is he ordered a hearing and he ordered a hearing in the
context of the innocense statute, he ordered a hearing when
those procedural issues like newly discovered evidence have
been past and that was the effect of that ruling and so we
think, Your Honor, we've been set for a trial twice, we're
ready to go again and we would just as leave not be prevented
from going forward this time because we think that issue is
past and if they want to raise the issue at the close of our
evidence, then we will deal with it at that point in time.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

Then let's turn, Mr.

Sullivan, to your Motion to Reconsider.
MR. REED:

Your Honor -

THE COURT:

Yes, Mr. Reed?

MR. REED:

- may it please the Court?

with the State as well.

(Inaudible)

This is my first appearance.

May I

speak from the table?
- THE COURT:
MR. REED:

Please.
One other minor matter that the Court

should be aware of has to do with regard to the
transportation of the petitioner.

She has, as the Court is

aware, been transported from the Utah State Prison to the
Weber County Jail.

She's present here today and parties have

crafted an order for the Judge to sign today which
memorializes the arrangement for that.

She is an inmate of
14
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the Department of Corrections, she's in their custodial care,
she's being transferred to Weber County Jail for purposes of
this hearing.

As I understand it in talking with corrections

officials yesterday, their intention is for her to remain
throughout the proceedings starting today until its
conclusion and there won't be any need to transport her back
to the prison on weekends.

As the Court is aware, next

weekend is a holiday, so it's really a 3-day hiatus.

In the

previous matter, it was their requirement that if at any time
she wasn't actively engaged in Cache County at that hearing
that she would be required to go back to USP.
way is simpler.

We think this

We certainly agree with the way the

department has decided to handle this and we appreciate the
cooperation of Weber County.
The Court should be aware of one other thing and
I'm going to take this upon myself to kind of be the
messenger.

You'll sign that order today we believe and then

corrections will get a copy of the signed order and then the
situation as I've explained it will ensue.
However, in talking with counsel today, there is
some concern on the part of Ms. Brown that her current living
arrangements in the prison which she considers to be
satisfactory to her, not be changed, that is they don't move
her cell and they don't.change her cell mate or anything like
that and I think that's an appropriate request.

I can't
15
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speak for corrections and I think it's kind of an ill fit for
the Court to presume to direct the activities of the
executive branch, but I would like to be able to go back to
the Department of Corrections and say that the Judge is
highly supportive of the notion that Ms. Brown's living
arrangements remain static throughout and then depending on
the Court's ruling, I guess we'll take it from there.
Obviously if the Court rules in her favor, she won't be
residing there and that's not going to be an issue.

If she

is however, then we'd like that situation to remain the same,
notwithstanding the turmoil in the constant change that
happens at the prison facility.

So with the Court's

permission and counsel's discussion, I'd like to be able to
make that representation to the department after today.
THE COURT:

That's fine.

Ms. Brown, just for your benefit, I tell all
individual who appear in front of me, I don't have the
authority to dictate what the jail does and/or the prison but
I'm certainly happy to allow Mr. Reed to communicate to the
officials at the Department of Corrections that my view is in
accommodating them by having you stay up here in Weber
County, that your living arrangements down at the prison not
be manipulated or changed in any way.

Now, you have to

understand that that's only a recommendation, that they're
free to do what they choose to do and I can't make you any
16
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1

guarantees or promises that they will follow my

2

recommendation.

Do you understand that?

3

DEFENDANT BROWN:

4

MR. REED:

5

THE COURT:

6

Thank you, Your Honor.
All right and you have that order or

you're going to prepare —

7 I

MR. REED:

8

MR. MARTINEZ:

9
10

I do.

Mr. Martinez has it.
One other thing on the order, Your

Honor, the State and we have agreed in this order to ask you
to allow Ms. Brown to be unshackled during the hearing and to

11 J appear in civilian clothes which we will provide and so
12

that's included in the order and we ask that you consider

13

that.

14

THE COURT:

Is that because you think that somehow

15

my view will be skewed by seeing her in inmate clothing or is

16

that just for her comfort and convenience?

17

MR. MARTINEZ:

I think, Your Honor, we're not

18

concerned about your view being skewed, this isn't a jury

19

trial, it's in front of Your Honor.

20

As much as anything, it's for Ms. Brown's comfort and

You know the situation.

21 I convenience during the course of this trial to allow her to
22

appear in civilian clothes and unshackled and to be able to,

23

you know, be more of a participant in the hearing.

24

THE COURT:

25 |

MR. REED:

Mr. Reed, on that later issue?
Certainly we don't have any preference
17
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that way.

I would just point out to the Court that in

similar situations where inmates appear in court proceedings
and motions made, it's generally left to the Court's
discretion or the institution with regard to their policy on
safety and such.
THE COURT:

Which would be my position here.

I

don't think that I - I mean, I don't have a problem
necessarily with her hands being unshackled so that she can
write and be able to look at documents.

But in terms of

ordering her to be completely unshackled, again, you're
asking me to sort of stick my fingers into the corrections
arena and tell the deputies and/or the USP transport
individuals, how she needs to appear and if we were talking
about a jury trial I think the arguments you've made or
position you've taken would make sense but in this context,
I'm not sure that I want to compromise security in any way by
ordering that simply for comfort reasons.
MR. MARTINEZ:

I understand and I understand your

reluctance to direct the county sheriffs on how they should
transport Ms. Brown.

I guess my position is that once Ms.

Brown is in the courtroom you do have jurisdiction over what
goes on in your courtroom and at that point is when we'd ask
that she be unshackled and allowed to appear before Your
Honor in your courtroom unshackled and in civilian clothes.
THE COURT: Okay, I'll give that some thought at
18
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1
2

least for purposes of (inaudible).
MR. MARTINEZ:

Your Honor, I brought two copies so

3 ! one could be taken by Mr . Reed and faxed to the Department of
4
5

Corrections.
THE COURT :

Ms. Brown, here's what I'm going to do

6

on the reques t that you be dressed out in civil ian clothes

7

and unshackled.

8

always feel some hesitation and concern that I'm opening the

9

door for other individuals to make a similar request and the

Whenever I'm asked to deviate from policy, I

10

problem that you get into is where do you draw that line?

I

11

mean, if I do it for you and someone else comes in and says

12

the same thing, Well, we were in the building and we happened

13

to pop into your court and we saw Ms. Brown and you know,

14

whatever the situation is and now I'm being asked, you're the

15

precedent and now I've got to apply that in other instances.

16

I recognize the need for you to be able to write notes and

17

look at documents and I guess in that respect I'm fine with

18

your hands being unshackled.

19

mean, in terms of your civilian clothes versus your inmate

20

clothes, I think I'm going to defer to the deputies to make

21

that determination.

22

to have no influence on me whatsoever and, of course, I know

23

that's not the concern but I don't think I want to use

24

comfort as a basis upon which to allow that to occur because

25

comfort really opens the door to a lot of options with other

In terms of how the jail - I

In this particular instance it's going

19
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1

individuals who appear in front of me.

2

that's how I'm going to handle that issue.

3
4

Whose going to speak to the Motion for
Reconsideration?

5
6

So, in any event,

Mr. Sullivan?

MR. SULLIVAN:

Just one word?

(Laughter).

More than one word but

I'm not going to take a lot of time.

7

THE COURT:

May I ask you some questions as we go

8

through this without appearing as though I'm trying to in

9

some way derail you?

10

MR. SULLIVAN:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SULLIVAN:

I welcome that, Your Honor.

Okay.
Thank you, Your Honor, may it please

13

the Court, counsel, as the Court knows, our Motion to

14

Reconsider is directed at the portion of the Court's summary

15

judgment ruling that relates to ineffective assistance of

16

counsel.

17

made the assumption that information that was known or should

18

have been known by Ms. Brown's lawyers during the prosecution

19

were, in fact, in the possession or should have been in the

20

possession of petitioner in the sense that they were imputed

We believe that the Court's ruling on that issue

21 I to the petitioner.

So, in my view the principle question

22

that we present to the Court today is whether the knowledge

23

of petitioner's trial counsel may be imputed to petitioner

24

for purposes of the PCRA statute of limitations and Section

25

107, Sub 1 and Sub 2 of the PCRA.
20
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Let me make it clear, Your Honor, and I say with
the utmost respect, that we disagree with the rest of the
Court's summary judgment on the PCRA issues and we believe
that for the same reasons that I'm arguing today in relation
to ineffective assistance of counsel that the other portions
of the Court's rulings were in error.

In other words, I

think the Court assumed that Ms. Brown should have been
imputed with the knowledge that was held or should have been
held by her lawyers as to the other grounds on which we based
our claims under the PCRA.

We raise the issue in relation to

ineffective assistance of counsel in this motion because we
believe it is especially unfair to hold petitioner
accountable for information her counsel should have had in
relation to the competence of counsel's representation during
the trial phase of this case.
THE COURT:

That was not - if that's what came

through to you in terms of the language of the ruling, that
was not the way that I analyzed it.

I did not, in my mind,,

take the position that Ms. Brown comprehended the legal
significance of the evidentiary facts that were in her
possession.

So if I suggested to you that my view was she

understood or should have understood the legal significance,
that's not the position I took.

The position I took was that

there was evidence in the record that she was aware of Bobby
Sheen and Sylvan Bassett and certain facts related to those
21
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individuals as they sort of dovetail to Bobby Sheen.

And so

she may not have known everything, but she knew information
about Bobby Sheen and had discussed that with her trial
counsel.

So my view as she knew about Bobby Sheen, she knew

about Sylvan Bassett.

Then the question becomes should she

have known about other information through the exercise of
reasonable diligence?

And that's where it became a little

murkier for me because there's no explanation anywhere of
what reasonable diligence constitutes and maybe you can help
me —
MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

I hope I will be able to -

- I mean, what is that?

MR. SULLIVAN:

I will address that specifically in

a moment if I may and what I'd like to do is just look at the
statute for a moment.

We believe the statute of limitations

is clear that limitations accrue not when trial counsel knew
of evidentiary facts or information that could have been put
into evidence or a police investigation, but when petitioner
knew and what we're talking about here —
THE COURT:

Or should have known.

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

I'm looking right at it.

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

No.

I'm looking at -

107(e) says, "The (inaudible)

petitioner knew or should have known."
22
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MR. SULLIVAN:

I'm looking at 107 - no, you're

true, you're exactly right.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. SULLIVAN: It says for purposes of this section,
the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following
dates and then we have A, B, C, and D, and then we have E,
the date on which petitioner knew or should have known - the
court is exactly right - in the exercise of reasonable
diligence of evidentiary facts on which the petition is
based.
The legislature clearly knew how to refer to the
knowledge of petitioner or her counsel and the circumstances
under which she's held responsible for information that her
counsel had.

We know that because Section 104-1 (e) says

exactly that.

You remember Section 104, Your Honor, is the

listing of the grounds for a PCRA claim and you have grounds
A, B, C, and D.

D is petitioner had ineffective assistance

of counsel and then the next ground is E, newly discovered
material evidence exists that requires the Court to vacate
the conviction.

This is the ground, Your Honor, that no

reasonable trier of fact could have reached the verdict of
guilty and if you look at E-l, it says neither petitioner nor
petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time and
that as a disqualifier under that particular ground but not
under the ground for petitioner had ineffective assistance of
23
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counsel and if you look, for example, at Section 106 of the
Act, 106-1 says the person is not eligible for relief under
this chapter upon any ground that, and then if you look at C,
could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal.
Then if you look at sub-3, it says not withstanding
Subsection 1-C, a person may be eligible for relief on the
basis that the ground could not have been but was not raised
at trial or appeal if the failure to raise that ground was
due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
And the point I want to make is the PCRA at various
points makes a distinction between what the petitioner knew
and what counsel knew and sometimes it joins those things
together to disqualify relief under certain circumstances but
not always and Section 107 (e) is one of those instances where
it doesn't join them together.
I'd also just refer the Court to - and I don't
intend to get into the case, but in the Currier case which we
have cited there was a statute of limitations that I guess
was the predecessor to the PCRA statute of limitations that
talked specifically about what counsel or the petitioner knew
and so the point I would make is that the legislature
definitely knew how to distinguish between those two.
We think, Your Honor, it would be manifestly unfair
for the Court to impute knowledge of counsel to petitioner in
the context.

That was the message we think of the Currier
24
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case.

That was the message of the Adams case which we cited

to the Court and we cited those cases to the Court not
because they were procedurally right on point with this case,
but because in those cases the Court of Appeals in the case
of Currier and the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Adams
made it really clear that you can only go so far in imputing
information that is in the possession of counsel to a person
who is incarcerated, who does not have legal training and in
those cases the courts dealt specifically with the question
of whether a person who is a petitioner should be presumed to
know of the ineffective assistance of the petitioner's
counsel during the trial phase, the appellate phase —
THE COURT:

I agree with you on that point clearly,

I don't disagree with you.

I think it would be absurd logic

to think that someone untrained whose sitting in a jail or in
a prison would have the legal training or legal understanding
to be able to say, Okay, I have this basket of facts over
here and I understand that that probably equates to
ineffective assistance of counsel.
statute of limitations requires.
there be an understanding.

But that's not what the
It doesn't require that

It simply says that the date on

which she knew or should have known in the exercise of
reasonable diligence of evidentiary facts, just the facts, it
doesn't say anything about having an understanding of those
facts.

So it seems to me if I'm reading the statute narrowly
25
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as it's written, the statute of limitations sub-E, all she
has to know about is the facts.
MR. SULLIVAN:
now.

And let me address that issue right

We believe that Debra Brown could not possibly have

learned of her counsel's ineffective assistance in 2008 and —
THE COURT:

2008 or 1998?

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

I'm sorry, until 2008, until 2008.

Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN:

And the argument that was made in

the State's brief was that her mere presence - I'm going to
talk about Bobby Sheen in a second but the argument that we
see in the State's memorandum in opposition to our motion to
reconsider, was that her mere presence at trial was enough to
appraise her of the facts that support a claim for .
ineffective assistance but the point I would make, Your
Honor, is that she didn't know what she didn't know at the
time.

So she didn't know what evidence her lawyers failed to

present.

She had no information on the basis of which to

assess her lawyer's performance on her behalf.

She is a

person of relatively limited education. She did not finish
high school, she was incarcerated continuously from 2004 to
the present and we believe that at least there is a disputed
issue of material fact on that issue.
And let's talk specifically about the issue of
Bobby Sheen.
26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

THE COURT:

Before you do that, let me just clarify

2

one thing.

3

she didn't know what evidence her attorneys did not present.

4

She knew Bobby Sheen was a suspect. She knew that that person

5

was not advanced as a possible suspect at trial.

6

there was some evidence that she discussed with her trial

7

counsel that she knew wasn't presented at trial, whether she

8

agreed or disagreed, there was some evidence that she was

9

aware of that she knew didn't come out at trial.

10

You said she didn't know what she didn't know,

MR. SULLIVAN:

So I mean,

That part is true but that's not

11

decisive we don't think.

Her information about Bobby Sheen

12

was the fact that he was evicted a few weeks before the

13

murder, that she and Lael Brown cleaned out the apartment,

14 I that Bobby Sheen was unhappy about the circumstance, that
15

Bobby Sheen owed Lael Brown some money and that she told her

16

counsel and told the police that Bobby Sheen was one tenant

17

that was an enemy of Lael Brown.

18

and that Your Honor,

She did not know however -

that was the last she heard of Bobby

19 I Sheen.

20

THE COURT:

Tell me when, remind me of the timing

21 I of this.

I recall in her deposition, Ms. Brown indicating

22

that she had discussed with her lawyers information that had

23

been derived from Sylvan Bassett that he had, Sylvan Bassett

24

had information regarding the location of the gun.

25 I

MR. SULLIVAN:

She knew, she heard - and I've.
27
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talked to her recently about this, she can't remember where
she heard about Sylvan Bassett, but what she knew about
Sylvan Bassett back in 1994, 1995 time frame was that
somebody had said that he had information about the location
of the gun and that's it.

She knew nothing about a

conversation between Sylvan Bassett and Bobby Sheen.

She

knew nothing - or that Bobby Sheen was a person who'd spoke
with Sylvan Bassett and disclosed that he wanted to get rid
of a weapon that was identical to the murder weapon, or that
Bobby Sheen had a roll of bills that was like the one that
could have been stolen.

She did not know any connection

between Bobby Sheen and the blue and white Bronco that was
seen at the scene of the murder at the time of the murder.
She didn't know —
THE COURT:

So therein lies my dilemma, Mr.

Sullivan, is I concede for the sake of our discussion that
she didn't know these things.

But the statute takes it one

step further and says that she - well, I'm phrasing it
differently, she knew or should have known through the
exercise of reasonable diligence.

So therein lies the

dilemma for the Court because in some instances she knew
about information, in others she didn't.

But if she knew

about Bobby Sheen, if she knew about Sylvan Bassett, then the
question I entertain is why could she not, through the
exercise of reasonable diligence discovered some of this
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additional information that you're now telling me she didn't
know about?
MR. SULLIVAN:

Let me ask a question rhetorically,

what could she do besides ask her lawyers and every time she
- we have testimony from her at her deposition and she will
testify in this Court that every time she asked her lawyers
what was going on,'how's the investigation going, what's
happening, they told her to mind her own business, make sure
her testimony was what she wanted it to be and they would
handle the investigation, they would handle the defense of
her case.

She received no information, no information about

the investigation that her lawyers conducted.

When there was

no mention of Bobby Sheen, she didn't know why that happened
and she didn't have the ability as a prisoner, as a person
who was incarcerated since a year before her trial, a year
before her trial, she didn't have the ability to do her own
investigation independent of her lawyers.
In addition to that, Your Honor, she didn't know
anything about the nature of the police investigation.

We

think one of the shortcomings of counsel in this case
assuming they knew about it, assuming there was, in fact, an
open door policy at the Cache County Prosecutor's Office, she
had no idea about the shoddiness of the Logan Police
investigation.

She didn't know that there was a bloody

handprint that could only have been made by the perpetrator
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1

of the crime that was destroyed by the Logan City Police

2

without any analysis, without any photography.

3

know that when witnesses testified that there was no sign of

4

forced entry and that the windows were all painted shut, that

5

in fact, one of the police officers who was first on the

6

scene opened a window because it was too warm.

7

know that no blood evidence was taken.

8

there was no effort to interview Bobby Sheen.

9

know that there was really no effort to match up the owner of

10

the blue and white Bronco, whoever that may have been, with a

11

real person.

12

police records there were two people who claimed to have seen

She didn't

She didn't

She didn't know that
She didn't

She didn't know, for example, that according to

13 I Lael Brown alive on Saturday afternoon.

She didn't know any

14

of this stuff and so she had no basis on which to assess the

15

competence, the performance of her lawyers.

16

upon her lawyers to tell her all of these things, assuming

She had to rely

17 I they had the information in the first place and that's the
18

reason why we believe that it is especially unfair for the

19

Court to rule against us on our claim of ineffective

20

assistance of counsel because she didn't know what she didn't

21

know and therefore she had no basis upon which to assess the

22

competence of her lawyers.

23

Now, what these folks say, the State says is well,

24

you're still too late because you learned this stuff when you

25

finally got records from the Cache County prosecutor's - from
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1

the Logan City Police and those records came in 2008 and then

2

more records came as a result of a subpoena after we filed

3

the case in April of 2009 and what we say on that, Your

4

Honor, is first of all it's irrelevant what the Rocky

5

Mountain Innocense Center did and when in relation to Section

6

107 because it's what the petitioner knew or should have

7 J known and you can't - I mean, you have to understand that the
8

Rocky Mountain Innocense Center doesn't just waltz into a

9

police department and get records.

They have to build a

10

relationship of trust and there was a certain point in time

11

when finally the Logan City Police decided that they would

12

turn over records and that was in July 2008 and that's when

13

we found out that there had been no effort to interview Bobby

14 I Sheen and that's when we found out that there had been a
15

complete mishandling of the police investigation that was

16 I never developed as a defense in this case, never developed.
17

And if it had been, it would have been a different outcome.

18

So -

19 I
20

THE COURT:

(Inaudible) scenario under this statute

of limitations where you find that the petitioner as Ms.

21 | Brown was situated in this case, should have known through
22

the exercise of reasonable diligence.

I mean, it sounds to

23

me like the argument you're making would in effect eviscerate

24

the statute of limitations because counsel like yourself

25

would always be able to come in and say, petitioner didn't
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know and couldn't have known because the petitioner was
limited to only that information that her counsel provided to
her and if her counsel didn't provide the information to her,
then there's nothing that she could have done.

So I guess

I'm just wondering how this statute of limitations would ever
have application.
MR. SULLIVAN:

I think it would have application in

lots of different instances where there is a real
relationship between counsel and a petitioner and where there
is a demonstrated sharing of information and where a
strategic decision has been made, for example, by a
petitioner not to present a particular piece of evidence,
where the petitioner herself can be shown to have know about
a series of facts concerning the nature of the police
investigation, or she had access to police files or she had
access during her period before incarceration to police
officers themselves where they actually shared information
that she chose not to present.

I mean, I can think of lots

of situation where that would occur.
But let me focus specifically on the issues the
Court has before it on this motion which is on ineffective
assistance of counsel.

What we're talking about here is a

woman who has to rely on what her lawyer tells her and if her
lawyer doesn't tell her anything about an investigation, then
she has to rely upon them and she has no way of knowing, she
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cannot reasonably be held with knowledge of shortcomings in
her lawyer's performance.

I mean, the failure to present

evidence on the shoddiness of the police investigation is a
perfect example.

Deb Brown was not privy to whatever

happened at the Logan City Police and how they investigated
the crime. Until 2008, she had no reason to have access to
the documents that we now have.

Now, we can debate about

whether counsel did and that will be part of the presentation
about whether counsel in fact had.

In fact, there are

important documents that were never Bates stamped and that we
know were not turned over to anybody until 2 008 but beyond
that, when you're talking about ineffective assistance of •
counsel you're really, it really becomes much more difficult
we believe for anybody to say that Deb Brown should have had
information concerning her lawyer's ineffective assistance.
I want to emphasize, Your Honor, that our argument
on ineffective assistance is for the most part an alternative
argument and we couched it in that way.

The Court knows that

we don't believe that crucial parts of the police files were
turned over to the attorneys for Deb Brown in the 1994-95
time frame.

We believe that, and we believe we'll be able to

show at trial that they weren't, that important facts weren't
turn over.
But the Court now has ruled that counsel knew or
should have known about the inadequacies of the police
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investigation, knew or should have known about the
implication of Bobby Sheen, knew or should have known about
the time of death issues that we have in this case and if
that's the case - we don't believe it is - but if that's the
case as the Court has now ruled, then they certainly didn't
present it at trial because they didn't even dispute time of
death really here and they didn't really, certainly Bobby
Sheen was never an issue, the link between Bobby Sheen and
the blue and white Bronco, none of that was an issue and the
missing bank statements.

I mean, evidence was presented at

trial that the only bank statements missing were the ones
that Ms. Brown forged.

Not true.

We had a detective who

testified in a deposition that there were many other bank
statements missing.

Now, that wasn't brought out at trial.

Could counsel have found it out?

I guess so, maybe if they

had had access to the particular officer, Detective Ridler,
maybe they could have but they certainly didn't present it at
trial and Ms. Brown had to rely upon her lawyers to do
exactly that.
Unless the Court has questions, I'll submit it.
THE COURT:

The only question that I'm still

struggling with is if, I mean, it seems like under this
statute of limitations requiring petitioner to bring an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim within one year of
either knowing or should have known in the exercise of
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reasonable diligence of the evidentiary facts, it seems like
the end run around this statute is dor/1 tell her, if your
trial counsel, anything, and if your post-conviction counsel
don't tell her anything, leave her in the dark and then she
can come in and say I didn't know and I shouldn't have known
and, in fact, I couldn't have known and then you'd never be
able to impose the one-year statute of limitations and
therein is where I'm saying, okay, what should she have to
do?

You're saying she's limited by counsel, but if as you

point out counsel is not having this full and complete
discussion with her, that doesn't take away the requirement
that she engaged in reasonably diligent efforts, that she be
a diligent litigant.

And so my question is, if that scenario

exists as you've described it, what is she required to do?
Anything?
MR. SULLIVAN:

Well, I think every case is a little

bit different and I think what we learn from cases like
Currier and Adams and other cases where there are ineffective
assistance of counsel claims is that there are plenty of
ineffective assistance claims that are clear at an early
stage.

I mean, for example if a lawyer fails to file a

notice of appeal within 30 days, the petitioner can't wait
for 10 years to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.

I mean, that would be ridiculous.
And there are other examples.

I mean, if a, if a
35
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1

petitioner wants to testify and the lawyer at trial will not

2

allow the petitioner to testify at the criminal conviction

3

hearing, then the petitioner can't wait for 10 years to bring

4

that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the basis

5

is because the petitioner herself was not permitted to

6

testify in her own defense.

7

of examples where ineffective assistance claims are obvious

8

or with even a limited amount of due diligence they can be

9

discovered.

But this is not one of those.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. SULLIVAN:

12

And so I could think of dozens

What What we have here, if I may, Your

Honor?

13

THE COURT: Yes.

14

MR. SULLIVAN:

What we have here, Your Honor, is a

15

series of facts that only became evident to anybody really in

16

2008 as a result of police records being turned over to the

17

Rocky Mountain Innocense Center which were then analyzed.

18

can debate about whether counsel saw them at the time but

19

there is no doubt that this person didn't see them.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes.

22

THE COURT:

We

So RMC enters in 2002.

And begins this process and nothing

23

happens with regard to the uncovering of evidentiary facts

24

that give rise to this ineffective assistance of counsel

25

claim for six years and I guess I'm wondering, even if, as
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1

you point out Ms. Brown was limited in terms of what she

2

could accomplish with trial counsel when the Rocky Mountain

3

Innocense Center came on board in 2002 and began discussing

4

with Ms. Brown the case and what had happened and I have to

5

assume there was a discussion about'evidence that was

6

presented and perhaps evidence that wasn't presented.

Why

7 I would it be fair to say that it was reasonably diligent for
8

six years to go by before this information is acquired?

9
10

MR. SULLIVAN:

investigation were about DNA evidence.

11 J
12

Because the initial phases of the

THE COURT:

But that was your choice.

I guess what

I'm saying, no one precluded RMIC from advancing an

13 I investigation into ineffective assistance of counsel
14

simultaneously with DNA.

That was just the choice that was

15

made by RMIC.

16

anything that precluded Ms. Brown and her post-conviction

17

counsel from uncovering this well before 2008?

My point though goes back to was there

18

MR. SULLIVAN:

19

have testimony on that.

20

witness.

Well, Your Honor, we're going to
That's going to be our first

It's going to be Jensie Anderson and she is going

21 I to testify about - we already have her declaration before the
22

Court - she is going to testify about the course of that

23

investigation, the difficulties in the investigation, how

24

long it took to get a copy of the trial transcript to

25

understand what happened at trial; how long it took to obtain
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1

the cooperation of the Logan City Police to turn over records

2

and that occurred after a long period of effort and

3

culminated in 2008 in turning over those records.

4

records were the key.

5
6

The

Another thing that was a key was Sylvan Bassett.
Sylvan Bassett came forward through a series of contacts in

7 J which Rocky Mountain Innocense Center people including
8

students had investigated who else may have had some

9

information and Sylvan Bassett was interviewed by

10

recollection is in 2008 and he told them, the Court knows

11 I what his story is and what he told Rocky Mountain Innocense
12

Center investigators.

None of this relates to what Ms. Brown

13 I knew or should have known during the period between her
14

incarceration in September 1994 and 2008 because she's out

15

there at the Utah State Prison or before that in the Cache

16

County Jail without access to anything, without access to

17

police records or anything else, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you Mr. Sullivan.

19

MR. SULLIVAN:

20

THE COURT:

Ms. Riley?

21 J

MS. RILEY:

Your Honor, it's the State's position

Thank you, Your Honor. .

22

that this Court can simply decide not to reconsider.

23

a matter of discretion with the Court and you can just say no

24

thanks, I don't want to reconsider and I'm not going to. .

25

That's

In her reply memorandum petitioner misstates what
38
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the State's argument is in one small portion wh ere it says
that the State's argument is that the Court may only
reconsider if its prior ruling wa:3
that ' s not what we were arguing.
within the Court's discretion.

C l early

erroneous a nd

Our argument .is that it is

Now, the only time it might

be an abuse of discretion not to reconsider are when certain
circumstances occur and there are three specific ones that
the case law mentions and those include when there's been an
intervening change of controlling authority; when new
evidence has become available; or when the Court is convinced
that it's prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work
a manifest injustice.
So the State's position is that those first two
circumstances don't exist at all here.
possibly exist is that third one.

The only that could

So what the State is

saying is that the Court doesn't have to reconsider at all
because - and it wouldn't be an abuse of discretion not to
reconsider because the prior decision was not clearly
erroneous, basically that's the State's argument.

However,

even if this Court chooses to reconsider, the State's'
position is that still should not change its decision because
even when you reconsider and look at the arguments petitioner
is raising, there is not a basis to change the summary
judgment decision.

In its Motion to Reconsider, petitioner

argues that her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
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did not accrue until 2008 when she first learned of her trial
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness or at the very least, that
there are disputed issues of material fact as to when she
learned of her counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.
First, it's the State's position that those
specific arguments were never made before the ruling on
summary judgment and that that reason alone is sufficient to
not reconsider, that the decision could not have been clearly
erroneous for not considering those assertions when those
assertions weren't made before the decision was entered.
However, even if those arguments had previously been made,
they would not be a basis for changing the summary judgment
decision because they ignore that crucial part of the statute
of limitations that says should have known in the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
THE COURT:

So let me ask you as I did Mr.

Sullivan, what does that mean?
reasonable diligence mean?

What does the exercise of

I mean, Mr. Sullivan makes a very

persuasive argument that what does a person at the prison
whose not legally trained, expected to do?

She's limited or

- an inmate is limited by what her counsel divulges to her.
An inmate is limited by what her counsel discusses with her
in terms of explaining strategic decisions, things of that
nature and if she's unaware of information, unaware of the
strategy, simply told focus on your trial testimony, that's
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1

all you need to worry about, we'll take care of everything

2

else, how then should she have known through the exercise of

3

reasonable diligence?

4

what I'm trying to answer in my mind?

5

reasonable diligence for someone situated as she was?

6

MS. RILEY:

What would you have her do I guess is
What would be

Let start by saying first of all, I

7 J think part of considering what reasonable diligence is, is
8

what any normal, average person in that situation could and

9 I should done.
10

THE COURT

Normal, average inmate?

11 I

MS. RILEY

Yes.

12 I

THE COURT

Okay.

13 I

MS. RILEY

And that a normal, average inmate, most

i

14

of them frankly are poor and not extremely well educated and

15 I they're incarcerated.

But a claim of ineffective assistance

16

of counsel is not some unusual, exotic claim that's really

17

complicated and hardly ever raise..

18

petitioners file post-conviction all the time asserting

19

ineffective assistance of counsel.,

20

that doesn't raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial

21 I or appellate counsel.

In fact pro se

In fact, I seldom see one

And there are probably a lot of

22 j defendants, prisoners sitting out at the prison right now
23

thinking, why did I get convicted?

Why did I lose my appeal?

24

And then what they think to themselves is, maybe it was

25

something my attorney did wrong.

Maybe if I'd had a better
41
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attorney I might not have been convicted.

So/ the

possibility of ineffective assistance of counsel is usually
one of the first things considered or investigated when
considering what to do next and whether to file a postconviction petition.
THE COURT: So is that the standard then, because in
your experience lots of inmates file these ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, I should therefore find that
Ms. Brown should have?
MS. RILEY:

No, I think what I'm saying is that a

prisoner sitting out at the prison thinking about what
happened, how did I get here, why am I here, what can I do
about it next, that that is a reasonable thing for them to
consider, I wonder what my counsel did?

In her reply

petitioner says that every time she asked counsel questions,
she was told just to worry about her own testimony, not what
trial counsel was up to.

Again, first, that's a new claim

petitioner hasn't asserted before.

But second, that's an

issue that could easily have been timely raised.

If

petitioner thought she was having communication problems with
her counsel, she could have raised that at trial and she
certainly could have raised it in a post-conviction petition.
For example, all she would have had to do is file a postconviction petition, claiming that she received ineffective
assistance of counsel because her counsel wouldn't answer her
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1

questions or her counsel wouldn't appraise her of what their

2

trial strategy was or her counsel didn't present evidence

3

about Bobby Sheen.

4

required.

5

Procedure, there's a (inaudible) post-conviction petition

6

there.

7

asserting post-conviction is a claim of ineffective

8

assistance of counsel.

Brief assertions like that are all that's

And if you look at 447 in the Rules of Civil

One of the claims it lists as possibility for

9

Now, if she'd asserted any kind of claim like that

10

about a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, that's a

11

claim that could have been timely investigated and timely

12

dealt with while her trial and appellate counsel were still

13 J alive.

And investigating that claim at that point would

14

likely have brought to light the various issues that she's

15

now attempting to raise.

16

do that, but she didn't.

17

She had an entire year in which to

She did, however, eventually file a petition for

18

DNA testing and that is relevant here.

Now, we think that

19

was even too late but even assuming solely for purpose of

20

argument that she couldn't have discovered any of her claim

21 I by herself, certainly by the time that she acquired counsel
22

through the Rocky Mountain Innocense Center, and they began

23

investigating her case, that's a point at which through the

24 I exercise of reasonable diligence, they could have discovered
25

the very things that were discovered here.
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Now, as far as I'm aware, the Logan Police
Department turned over their files when they were asked to
which says to me if they'd been asked to sooner, that they
would have turned them over then.
THE COURT:

Well, I didn't remember from the

materials any allegation being made - and maybe I overlooked
it - that the Logan City Police Department dragged its feet
or in someway delayed in turning over the materials that were
requested and so I did have that very question, why did it
take so long to request the information and I thought, well,
maybe I missed something here.

I mean, it's not that there

isn't a ton of material in this box next to me and I might
have overlooked something but you're confirming my
understanding that there's been no claim of that; is that
right?
MS. RILEY:

That's my understanding, Your Honor and

certainly we all know these things take time and sometimes it
might not be the top priority and there can be issues there
but that's why they get a whole year and that's why the
statute in the old Currier case which was only three months
and a very rigid statute with no tolling exceptions or
interest of justice exceptions was struck down because they
determined that three months was not sufficient.

But a year

has been upheld, the federal courts use a year, a lot of
states use a year.

A year has been determined to be
44
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reasonable.
THE COURT:

But there was no interest of the

restoration of justice exception.
MS. RILEY:

Correct, but there is a tolling

provision which —
THE COURT:

Right.

MS. RILEY:

- is very similar to the federal

provision.
Now, one other thing I wanted to touch on had to do
with the language of the statute itself and issues about
knowledge being imputed to the petitioner.

First of all I

want to state that petitioner is mistaken if what she's
asserting is that her counsel's knowledge is not imputed to
her because it is.

Utah case law is very clear.

One of the

cases cited a lot is VonHaech vs. Thomas which is a Court of
Appeals case from 1993 where it states, "An attorney is the
agent of the client and knowledge of any material fact
possessed by the attorney is imputed to the client."

So, any

facts, any material facts that counsel knew, the knowledge of
those facts is imputed to petitioner.
THE COURT:

Okay, but now you're taking me back

over to Mr. Sullivan's side of the equation, that seems
manifestly unfair.
MS. RILEY:

Well, what's not imputed to her is

legal knowledge or what counsel did with those facts.

In
45
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other words —
2 I

THE COURT:

But how can she appreciate that there's

3 I been ineffective assistance if she doesn't know all of the
4 I information that her trial counsel is not presenting, or if
5

she's not aware of the things out there that should be

6

pursued that aren't being pursued?

7

it flows from counsel to her, if her counsel are dropping the

8

ball then in essence what you're saying is that runs to her,

9

she's dropping the ball.

10

MS. RILEY:

I mean, when you say that

Yet, what can she do about it?

Well, she can investigate.

She can ask

11

her own attorney questions and if they don't appropriately

12

answer or respond she can file a claim of ineffective

13

assistance of counsel.

14

Now, there is some case law talking about what if

15

counsel affirmatively lies to her?

In other words, she asks

16

questions and they tell her a lie?

Well, then obviously the

17

claim doesn't start to run until she finds out that that was

18

a lie.

But she can't simply wait and do nothing and then

19 I years later begin to investigate and then file a post20

conviction petition asserting that the claim arises when she

21 I finally began to investigate and finally discovered some of
22

this stuff or finally realized that information she and/or

23

counsel knew, that the way it was handled or dealt with was

24

ineffective assistance of counsel.

25

is clear about that.

And I think the statute

I think that the portions of the
46
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statute Mr. Sullivan read, it's important to remember that
they're not always, they don't always proceed together in
that.

There's a section that talks about a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel and there are plenty of
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that don't have
anything to do with newly discovered evidence and then
there's the section that has to do with newly discovered
evidence and lots of claims of newly discovered evidence
don't have anything to do with ineffective assistance of
counsel, because if it's really newly discovered evidence
then counsel couldn't have known about it.
So what we're talking about here are facts and
information that - first of all, the State's position is
don't really qualify as newly discovered evidence because
they were or should have been known and then a separate claim
of was trial counsel or appellate counsel ineffective based
on what they did or didn't do with the information they had?
So the part that she had a duty to investigate was, what
happened at my trial?

Was there anything that did or didn't

happen that my counsel did wrong, that was ineffective?
Now, I also want to clarify a couple of things that
Mr. Sullivan said.

For example, she did know about the

police investigation.

She sat through the preliminary

hearing. She was present at her owrn trial. She heard police
testimony about what they did or didn't do including
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testimony from my recollection about the bloody handprint
because counsel did bring in information about it that it
wasn't photographed or analyzed.

They knew that the Luminal

had been sprayed and that there was blood there and that was
all that had been done.
know about.

So information like that she did

She could have asked her attorney questions and

information about that.

The fact that a petitioner has an

attorney doesn't mean that she doesn't have any obligation if
she wants to proceed later, to collaterally challenge her
case and that is another very important thing here to talk
about is that this is not a criminal case or a part of the
criminal case.

This is a collateral civil action where the

burden is on the petitioner.

The petitioner, if she wants to

proceed with a post-conviction claim, has'the affirmative
burden to go forward and proceed with that claim and she has
the burden under the statute to exercise reasonable diligence
and file any claim within one year when she knows about the
underlying facts that are the basis of that claim or by
exercising a reasonable diligence, could have known those
facts.

And that's our position here, Your Honor, that if she

had exercised reasonable diligence in that one year, that she
could have discovered the facts that are the underlying basis
of her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
THE COURT:

How would she do that?

MS. RILEY:

Write a letter to her attorney, ask
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questions, write a letter to the Logan Police Department,
write a letter to the prosecutor, ask for copies of her file,
ask for a copy of her entire file from her defense counsel.
Petitioners do that all the time and it's not that difficult
and if counsel provided the file she can read through it. She
can ask for help from the contract attorneys at the prison.
Now frankly, they don't give a lot of time to these pro se
petitioners but it within their contract obligations to help
them file the initial petition.
If her counsel refused, never responded to the
letter, prosecutors never responded, no one responded, then
that alone could be a basis for filing a petition saying, you
know, I'm attempting to proceed with my claim but my counsel
won't cooperate with me and, you know, it's a violation that
I can't get the information I need and now I realize that
they never explained the strategy of their case when I went
to trial and simply doing something and getting the process
started would at least provide some information that
reasonable diligence was being asserted.

But what we have

here is, as far as we can tell from this record and from the
information I have, nothing at all happened, petitioner doing
nothing for years and years and years and in that time frame
her trial counsel dying and Bobby Sheen, the person they're
not alleging was the likely suspect or likely perpetrator,
also dying.
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Setting out or underlying the importance of having
a statute of limitations and even before statutes of
limitations, latches were argued, which is if you sit on your
claim, if you rest on your claim and do nothing and it's to
the detriment of the opposing party because if by the time
you do proceed things have happened that cause it to be
impossible or difficult for the other party to proceed, then
you shouldn't be allowed to go forward with your claim and I
think that's the point of the statute of limitations and the
point of the reasonable diligence part of the statute of
limitations is that it requires a petitioner to ask and that
the burden is hers and that she hasn't met that burden here.
So we would ask the Court not to reconsider and even if
reconsideration is given, to not change the summary judgment.
THE COURT:

Okay, thank you Ms. Riley.

Mr. Sullivan, response?
MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

May I respond briefly?

Yes, please.

MR. SULLIVAN:

Your Honor, it is true as Ms. Riley

says, the Court does not have to reconsider at all, it's at
the discretion of the Court and we appeal to the discretion
of the Court to correct what we think is an error in the
Court's ruling.

We did make the argument that newly

discovered evidence, that evidence received in 2008 was the
basis for our ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

We
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made that argument.

We pointed out to the Court in our reply

brief, the portions of our response brief on the motion for
summary judgment where we stated specifically that this was
an issue that we were raising and so we don't think there's
any question about that.
Ms. Riley says that if Ms. Brown had problems with
her lawyers, communication problems with her lawyers she
could have done something about that but I guess what I want
to say to Your Honor is, she didnrt know that there was a
problem.

She thought this was how it was suppose to be.

She

was confronted by her lawyers and she had told them some
information and she asked what was going to happen at trial
and they said, you need to mind your own testimony and get
ready for trial, you leave it up to us.
was a problem.

She didn't know that

She thought that was how it was suppose to be

and I would guess that lots of criminal defendants are in
exactly the same position.
THE COURT:

So when she's convicted and either

shortly thereafter or following the Supreme Court's decision
on the appeal, she sits back and says, this isn't right, this
shouldn't have happened —
MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

That -

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

She sits back -

- sorry.

No, that's okay.

That triggers no
51

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

activity on her part at all?

I guess that's where I'm kind

of a little bit on Ms. Riley's side where she says, Judge,
it's not that she did certain things and we're simply arguing
that's inadequate.

She did nothing.

How can nothing equate

to reasonable diligence?
MR. SULLIVAN:
information that she has.

Because she can only act on the
She knows that she's been

convicted, but let's think of all the things that she doesn't
know.

She doesn't know that Bobby Sheen drove a blue and

white Bronco and had a gun and showed it to somebody and
wanted to get rid of it in 1993.

She doesn't know that the

police never investigated Bobby Sheen.

She doesn't know that

there was not one note of a conversation with Bobby Sheen or
what he might have said in the police file even though their
practice was to keep notes of all of these investigative
interviews.

She doesn't - I mean, there are a whole host of

things that she doesn't know and therefore, as she's sitting
at the Utah State Prison in 1995,, 1996, 1997 and 1998 she
doesn't know on what grounds her lawyers were ineffective
because she doesn't have a base line of information that
would point up those deficiencies and it's not until 2008
when the police file is finally turned over and other
information comes in as the result of an investigation by
people in her interest on the outside that she has that
information and she filed it within one year of that period
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of time.
Now, why couldn't Rocky Mountain Innocense Center
have worked faster?

Well, I may have the year wrong but I

don't think it was formed until

x

99 or 2000.

when it first came into existence.

I think that's

Rocky Mountain Innocense

Center, as you will hear from Jensie Anderson, doesn't just
have one case to deal with.

They get dozens and dozens and

dozens of requests each year and they have a process to sift
through that.

It's become a work in progress.

law students who are assisting.

We now have

It is entirely dependent

with except for one person who is a paid person who is the
Executive Director, everybody is a volunteer, they have to
figure out a time to do it, you know, after their day job
ends.

That includes lawyers and everybody else and so I

guess in a perfect world we would have a system where these
issues could have been raised promptly and we could have
gained the' confidence of the folks at the Logan Police and
gotten the records earlier.

But that's really not the test.

The test is not what Rocky Mountain Innocense should have,
Rocky Mountain Innocense Center should have done sooner, it's
what this person whose sitting out at the prison knew or
should have known at the time and we think that the record
will be clear as trial proceeds, that she had no reason,
absolutely no reason to know of these deficiencies in her
lawyer's performance until 2008 at the very earliest, Your
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Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN:

Let me just say one more word.

Your

Honor, the argument that knowledge should be imputed is
absolutely wrong.

It is wrong under the statute, the statute

shows that the legislature knew how to distinguish between
the knowledge held by lawyers and the knowledge held by
petitioners.
THE COURT:

• ', .
Your position is that they meant to

include lawyers in this, they would have said what petitioner
and/or counsel knew or should have known?
MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

I don't disagree.

MR. SULLIVAN:
kind of situation.
time.

Yes, yes.

And the VonHaete case is not this

I mean, I have read VonHaete for a long

I have read it but my recollection is that it's a

breach of fiduciary duties case or it's a fraud case or it's
both and the situation there is, I don't think it dealt with
the statute of limitations either but it was a civil type
context and not a context in which we're dealing with a
statute that distinguishes, we believe, between what lawyers
know and what petitioners know.
The final thing I'd say, Your Honor, is that this
is an issue on which we ask the Court to be cautious.

We

think there will be at least a disputed issue of material
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fact on the statute of limitations issue as it relates to
everything but especially as it relates to ineffective
assistance of counsel.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you.

I heard reference made that we were going to start
the evidentiary hearing on Tuesday.

Were you not planning on

starting that after, sometime later today?

I guess, in my

mind, I thought we were going to deal with this in the
morning and then maybe begin taking evidence in the
afternoon.

Was that not —
MR. SULLIVAN:

I missed the first part of the

Court's question.
THE COURT:

Just that several of you had mentioned

that we were going to start the evidentiary hearing on
Tuesday.
MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay, you didn't anticipate starting

that at all today, because I guess I came thinking that we
would deal with this issue out of the chute and then once
this - I would recess and take some time to kind of organize
my thoughts, come back in either recess for an hour or a
fixed period of time and then we'd start the trial this
afternoon.

But that's not the plan it sounds like?
55

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

MR. SULLIVAN:

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. NOLAN:

Your Honor -

4

MR. SULLIVAN:

5

MR. NOLAN:

6

That's not what we planned.

We -

Excuse me Alan.

In our conversation,

as I recall on the telephone, there was some discussion about

7 I this and what I recall is that depending on how the Court
8

rules, based on the need to adjust the plan a little bit, and

9

that we weren't planning on doing anything today either.

10

THE COURT:

Okay.

Then it was my misunderstanding.

11 I I was concerned that we wouldn't have enough time and thought
12

that squeezing in an additional half day might help us but

13

that's fine.

14

Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN:

Your Honor, there are some

15 I housekeeping issues if I could just raise them?
16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SULLIVAN:

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SULLIVAN:

20

Please.
Is this a good time to do that?

Yes.
Okay, just a couple.

What we had

intended to do as far as exhibits is concerned is that we

21 I have provided counsel with a binder of all our exhibits.

We

22

will have a binder and we will provide the Court with a

23

binder of all of our exhibits and we're going to have one on

24

the witness stand so the witnesses can flip and then what

25 I we'd like to do as well - and this is only my preference and
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if the Court obviously overrules me - is to have an
electronic screen so that Ms. Brown and everybody can look at
the same document and not have their nose in a book if they
don't want to where the exhibits would be put up on a screen.
THE COURT:

I don't see - I mean, initially my

response is I don't have a problem with that approach.

Maybe

I'm not seeing something that's there that I should be
seeing.

I mean, I can't see why that would be problematic.
MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

I hope it's not.

Maybe I ought to ask Mr. Nolan, Mr.

Reed, Ms. Riley, can you see a problem with'that approach at
all?
MR. NOLAN:

Not at all, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay. .

MR. SULLIVAN:

We have two depositions that will be

put into the record and even though this is a bench trial and
sometimes judges at bench trials don't like to have
depositions read, they're relatively brief and we would like
to read them into the record.

They are two detectives,

Detective Ridler and Detective Wolcott, and so we will plan
to do that.
I would like to give an opening statement.
counsel for the State would like to do that as well.

Maybe
It will

be relatively brief and I would just plan to do that on
Tuesday morning, Your Honor.
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1

THE COURT:

Okay.

2

MR. SULLIVAN:

If the Court does reconsider the

3

ineffective assistance of counsel issue and if Ms. Riley is

4

part of the team that tries the case, we make the request

5

that only one person, one member of the State's legal team

6

cross examine each witness and examine each witness.

7 I

THE COURT:

We —

So if Ms. Riley is approaching it from

8

a completely different vantage point because her PCRA issue

9

is different than what Mr. Reed and Mr. Nolan are dealing

10

with with factual innocense, it seems to me that it would be

11 I fair to at least allow one attorney that's handling factual
12

innocense to examine and allow Ms. Riley to.

I mean, I

13

understand why that could become cumbersome but they're

14

dealing with different legal standards, they're dealing with

15

different evidentiary rules and I just don't know where

16 I they've kind of kept it separate to this point, that it would
17

be fair to say, Okay, Ms. Riley, you know, I know you've

18

handled the PCRA materials, but you're going to have to let

19

Mr. Reed or Mr. Nolan deal with it if they're primarily

20

focusing on factual innocense, they're going to have to take

21 I your stuff as well.
22

MR. SULLIVAN:

Your Honor, I've actually never been

23

in a trial where one party gets two bites at the apple and

24

that's exactly what happens here.

25

obviously who they want to examine a witness.

They get to choose
There's one of
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1

us, there's two of them, they get two chances.

2

unfair.

3
4

THE COURT:
we bifurcated.

I think it's

But we wouldn't be dealing with this if

I mean, if we had two different hearings —

5

MR. SULLIVAN:

6

THE COURT:

Yes, but there's -

No, I'm just saying, if we had two

7 J different hearings, if we had a hearing on the PCRA claims
8

and then we had a separate factual innocense determination

9

hearing, then you would have two attorneys dealing with the

10

issues.

11 . [ . ' • •
12

MR. SULLIVAN:

That probably is true but there is

absolutely no reason to bifurcate, Your Honor, I think - I

13 i mean, this is no different, Your Honor, from a civil case in
14

which you have two separate claims based upon a common law

15

theory and a statutory theory, where the evidentiary standard

16

is different.

I mean, it happens all the time and the idea

17 J that we have to have two separate lawyers from the State to
18

examine each witness because each has responsibility for one

19

claim, it doesn't make any sense to me and I'm not going to

20

make a big deal about it but I just think it's unfair and I

21 | raise it for the Court's consideration.
22
23

THE COURT:

Ms. Riley, Mr. Nolan, once Mr.

Sullivan is done do you want to respond to that last issue?

24
25

Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN:

I'm done with my housekeeping

issues.
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THE COURT :
MR. REED:

Okay, or Mr. Reed?
Thank you, Your Honor and first of a.LI,

with regard t o the deposition, Ms. Riley haid raised <an
obje ction to *that on her as>pect of the casei and depending on
how the Court rules on reconsideration, we' d reserve that
objection.
With regard to the presentation of evidence, I
think it's, clear that the petition to determine factual
innocense and the petition for relief under PCRA are apples
and oranges, standards of proof are different, what the Court
may consider in the case is different and so how are Mr.
Nolan and I to know what's essential in Ms. Riley's mind if
we haven't had some kind of mind meld meeting in the midst of
this and said, okay, we get your case, you get out case and
now everybody is on the same page.

We have proceeded from

the very beginning as if it were two different claims under
two different standards, two different statutes and I
understand and I appreciate Mr. Sullivan's expression that
we're here trying to determine all of this in one proceeding
and let's just take the standard course as we have in all
other standard one proceedings types of action but this isn't
that.

This is something entirely different.

We've never

done this before, we're not sure if this is how it's suppose
to go. We're taking our best shot at it and this is an area
where we think it's appropriate for the Court to allow
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examination or cross examination of a witness on a particular
claim and to allow that examination for both sides as it
relates to the State.
THE COURT: This division of responsibilities has
been present since the outset of this case, is that right,
long before I inherited it from First District?

I mean, this

isn't something that you just decided recently, Ms. Riley is
going to handle the PCRA materials and you're going to handle
factual innocense?

I mean, this has been ongoing, is that

not the case?
MR. REED:
THE COURT:

That is the case, Your Honor.
I think I'm inclined based on the fact

that you've handled it this way thus far, you've responded
separately with regard to the motions that have been filed,
that I'm going to allow Ms. Riley to question witnesses
assuming the Court reconsiders and reinstates the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, I'm going to allow her to
examine witnesses based on her aspect of the case and then
I'll allow one of you gentlemen to examine witnesses based on
the factual innocense determination that's pending.
MR. REED:

Well, Your Honor, thank you, and in that

regard I would suggest to the Court, I'm speaking now for Ms.
Riley without full knowledge but I would expect and we had
talked as team about this before, that we would also like to
present an opening statement and it is likely that not only
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myself but Ms. Riley would like to make that opening as well.
THE COURT:
MR. REED:

That's fine.
As it relates to her portion of the

claims under PCRA.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right, and then Mr.

Martinez, if Mr. Sullivan doesn't saying something in his
opening that you want to supplement, I'll let you do that as
well.

Okay?
MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

That's fair.

Okay.

I'm going to need some time, not

a lengthy amount of time but it would probably be better if I
tell you if I could have an hour to just sit down and review
the materials and my notes and the things that you've
articulated, perhaps we could come back at 10 to noon and
then in that way, if for some reason I feel a little still
like I need some more time, we can break for lunch and I'll
have you back at 1:00.

But I'm hopeful that I can just be

done, give you my decision and then you folks can be on your
way at 10 to noon for lunch and not have to hang around here
longer than you'd like to.

Okay?

That should also I think allow you to receive
lunch.

I don't know what time the jail does lunch but if I

get you —
MS. RILEY:

Your Honor, I do have two other just

minor things if I remain a part of the case; and first is
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1

that I'd request witness exclusion as we proceed to the

2

evidentiary hearing, that witnesses aren't —

3

THE COURT:

You're referring to Rule 615?

4

MS. RILEY:

Yes, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

6

MS. RILEY:

And the second thing is and I raise

7 I this now so they can address it with Ms. Brown if they want
8

to, if the Court reconsiders and we move forward into the

9

evidentiary hearing with the claim of ineffective assistance

10

of counsel, I would ask Ms. Brown to waive on the record any

11 I privilege, any attorney/client privilege as to that claim and
12

I believe that's required by proceeding with the claim of

13 I ineffective assistance of counsel and I would ask her to do
14

that on the record before we proceeded with the actual cross

15

examination.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. SULLIVAN:

18
19
20

Okay.

Any -

I think we waived that already.

She's been examined about her communications with counsel.
THE COURT:

Okay.

like it's an issue then.

21 I back at 10 to noon.

All right.

All right.

It doesn't sound

Then I'll see you folks

We'll be in recess.

22 j

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

23

THE COURT:

Thank you.

All right, let's go back on the record

24

in Debra Brown vs. State of Utah.

This is Case 1009003670.

25

This is the time set for decision on a Motion for
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Reconsideration that was filed by petitioner on the limited
issue of the Court's decision to grant summary judgment on
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court

appreciates and expresses to counsel appreciation for their
detailed patient arguments as they discussed with the Court
the statute, statutes I should say that are applicable in
this particular case.
As I have considered the Court's decision on
summary judgment and specifically the issue regarding the
Court reconsidering it's decision, and at least beyond the
Court's, I suppose, inherent authority to reconsider a
decision that it has made if the Court feels that it's
overlooked something or feels the need to correct an error, I
think the circumstances outlined in Shelton vs. Young are
instructive and helpful to the Court and I think counsel has
addressed those circumstances.
. There's been no claim in this particular case that
there's been an intervening change of controlling authority.
There's been no claim or argument advanced that there's been
new - that new evidence had become available since the
Court's decision.
So the last factor or prong of this analysis
centers around when the Court is convinced that its prior
decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice, those two things being in the conjunctive.

I
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don't think in this particular instance, while it certainly
is arguable that the Court's decision may rise to the level
of working a manifest injustice, that the Court's prior
decision was clearly erroneous.

I suppose at the end of the

day it makes little if any difference whether I actually, as
a matter of procedure grant the motion for reconsideration or
deny it because even for the sake of discussion if I were to
grant it, I am convinced that the decision this Court made
was the correct decision in granting summary judgment and let
me just for the sake of making a record, indicate in the
greater detail some of the reasons why the Court felt that
summary judgment was appropriate on the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.
There was quite a bit of discussion during oral
argument as to what Ms. Brown knew and I don't think the
Court disagrees with Mr. Sullivan when he outlined for the
Court the body of material that Ms. Brown was unaware of.
The problem that the Court perceives as it analyzes 78B(9)
107(2)(e) is that the statute of limitations provision
doesn't just end with the inquiry into what petitioner knew
but goes beyond that into an inquiry of what she should have
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary
facts on which the petitioner is based.
So there are two aspects of this statute of
limitations provision that the Court feels are important.
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1

The first of which is, the should have known component; the

2

second of which is evidentiary facts, not a legal

3

understanding of those facts, not a legal counsel's

4

explanation of why those facts constitute ineffective

5

assistance of counsel, but simply a recognition of the facts

6

or the responsibility to know about the facts if the

7

individual is exercising reasonable diligence.

8

particular case, it would be helpful perhaps to review just

9

in a broad way, the basic procedural history.

10

And in this

Ms. Brown had a trial in this case in 1995 and was

11 I convicted.

The Supreme Court entered it's decision affirming

12

petitioner's conviction on October 24th, 1997.

13

period of time, and, in fact during that period of time,

14

there's no indication whatsoever that either during the

15

pendency of the underlying criminal matter or following

16

conviction, that Ms. Brown communicated with the trial court

17

regarding the discussions she was having with counsel, the

18

fact that she was being told - and I think it's been

19

referenced several times, you know, mind your own business,

20

worry about your testimony, we'll take care of everything

21

else.

22

court that that was of concern to her and perhaps it wasn't

23

of concern to her.

24

that she seems very quiet and soft spoken and maybe that's

25

the reason why she wasn't more assertive in this particular

From that

There was no expression by Ms. Brown to the trial

Perhaps it more a function of the fact

66
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

instance.
There's similarly no evidence that there was
communication with staff counsel at the prison following her
conviction and following the Supreme Court's entry of its
decision affirming her conviction.

There's no evidence of

communication whatsoever with law enforcement, no evidence of
communication with defense counsel, again following her
conviction, following the Supreme Court's affirmance of her
conviction, requesting materials from her defense counsel,
requesting materials from law enforcement, requesting
materials from the county attorney's office and I think it's
been put on the record that the county attorney's office had
an open file policy.

There's no indication that she had

communication with anyone during this period of time.
There also seems to be at least an apparent lack of
communication with post-conviction counsel and the reason for
the Court saying that is that when the Rocky Mountain
Innocense Center entered in this case in 2002 nothing of note
occurred, at least relative to the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim until 2008.
Now Mr. Sullivan explained to the Court a little
bit of what was going on at that time and also explained also
how the Rocky Mountain Innocense Center is set up and those
who honorably donate their time and knowledge and experience
in this area to help individuals like Ms. Brown, but that
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1

aside, there's simply in this Court's view, no basis upon

2

which to find that Ms. Brown was a reasonably diligent

3

litigant when 13 years approximately, the better part of 13

4

years passed with nothing on her part that the Court can

5

pinpoint in terms of pursuing this ineffective assistance of

6

counsel claim.

7

evidentiary facts.

8

individual who was a potential suspect, who was not mentioned

9

during her trial.

She was clearly in possession of some
She knew that there was another

She also knew from the trial itself

10

aspects of the investigation that were lacking in nature.

11

She was in possession of not all, but certainly a large

12

portion of facts that gave her the basis upon which through

13

the exercise of reasonable diligence, to pursue ineffective

14

assistance of counsel claim and that simply did not happen.

15

It is difficult for the Court to comprehend that

16

she could not have known through the exercise of reasonable

17

diligence any sooner than 2008 of the materials that Mr.

18

Sullivan has now presented to the Court I think by way of Ms.

19 I Anderson's affidavit, that were received by Ms. Anderson on
20

behalf of the Rocky Mountain Innocense Center.

Again, it is

21 I noteworthy to the Court that this was an approximately 1322

year period of time and the Court simply cannot conclude that

23

this constitutes the exercise of reasonable diligence.

24 I
25

Now, there was some discussion or at least the
Court perhaps mistakenly, seemed to glean from the arguments
.
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made by Mr. Sullivan that there has to be more than just an
understanding or possession o f evidentiary facts; there has
to beJ an appreciation of the legal sigrlificance of those
facts which did not occur for Ms.- BrowrL until 2008 and in
this Court's view, if an unde rstanding of the legal
significance is the standard - and I don't think it is, and I
don't think the statute of limitations contains language
supporting that, then in my view, the statute of limitations
would in effect be destroyed because any person could come in
and say, Well, I didn't know until the day we filed the
petition and my attorneys explained to me the legal .
significance of all these facts that I knew about but didn't
appreciate the legal significance of and you would never be
able to enforce this one-year statute of limitations.
I think the other aspect of this, there was mention
made and although this isn't the basis for the Court's
decision, I think it's at least worth noting, Ms. Riley, you
mentioned this concept of latches and the challenge that a
litigant who doesn't bring an action in a timely manner
creates for the party on the opposing side.

I think that

point is born out in this particular case, especially when
you consider the fact that as the Court looks at this overall
ineffective assistance of counsel issue, we have because of
this delay, lost Mr. Kane, someone who I think would be
extremely important in this Court's view in determining
69
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1

whether in fact, ineffective assistance of counsel occurred

2

or not.

3

strategic decisions, to give us any indication of what he

4

knew or should have known and I think this illustrates why

5

it's important for the statute of limitations to be adhered

6

to in his particular case.

7

Court will reaffirm I suppose and I'm using that term

8

extremely loosely, its decision granting summary judgment on

9

the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

We don't have Mr. Kane any longer to explain his

And so for those reasons, the

10

And questions?

Clarifications?

11 J

MR. SULLIVAN:

12

THE COURT:

Ms. Riley?

13 I

MS. RILEY:

Nothing, Your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

No questions, Your Honor.

Anything else we need to discuss

15 I before we adjourn?
16

MS. RILEY:

I think the only other thing in light

17

of this ruling, Your Honor, might be some timing on the

18

State's motion to reconsider the motion to bifurcate and like

19 I I say, I'm not concerned about timing except that a ruling be
20

entered before a final ruling on the factual innocense

21 I petition.
22

THE COURT:

Mr. Sullivan?

23

MR. SULLIVAN:

We would prefer to defer the

24 J response to a motion to bifurcate until after the hearing is
25

over next week but that's not essential.

I think our due
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date on the motion to bifurcate is January 31st.

We will

commit to having a response by January 31 or if the Court
wants it earlier, we'll do it then.
THE COURT:

I think your point, Ms. Riley, is that

I need to make a decision on bifurcation before the decision
is made on the factual innocense determination, is that
right?
MS. RILEY:

Yes, Your Honor.

I think even if a

verbal ruling from the bench were made or a memorandum
decision, that would still be all right as long as a final
written appealable order was entered because once that's
entered then this Court loses jurisdiction and it would
simply go to the Court of Appeals and so I think a final
ruling on the motion to bifurcate needs to be entered before
a final written ruling is entered on the factual innocense
part of it.
MR. SULLIVAN:

Your Honor, I'm going to say it just

escapes me why bifurcation is even relevant.
THE COURT:

I'll be honest, I'm not in disagreement

with you but I'm not fully appreciating the appealable order
aspect of this.

Initially I thought it was simply for the

sake of keeping the evidence clean in terms of each
proceedings and I thought once I decide on this issue of
reconsideration, if in fact I stand by my decision and
eliminate Ms. Riley from this process and the whole PCRA
. .
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prong of this hearing, there isn't anything to bifurcate.
MS. RILEY:

Well, Your Honor, just so it's clear to

everyone, I think our position here and the main reason we
want the bifurcation here is to make it clear on appeal that
they are two separate matters for appeal and our concern is
that it's the State's belief that the way the statute reads
now, the petitions have to be filed separately, will in the
future have to be filed separately and proceed separately and
therefore, of course, would go up on appeal separately.

So

we're a little bit concerned that if this goes up on appeal
as one case, it'll come out with some either confusing or
muddied kind of law that will cause problems in the future
when people try to apply that, for instance they try to apply
part of it to a future post-conviction case when really that
part of the case was only referring to the factual innocense
part of the case.

So we're kind of anticipating possible

problems down the road for that and hoping to eliminate them
by having them proceed on appeal as two separate matters and
that's our whole reason for doing it.
MR. SULLIVAN:
it's one case.

The reality, however, Your Honor, is

There are two claims; one with the PCRA, one

under the innocense statute.

They will proceed to the Court,

to a Court of Appeals if there is an appeal, as the same case
and I don't understand what bifurcation accomplishes.
THE COURT:

Well, I don't either.

So I'm glad you
72
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1

don't because I was feeling somewhat alone in that respect

2

and I'm saying that because I'm wrorried I don't understand

3

intellectually the distinction it makes.

4

you're saying as far as two separate petitions but I guess

5

what I was hearing Mr. Sullivan saying, he's reiterated it

6

now, is how is that any different than one civil action that

7 J has multiple claims in it?

I mean, I hear what

And this is just an action that

8

has two different claims in it.

9

or•Supreme Court, whoever it is that reviews this, simply

10
11 J
12

And so the Court of Appeals

analyzes each claim separately.
MS. RILEY:

Well, it's always been our position

from the first that it shouldn't proceed like that, Your

13 J Honor, and of course you know, we lost that on the first
14 ! motion to bifurcate.

But it's still our position that they

15 I were erroneously filed together, they shouldn't have been
16

filed together, the legislature has now corrected that and

17 I changed the statute so that they can't be filed together and
18

have to be dealt with separately and that it would be more

19

clear cut as far as looking at the burdens of proof, looking

20

at the factual evidence presented, looking at what evidence

21 I was admitted and admissible, to have them appear in the
22

Appellate Court as separate matters and —

23

THE COURT:

I guess I -

24 I

MS. RILEY:

I would also say that under Rule, I

25

think it's 54, it talks about - and of course usually the
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1 I losing party would be asking for this.

In other words, if

2 I this were a regular civil case where various parties and
3 | issues were involved and a portion of it was concluded by
4 I summary judgment, the losing party of that summary judgment
5

could ask the Court to designate it as a final order and it

6

could proceed up on appeal.

7

would be happening here if it were bifurcated and it would be

8

designated as a final order to proceed on appeal.

9

that we're the winning party asking for that in case it is

10

And that's essentially what

It's just

appealed, that it would go up as a separate matter.

11 I

THE COURT:

12

MR. SULLIVAN:

13 I 54 (b) .

Okay.
There has been no motion under Rule

The Court has not found there is no just reason for

14

delay and I guess where we are, Your Honor, I have the same

15

concern, the same question as the Court has and I'll

16

reiterate again, we will file our —

17

THE COURT:

On the 31st.

18

MR. SULLIVAN:

- (inaudible) in due course unless

19 I the Court asks us to do otherwise.
20

THE COURT:

No, we'll go ahead and follow that

21 I pleadings schedule and then, Ms. Riley, I'll give you five
22

days after the 31st for your response and then I'll just need

23

to defer as you've asked me to - and I'm not sure I

24

understand the interplay but you suggested to me that I'll

25

need to defer my decision on factual innocense until this
74
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bifurcation issue is resolved; is that right?

I'm not sure I

fully understand why that it the case but I suspect that if I
have some time to review the materials, I will understand.

I

just don't at this point.
MS. RILEY: And obviously our point at this part of
the case is not to separate them for purposes of this hearing
because that's happened already because of the summary
judgment.
THE COURT:

Yes.

MS. RILEY:

But there are are cases out there

talking about bifurcation and talking about that once a
judgment has been entered, the Court's can't go back and
order a bifurcation order and that's what we're trying to
avoid here and the point now is bifurcation to separate the
issues on appeal.

But we think in light of the case law that

a ruling on the bifurcation needs to take place before the
final judgment, otherwise, even if the Court decides to
bifurcate, it can't at that point.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else?

Not from us, Judge.

Okay, thank you folks.

Thank you, Ms. Brown.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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